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This dissertation research focused on the following: 
1. Determined possible vulnerabilities that exist in multi-user kiosks and the computer 
systems that make up multi-user kiosk systems.  
2. Developed an evaluation system and audit checklist for multi-user kiosk systems 
adapted from the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) audit protocols, to address the 
vulnerabilities identified from our research.  
3. Improved the design of a multi-user health kiosk to meet the HIPAA/HITECH 
standards by incorporating privacy and security (P&S) policies.  
4. Explored the feasibility and preliminary efficacy of an intervention to explore the 
magnitude of differences in users’ perceived risk of P&S breaches as well as the 
correlation between perceived risk and their intention to use a multi-user health kiosk.  
A gap analysis demonstrated that we successfully incorporated 91% of our P&S polices 
into the design of a health kiosk that is part of an ongoing, large-scale investigation. This is higher 
than our initial target of 50%.  
Repeated measures ANOVA was performed to analyze baseline and six-month follow-up 
of 36 study participants to measure the magnitude of the change in their perceived risk in response 
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to varied intervention approaches: usual care vs. printed materials vs. printed materials plus brief 
oral explanation. Results from the ANOVA revealed no significant group-by-time interaction 
(Time*Group) F (2, 33) = .27, p=.77, ηp2=.02, a significant main effect of time F (1, 33) = 4.73, 
p=.04, ηp2=.13, and no significant main effect of group F (2, 33) =1.27, p=.30 ηp2=.07. 
Users’ “perceived risk lessened over time (baseline and six-month follow-up), although the 
magnitude of the change was small. We were, however, unable to perform the correlation analysis 
as originally proposed because all kiosk participants included in the analysis intended to use the 
kiosk both at baseline and at six-month follow-up.  
These findings may inform future research into methods aimed at reducing perceived risk 
of P&S breaches and using education and communication to reduce risky behavior by both internal 
and external users of new health IT applications and technologies.  The findings may also provide 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Recent increases in information security and privacy (P&S) breaches have led to more interest in 
and scrutiny of information security issues (Bui, Wang, & Clemons, 2017; Conti, Dehghantanha, 
Franke, & Watson, 2018).  Regulators, security experts, technology developers and academic 
researchers are clamoring to find better ways to protect information (Angst, Block, D’Arcy, & 
Kelley, 2017; Bui et al., 2017; Sezgin, Yıldırım, Yıldırım, & Sumuer, 2018). Criminological 
reports about motivation and decision making among burglars found that offenders are deterred if 
there are signs indicating the presence of an alarm system or a dog (Angst et al., 2017). In 
information technology (IT) security/privacy, the signals could be in the form of policies (security 
education, training, and awareness [SETA] programs), monitoring and detection technologies 
(Angst et al., 2017; Kafali, Jones, Petruso, Williams, & Singh, 2017).  Privacy and security policy 
development is an important part of developing secured technology (Kafali et al., 2017). This 
dissertation focused on P&S policy development as part of the systems/technology development 
cycle to mitigate privacy and security breaches.  
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was developed by Freed Davis in 1980 to study 
factors that influence acceptance of computer technology (Ahlan & Ahmad, 2015). One variable 
that has been added to the extension of TAM is “perceived risk,” which had been identified in 
many studies as one of the primary drivers of technology acceptance by users (Mitzner, Stuck, 
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Hartley, Beer, & Rogers, 2017). Privacy, security and confidentiality are the main variables that 
have been used to define “perceived risk”(C.-F. Li, 2013). In this dissertation we will be using 
“perceived risk” to mean perceived risk of breach of P&S. The findings provide P&S guidance for 
the development and deployment of multi-user kiosks and for the education and training of kiosk 
developers. 
There have been numerus exploratory studies into the P&S of information technology, and 
computer systems.  However, there have not been many experimental, and well controlled studies 
into privacy, security and confidentiality of various IT systems, especially in the Health IT arena 
(Merete Hagen, Albrechtsen, & Hovden, 2008). Researchers have the responsibility to conduct 
well-designed studies that shed light on this very important issue of P&S as new technologies are 
developed. A pilot study conducted as part of this dissertation examined the feasibility of 
conducting a randomized controlled trial to determine users’ perceived risk associated with a novel 
health IT and whether such perceptions affected their intention to use the technology over time. 
1.1 SPECIFIC AIMS 
1.1.1 Specific aim 1 
There is very limited literature on the development of P&S policies for health applications. P&S 
is usually an afterthought in the system development lifecycle, as is evidenced in recent high-
profile breaches. This dissertation developed P&S policies, aligned with the OCR audit protocol, 
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during development and deployment of a multi-user health kiosk, to make sure it was 
HIPAA/HITECH compliant. 
1.1.2 Specific aim 2 
Recent high-profile data security breaches have shown that more attention must be paid to users 
(both internal and external users) when developing P&S policies if we are to succeed in our fight 
against this menace.  There have been very few empirical, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
investigating “perceived risk” and how it affects “intention to use” health IT systems. This research 
focus could go a long way to help shape polices, training and communication of P&S policies. 
This dissertation explored the feasibility and preliminary efficacy of an intervention to reduce 




2.0  BACKGROUND 
Advances in computer technology have opened up a new frontier in the delivery of care to patients.  
Recent findings have shown widespread use of mobile devices and other computer technologies 
across the world. There has been an urgent need or “rush” to harness the power and other benefits 
of these technologies to provide healthcare services to patients (Gallagher, 2012; Kate & Borten, 
2010; Sezgin et al., 2018).   
For example, data from the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society 
(HIMSS) show that 90% of the world’s population has access to some sort of wireless signal. 
There are 5 billion cell phone users in the world, 70% of whom are in third world countries. Fifty 
percent of all cell phone users have access to the web through their cell phones, and over 100 
countries currently use a form of mobile health technology.  A report on the Healthcare IT News 
website shows tremendous movement to integrate different computer technologies into healthcare. 
Some of the items and processes mentioned are cloud-based systems, telemedicine, integration or 
genomic and predictive modeling to improve personalized medicine and empowering the 
increasingly demanding patient. Further, it has been estimated that the patient portal market will 
grow from $279.8M to about $900M, an increase of  about 221%, through 2017 (Ratchinsky, 
2014). P&S is a primary concern. 
Another issue that has spurred the adoption of EHRs is the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a US government mandate for all US hospitals to have had EHRs in 
place by the year 2015 (Blumenthal, 2009). To expedite implementation of the mandate, the 
government has provided incentives for the adoption of EHRs. These have included about $17 
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billion in financial incentives since 2011 for doctors and healthcare providers who use EHRs. 
Payments reached as much as $18,000 in the first year for the adoption of EHRs between 2011 
and 2012, $15,000 for those who adopted EHRs in 2013, and a lower amount for those who 
adopted EHRs by 2014 (Blumenthal, 2009). Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health (HITECH) legislation also threatens financial penalties to encourage the adoption 
of EHRs. Physicians who were not using EHRs by 2015 could lose 1% of their Medicare fees, 
followed by 2% in 2016, and 3% in 2017. Hospitals that did not comply by 2015 also faced 
penalties (Blumenthal, 2009). The spread of value-based healthcare and Medicare Access and 
CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) further announced these incentives and penalties as 
it has compiled quality reporting, value-based care and EHR incentive programs into one single 
system called the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS).   
Stolen medical records are said to be worth about twice as much as other stolen records, 
including social security numbers, on the underground market (Robertson, 2013).  Information on 
KevinMD.com, a reputable online journal, states that medical records sell for around $60 a copy 
(Kevin, 2007). An article in the online version of the New York Post on September 25, 2014, stated 
that medical information is worth 10 to 20 times more than credit card numbers on the underground 
market. Cyber criminals are said to be increasingly targeting the U.S. healthcare industry because 
they see the healthcare systems as a soft target (Kevin, 2007; Reuters, 2014). This is in part because 
healthcare providers are always the last to adopt new technologies and are often over-reliant on 
old legacy systems that mostly do not meet the P&S standard of today’s sophisticated computer 
networks (Reuters, 2014). Some of these computer systems are not only old but have not been 
updated with the latest security patches. According to an annual survey on data protection policy 
by the Ponemon Institute, (an independent research group focused on privacy, data protection, and 
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information security policy), the proportion of healthcare organizations that have reported criminal 
cyber-attacks rose from 20% in 2009 to 40% in 2013, and it is expected to increase in the coming 
years (Paul III, Spence, & Bhardwa, 2018; Reuters, 2014).  
Healthcare technology developers and providers are mostly interested in their bottom line 
and hence P&S has traditionally been an afterthought (Mitzner et al., 2017). Lack of  funding and 
staffing for information security and inadequate investment in technology remains a problem in 
the healthcare sector (Gordon, Fairhall, & Landman, 2017). The type of question that most 
healthcare providers have had to answer is whether to invest in a new MRI machine which can 
bring in thousands of dollars every year, or to invest in a new firewall system (Reuters, 2014).  
Theft of EHRs is therefore a very lucrative business and bound to attract the interest of hackers 
who seek to profit from the sale of stolen medical records.  
The actual cost of medical records theft to victims is, however, not monetary. Medical 
records are usually sold to people who lack medical insurance and hence cannot afford the cost of 
treatment for an ailment. The victim’s information is used to obtain care, and in the process the 
user taints the victim’s health record with diagnoses, prescriptions, and other information that 
could affect the victim when he or she seeks treatment in the future. For example, victims of 
healthcare fraud have had their premiums go up for conditions they do not actually have. Some 
have even been given the wrong medication because someone else had used their information to 
seek treatment. Other victims have been sent bills for treatments they did not receive (Kevin, 
2007).  Some stolen medical records have been sold to companies that sell healthcare products like 
testing supplies for diabetes. Such companies can then become a source of constant harassment to 
the victims whose health records were stolen(Kevin, 2007).  
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Recent increases in high profile information security/privacy breaches and the manner in 
which the breaches occurred means this issue has to be tackled throughout the systems/technology 
development lifecycle (Kafali et al., 2017; Sharma et al., 2018; Takyi, Watzlaf, Matthwes, Zhou, 
& DeAlmeida, 2017). It is reported that 90% of organizations have had to deal with a security 
issue in one year (Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2007). A 2017 survey of US companies with 
more than 500 employees found that 90% of the companies had cybersecurity polices. Yet only 
two-thirds (66%) of the companies enforced those policies and hence were vulnerable to attacks 
(Kemper, August 31, 2017). 
2.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Even though emerging healthcare technologies provide tremendous benefits in terms of cost and 
convenience to patients and healthcare providers, there are various P&S and confidentiality issues 
that need to be addressed (Harman, Flite, & Bond, 2012; Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015; Yüksel, 
Küpçü, & Özkasap, 2017). The increased adoption of emerging healthcare technologies is set to 
increase P&S and confidentiality issues as more people try to exploit the vulnerabilities of systems 
(Adhikari, Richards, & Scott, 2014; Gunter & Terry, 2005; D. G. O'Brien & Yasnoff, 1999; 
Papageorgiou et al., 2018). This ever increasing threat to P&S has made it more important to put 
systems and procedures in place that address both internal and external threats to patient data 
(Lewis, 2014; F. Li, Zou, Liu, & Chen, 2011).  A 2017 survey conducted by the Ponemon Institute 
found that 90% of health care organizations/providers have had a data breach. Sixty-four percent 
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of these organizations reported a successful attack involving medical files in 2016 (Gordon et al., 
2017).  
Growing concerns over healthcare information P&S have brought about expansion of 
healthcare regulations like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and 
the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) to safeguard 
patient data/information. These concerns have also resulted in an overhaul of the P&S 
requirements necessary to achieve compliance as well as a tremendous increase in fines for 
noncompliance (J. Kwon & Johnson, 2013). Further, a new regulation by the European Union 
entitled the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was enforced in May 2018 and includes 
stringent rules on the use, transmission and processing of personally identifiable information.  
Research has shown that perceived risk is an important determinant of technology 
acceptance and usage (Blumenthal, 2009; C.-F. Li, 2013; H. Li, Gupta, Zhang, & Sarathy, 2014; 
Mitzner et al., 2017). Curran and Meuter found that risk plays an important role in the intention to 
use, which then translates into actual usage when it comes to self-service technologies like clinical 
kiosks. This is because self-service technologies are “low touch” (with little or no human 
interaction) (Curran & Meuter, 2005).  A recent study into concerns of Televideo technologies 
showed that users were more concerned with P&S when it comes to technology acceptance than 
other factors such as ease-of-use and benefit (Mitzner et al., 2017). Hence, developers of health 
applications must take the necessary steps to ensure that they develop private and secure systems 
that protect the user.  
Evidence-based medicine is the integration of individual clinical expertise with best 
available external clinical evidence from systematic research for diagnosing and treating patients 
(Sackett, 1997). This can also be applied in P&S of health technology by showing evidence that 
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users are increasingly interested in P&S of health technology, applications and systems.  This can 
serve as a strong incentive to improve P&S of the various health technologies, applications and 
systems. Organizations and decision makers will take P&S seriously if they are made aware 
through good research that users will not patronize their facilities if the P&S of their information 
cannot be assured or guaranteed (they stand to lose income that way).  
2.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Research was done as part of this dissertation to: 
1. Determine possible vulnerabilities that exist in multi-user kiosks and the computer systems 
that make up multi-user kiosk systems.  
2. Develop an evaluation system and audit checklist for multi-user kiosk systems adapted 
from the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) audit protocols to address the vulnerabilities 
identified from our research.  
3. Develop P&S policies and guidelines for multi-user health kiosk systems by adapting the 
OCR audit protocol. 
4. Improve the design of a multi-user health kiosk to meet the HIPAA/HITECH standards by 
incorporating P&S policies.  
5. Explore the feasibility and preliminary efficacy of an intervention to explore the 
magnitude of differences in users’ perceived risk of privacy and security breaches as well 




Findings in this dissertation could serve as a framework to drive policy in P&S of health 
applications, technology and health IT systems. 
2.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
There is increased concern among many healthcare providers about how to be compliant with P&S 
regulations when using health technologies (Kafali et al., 2017; Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015; Takyi, 
Watzlaf, Matthwes, et al., 2017). HIPAA and HITECH rules do not explicitly state the steps that 
organizations need to perform to become compliant with these technologies (tele-health, mobile-
health, social media, and health kiosks). Hence, interpretation of HIPAA and HITECH rules 
remains a major headache for some healthcare organizations (Kafali et al., 2017; Lent, Zelano, & 
Lane, 2013; V. J. Watzlaf, Moeini, & Firouzan, 2010). This dissertation has explored computer 
security, information privacy, and confidentiality in relation to HIPAA and HITECH in non-
traditional types of emerging healthcare technologies such as a multi-user health kiosk. The Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR) audit checklist then guided development of P&S and confidentiality 
procedures that should be used in such healthcare technologies. This approach will ultimately help 
healthcare providers to develop the appropriate P&S policies to secure such mobile health IT 
systems to achieve HIPAA and HITECH compliance.  
This approach was utilized from the outset as part of the process of developing a multi-
user health kiosk system with our collaborators from the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie 
Mellon University.  The resulting multi-user health kiosk was deployed at convenient community 
centers to target older adults, for helping them to manage various aspects of their health. The multi-
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user health kiosk enables assessment and tracking of blood pressure and pulse rate, weight, oxygen 
saturation, and grip strength, and it provides interventions pertaining to self-management of health 
and chronic disease including patient-provider communication, sleep, bladder control, mobility 
and balance, lifestyle (nutrition, weight, and physical activity), and mood. Aspects of the OCR 
audit checklist were adapted to develop P&S policies to be implemented in the kiosk. The audit 
checklist formed the foundation upon which the multi-user health kiosk was secured. Applying the 
P&S policies across the multi-user kiosk architecture will help it to meet HIPAA and HITECH 
requirements.  
Developing a secure system can lead to improvements in “perceived risk” by the user, 
which can lead to an increase in the user’s trust of the system (such as a multi-user health kiosk), 
intention to use it, and actual use of the system (Curran & Meuter, 2005; P.-J. Hsieh, 2015; Kafali 
et al., 2017; C.-F. Li, 2013; Mitzner et al., 2017). Kiosk users’ perception of risk regarding security, 
privacy, and confidentiality pertaining to use of a multi-user health kiosk was assessed for change 
over a 6-month period. Data were collected using an investigator-developed, paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire that elicited user response to “perceived risk” of P&S breaches and “intention to 
use” pre- and post-intervention in a randomized controlled trial of approaches designed to affect 
these perceptions.   
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3.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Protection of health information must be performed while complying with different health 
regulations such as HIPAA, HITECH, and other state and federal regulations.  With advancement 
in electronic healthcare, personal health information can be entered, processed, stored, and 
transmitted electronically. This has uncovered numerous challenges to protecting an individual’s 
privacy and to securing the tremendous amount of data generated. With the increased use of new 
and divergent technologies in healthcare, risks posed to users’ information are at an all-time high. 
According to information from the OCR website, HIPAA complaints are soaring.  Data breaches 
in 2017 surpassed previous years (Ziskovsky, 2017).  According to data released by OCR, as of 
July 2017, approximately 174,792,250 people had been affected by 1,996 HITECH breaches.  
Business Associates accounted for 409 of the breaches, affecting approximately 31,239,362 
people.  The number of complaints by June 30, 2017 were 158,834, with a monthly average of 
2,000. This was a significant increase compared to an average of 1,500 per month in 2015 and 
1,750 in 2016.  Most of the complaints focused on: 
• Impermissible use and disclosure of protected health information (PHI) 
• Lack of safeguards of PHI 
• Lack of patient access to their PHI 
• Use or disclosure of more than the minimum necessary PHI 
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• Lack of administrative safeguards of ePHI 
Theft of information was the leading cause of all the breaches reported (Kafali et al., 2017). 
Unauthorized access accounted for 149 of the breaches. Laptop theft was the leading medium, 
responsible for more than 270 breaches. Hence, steps should be taken to understand the diverse 
healthcare rules as they relate to health information P&S, to create efficient ways to protect PHI 
both at rest and in transmission to be compliant.  
3.2 HIPAA/HITECH RULES AND OTHER REGULATIONS 
The need to protect patients’ data and privacy gave birth to HIPAA and later to HITECH, which 
is a more detailed extension of HIPAA that deals with data security and privacy issues in an 
electronic environment. HIPAA/HITECH requires that all breaches affecting fewer than 500 
people be reported to the individuals within 60 days and to the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) annually. Any breach involving more than 500 patients shall be reported to the 
affected individuals, media houses, and DHHS within 60 days (OCR, 2013; Ziskovsky, 2017).   
Many of these breaches could be avoided by combining good IT P&S practices with policies 
adopted from HIPAA/HTECH and other P&S legislation. These breaches are on the increase, but 
they can be mitigated. This is evident by the summary provided on the OCR website regarding the 





Table 1: Top Reasons for All Major HITECH Act Breaches 2017 
Top Reasons for All Major HITECH ACT Breaches as of July 2017 
# of Breaches  Reason for Breach  
627 Theft 
419 Unauthorized Access/Disclosure 
91 Loss 
45 Improper Disposal  
256 Hacking/IT incident 
 
Source: HIPAA/SA Analysis of OCR Data 
 
 






Source: HIPAA/SA Analysis of OCR Data  
 
HIPAA was enacted in 1996 and amended in 2013. There are two major parts to HIPAA. 
The first part is to prevent individuals, especially those with preexisting conditions, from losing 
insurance coverage when they change jobs. The second part deals with creating standards for 
electronic data exchange, which also deals with the P&S of patient data (Choi, Capitan, Krause, & 
Streeper, 2006; Murphy, Gainer, Mendis, Churchill, & Kohane, 2011; Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015; 
Schachat, 2003; D. Solove, 2013). There are three major groups or covered entities (CE) that are 
Breaches Involving Network Services as of Feb. 17, 2014 
# of Breaches Reason 
63 Unauthorized Access/Disclosure 




covered by HIPAA: health plans (e.g., managed care organizations), healthcare clearinghouses 
(e.g., billing companies, community health management information systems), and healthcare 
providers (e.g., healthcare facilities, doctors, nurses, therapists, etc.) (Choi et al., 2006; Kafali et 
al., 2017; Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015; D. Solove, 2013).  
Noncompliance with HIPAA can lead to severe consequences for CEs. The most severe 
consequence is a fine of up to $250,000 and up to 10 years of imprisonment if the intent is to sell, 
transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage, personal 
gain, or malicious purposes (Annas, 2003; Choi et al., 2006). This fine has been increased from 
$250,000 to $1.5 million with the new HITECH rule. 
The privacy rule of HIPAA was enacted to put in place a national standard for the flow of 
sensitive PHI. This is applicable to PHIs that are in oral, written, and electronic format. It governs 
the use of PHI for treatment, payment, and healthcare operations (TPO) as well as the minimum 
necessary use and disclosure of information. It also applies to the creation of a limited data set or 
de-identified information and formulation of standards for dealing with business associates (BA), 
mainly with contracts, application to information about the deceased, adherence to privacy 
practices and regulations, and application of covered entities’ and constituents who are not covered 
entities (CEs), such as BAs. Any organization or person working in association with or providing 
services to a CE that handles or discloses PHI is a BA (Choi et al., 2006; McDavid, 2012; Peterson 
& Watzlaf, 2015; Wu, 2007). The HIPAA rule also requires a written authorization to collect, use, 
and disclose PHI for research purposes (Act, 2010). 
The HIPAA security rule primarily addresses ePHI. It is designed to protect confidentiality, 
unauthorized use or access, threats to security, and integrity of PHI. There are different compliance 
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categories covered by the security rule (Annas, 2003; Choi et al., 2006; D. Solove, 2013). These 
are (Choi et al., 2006; HHS, 2013; Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015): 
• Administrative safeguards - strict practices to manage security and personnel.   
• Physical safeguards - physical protection of computers and the entire IT infrastructure and 
the buildings in which they reside.  
 
• Technical safeguards - the use of technology to secure data in transit and to control and 
monitor access to information.  
 
• Organizational requirements - BA contracts.  
• Policies, procedures, and documentation requirements - this includes rules to protect 
individual PHI by defining how, when, and the specific reasons and conditions under 
which PHI can be disclosed.  
 
HIPAA is a very complex law and could be costly and frustrating to clinicians, patients, 
and all major players in healthcare (Annas, 2003). One thorny issue when using telehealth 
technologies is exactly who is to be considered a BA, and how healthcare providers can get some 
of these businesses to enter into a business associate agreement (BAA) with them (Peterson & 
Watzlaf, 2015; V. J. Watzlaf, Moeini, Matusow, & Firouzan, 2011). For example, how do 
healthcare providers and other institutions who use Skype to provide health services to people from 
a distance convince the company that owns Skype, in this case, Microsoft, to engage in a BAA 
with them?  HIPAA also mandates CEs to constantly monitor and perform routine auditing of their 
IT infrastructure. The audit reports are then used to find existing or potential violations to P&S (C. 
Wang, Wang, Ren, & Lou, 2010). Most hospitals and other health service providers contract with 
third party associates to perform the audits for them. Many individuals are of the view that using 
third party companies for auditing can introduce potential vulnerabilities because these companies 
have unlimited access to PHI. Therefore, BAAs between the CE and a BA of the CE are required.  
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Also, data use agreements (DUAs) that specify uses of PHI may be needed when the CEs work 
with BAs for different purposes such as research, quality improvement, or patient safety.   
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and HIPAA offer minimal protection against 
the use of genetic data. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) was passed in 
May 21, 2008. This provides safeguards to prevent health insurance companies and employers 
from using people’s genetic data to discriminate against them. For instance, the law prohibits an 
insurance company from using genetic information to set rates or premiums (Erwin, 2008; Hudson, 
Holohan, & Collins, 2008). Noncompliance with GINA could result in a fine of $300,000 per 
intentional incidence. For unintentional incidences, the fine could range between $2,500 and 
$500,000. GINA also provides an extension of the HIPAA confidentiality law to the use or 
disclosure of genetic information (Erwin, 2008; Hudson et al., 2008). Hence, securing genetic data 
should also be incorporated into P&S policies that govern health information.  
The HITECH Act was passed by Congress in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA). This was an extension of HIPAA which addressed P&S issues related 
to the use of technology, such as IT in healthcare. HITECH strengthened HIPAA enforcement, 
accumulating $14,883,345 in fines and penalties for violations (Act, 2010; D. Solove, 2013). 
Penalties have been as high as $1.5 million in certain instances. The new law also granted more 
powers to the OCR to enforce HIPAA. The HITECH Act increased penalties for HIPAA violations 
drastically from $100 per violation and capped at $25,000 per annum to $1.5 million annually. The 







Table 3:  Breach Civil Monetary Penalties 
 
 
Tier Penalty Ratings  
1.Reasonable Diligence (Did not know) 
 
$100-50,000 for each violation; maximum of 
$1.5 million for the same violations in the 
same calendar year 
 
2. Reasonable Cause (Should have known) 
 
$1,000-$50,000 for each violation; maximum 
of $1.5 million for identical violations  
3. Willful Neglect (Corrected) $10,000-$50,000 for each violation; maximum 
of $1.5 million for identical violations in the 
same calendar year 
 
4. Willful Neglect 
 
$50,000 or more for each violation; maximum 
of $1.5 million for identical violations in the 




Data from (D. Solove, 2013) as well as information on the DHHS website show evidence 
of  increased oversight and fines for HIPAA and HITECH violations, as shown in Table 4 below.   
Aside from the fines, there is also public shaming of the corporations whose information is 
displayed on the website. 
 
 
Table 4:  Example of Breaches and Fines 
   
Breach Cause Breach Summary 
Not following risk 
management rules 
Fresenius Medical Care North America (FMCNA) paid a fine of $3.5 
million for failing to follow HIPAA’s risk management rules.  
Impermissible 
disclosure of ePHI 
CardioNet has agreed to settle potential noncompliance with the HIPAA 
Privacy and Security Rules by paying $2.5 million and implementing a 




Table 4 (continued) 
Insufficient ePHI 
Access Controls 
Memorial Healthcare System paid $5.5 million in 2017 for failing to 
have sufficient access controls to peoples ePHI 
Theft of USB drive Alaska Department of Health and Social Services settled with the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in the amount of 
$1.5 million for violations in 2012. 
Hard Drive theft Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee paid a fine of $1.5 million for an 
incidence involving unencrypted hard drives that were stolen from one 
of their facilities. 
Data not erased from 
copier hard drives 
DHHS fined Affinity Health Plan, Inc. $1,215,780 for mistakenly 
disclosing PHI of 344,579 people when it returned leased photo copiers 
without flashing the hard drives on the copiers. 
Improper disposal of 
PHI 
CVS Caremark fined $2.25 million for improper disposal of personal 
health information (PHI) in 2009 (labels from prescription bottles and 
old prescriptions). 




Phoenix Cardiac Surgery paid $100,000 to DHHS for lack of HIPAA 
security safeguards and posting patient schedule on public Internet 
calendar-2012. 
UN-Authorized use 
of PHI in training 
Shasta Regional Medical Center was fined $275,000 for impermissible 




As seen in Table 4, OCR is now imposing stiffer penalties on violators of HIPAA. Another 
significant change in HIPAA was the expansion of HITECH under the Omnibus rule, which was 
enacted in 2013 (Bendix, 2013). One significant part of the Omnibus rule involved the expansion 
of HIPAA to directly apply to BAs (D. Solove, 2013).  About 20% of all violations were a result 
of violations by BAs (Act, 2010; D. Solove, 2013). In the past, CEs were required to enter into 
contracts with their BAs, but the CEs were held responsible for any violations by the BAs. 
However, under HITECH/Omnibus, BAs are now subject to direct enforcement and sanctions. 
This means BAs are held to the same high standards as CEs (Chaput, 2013; D. Solove, 2013; V. J. 
Watzlaf et al., 2011; Wu, 2007). 
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) was signed into law by 
President Obama on March 23, 2010. It is said to be the most significant change in the health care 
system in the United States since Medicare and Medicaid (Huntington, Covington, Center, 
Covington, & Manchikanti, 2011). The law does not mandate businesses to provide health 
insurance to their employees. However, larger employers face penalties if they do not make 
affordable coverage available to their employees. Employers with 100 or more employees must 
comply by 2015 or face penalties. Employers with 50 or more had until 2016 to comply or face 
penalties.  The law also requires all individuals to have health insurance. Failure by both business 
and individuals to obtain insurance can lead to potential fines. ACA prevents health insurance 
companies from refusing to insure people with pre-existing medical conditions. The incorporation 
of newer computer technologies in healthcare is bound to complicate things. Health service 
providers need to understand how to stay in compliance with healthcare regulations as they use 
these newer technology platforms. 
3.3 ADVANTAGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN HEALTHCARE 
The use of various forms of information technology (IT) for patient care has many advantages. 
Some of these benefits include improved access to information and decision support systems, cost 
savings, and overall efficiency/effectiveness in patient care (Bhuyan et al., 2017; Idowu, 2015; 
Kokkonen et al., 2013; Rindfleisch, 1997).  
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3.4 EXAMPLES OF ADOPTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN HEALTHCARE 
According to the info-graphic page on HealthIT.gov, 8 out of 10 physicians surveyed reported that 
EHR use enhanced overall patient care (HealthIT.gov, 2013): 
• 81% agreed that their EHR helped them to access patient information remotely. 
• 64% said the use of their EHR alerted them to a potential medication error. 
• 62% reported being alerted to a critical lab value. 
With smartphones and other mobile devices set to overshadow PCs as the number one 
method of computing, both in the personal and professional environment, cyber criminals have 
turned their attention to mobile devices. A 2011 global study report released by Juniper Networks 
showed an increased rate of security threats to mobile devices, with Android-based devices 
showing a 400% increase in Android malware (Markelj & Bernik, 2012). It is therefore important 
to secure these platforms before using them in healthcare delivery in order to protect patient 
information (Gozalvez, 2011; Ifrim, Pintilie, Apostol, Dobre, & Pop, 2017; Kowitlawakul, Chan, 
Pulcini, & Wang, 2015). 
A HIMMS survey conducted in 2011 captured interesting data related to the United States 
wireless-health market: 
• Wireless-health saw an increase from $2.7M in 2007 to 9.6B in 2012.  
• 80% or more of physicians owned smartphones and two-thirds accessed information on 
the web for professional needs 
 
• 95% of physicians used their portable devices or smartphones to download apps for 
medical information (Gallagher, 2012) 
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Availability of mobile health apps is on the rise, spurred by an increase in demand 
(Burkhart, 2012; Gallagher, 2012) (see Table 5). 
 
 
Table 5: HIMMS Survey results for number of mobile health apps in 2011 
 












iPhone ~6000 73% 30% Unknown 
Android ~600 81% 20% 3.5 million + 
Blackberry ~200 70% 30% Unknown 
HIMMS survey conducted in 2011 
 
 
Another survey conducted by HIMMS in December 2011 found that many more hospitals 
are allowing physicians to use mobile and wireless devices in their practice. Some of these devices 
are privately owned by the physicians. It is estimated that 25% of the 80 % of physicians who own 
smartphones and tablets utilize them in various forms of patient care (Burkhart, 2012). The survey 
also revealed that most institutions have acknowledged some P&S concerns, yet they have no P&S 
policies in place for the use of such devices (Gallagher, 2012). Although 41% of healthcare 
institutions allow doctors to use their personal devices, 28% of these devices retain PHI and 77% 
of doctors access data on public networks with those devices (Gallagher, 2012). This could lead to 
various P&S breaches as well as breaches of HIPAA, HITECH, and other healthcare regulations. 
 Research has further shown that there are no clear federal regulations for the use of mobile 
technology in healthcare (Giunti, Giunta, Guisado-Fernandez, Bender, & Fernandez-Luque, 2018; 
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Petersen & DeMuro, 2015). Until recently, the mobile market was mainly self-regulated. This is 
due in large part to the very nature of the technology. An example is a situation where a woman 
was reported to have used a commercial smartphone app as a “standby stethoscope” to monitor 
her infant daughter’s heart condition. US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval was not 
needed for the device because it was supposed to be used for gathering “bio-feedback data” rather 
than for diagnosis (Burkhart, 2012). Congress in July 2012 finally signed into law the FDA Safety 
and Innovation Act to try to regulate mobile medical apps. This led to the establishment of a 
commission charged with finding ways to regulate mobile medical apps and reporting back to 
Congress within 18 months (Burkhart, 2012; Steinbrook & Sharfstein, 2012).  
The FDA issued a final guidance on mobile medical apps on September 25, 2013, which 
first defined a medical app. According to the FDA, a mobile medical app is a software that runs 
on a mobile platform which is either used as an accessory to a regulated medical device or 
transforms a mobile platform into a regulated device (Kamerow, 2013).  Most health-related apps 
are not regulated, as they are considered non-devices by the FDA definition of mobile apps.  
Examples are electronic versions of medical books and reference materials, educational apps for 
patients, or clinicians, general office apps, Generic tools (magnifiers, recorders and 
communication aids)(Giunti et al., 2018; Kamerow, 2013).   
The FDA will employ “enforcement discretion” and will not regulate mobile medical apps 
that are not considered devices but can be used for diagnoses, treatment or prevention of diseases 
so long they pose a low risk to the public. Most disease tracking apps such as apps for diabetes, 
motivational or educational apps for dieting and exercising, smoked cessation, and other 
behavioral changes fall under this category(Kamerow, 2013).   
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The FDA will regulate apps that use attachments of any sort of gadget to a phone to 
measure, diagnose, or treat a medical problem, hence turning the phone into a controller or screen 
for the device. Any app that has the capability of turning the phone itself into a device such as 
using the phone’s speaker phone for audiometry, or allows phones to be used for remote 
monitoring will be regulated under the same rule that the FDA applies to  other devices (Kamerow, 
2013).  
             Another technology that is being widely adopted in providing health services is 
Voice/Video over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology. The problem with this widespread 
adoption is that regulatory agencies now have to play catch-up in order to regulate the industry (V. 
J. Watzlaf et al., 2011). There are many issues pertaining to HIPAA, HITECH, and other regulatory 
compliance with the use of VoIP for various forms of patient care (V. R. Watzlaf & Ondich, 2012). 
All mobile health technologies, including VoIP, use TCP/IP protocols and run on networks 
including the Internet. This renders them susceptible to all of the P&S vulnerabilities associated 
with such networks (Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015; V. J. Watzlaf et al., 2011). According to Watzlaf 
et al. (2011), there are no clear-cut guidelines for P&S and HIPAA compliance for the use of 
different consumer-based VoIP technologies in healthcare. This is also true for the use of other 
existing and emerging technologies such as social media, cloud-based computing, mobile 
technologies (e.g., smartphones, tablets, and apps), and multi-user health kiosks in providing care 
to patients.  
The first step in securing PHI in these emerging systems is to develop a detailed 
understanding of the unique vulnerabilities associated with the use of such devices and 
technologies. Another issue involves determining whether third party vendors, such as those 
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providing consumer-based technologies like Skype and others, are considered BAs when used for 
tele-practice, and whether they fall under HIPAA, HITECH, and other regulations.    
Information security should be the cornerstone of any HIPAA/HITECH and other 
regulatory compliance. It is reasonable to think that, in this information age, there cannot be 
HIPAA, HITECH, and state and federal compliance without procedures in place to safeguard 
patient information. A good P&S guideline must therefore reference the technical safeguard 
section of the HIPAA P&S standards for addressing access control, audit control, integrity, person 
or entity authentication, and transmission security to ensure HIPAA compliance (Maji et al., 2008; 
Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015). 
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4.0  INFORMATION SECURITY 
Information security has been defined as the task of safeguarding information that is digital in 
nature. A successful information security system should have multiple layers of security by 
employing the  following procedures  to protect computer systems and information (Bendix, 2013; 
Merkow & Breithaupt, 2014; B. Smith, 2008; Whitman & Mattord, 2010). 
Physical security should be used to offer protection for physical items, objects, and 
sensitive areas from unauthorized access to misuse. This is normally accomplished by controlling 
access to sensitive rooms or areas in the organization, access to network cables and devices, and 
hardware and data disposal procedures.  
Workers and other authorized individuals who have access to an institution’s computer 
devices and data should be protected. This can be accomplished by instituting proper personnel 
security procedures such as employing security guards and protecting personnel identity in some 
cases. 
Logical security must be well designed to protect computer infrastructure, data, and 
information through a string of encryption procedures, secured accounts and passwords. 
Effective operations security should be put in place for the protection of an organization’s 
operations or activities through adoption of secured operational procedures such as allowing 
employees to use only licensed software and using computer systems only for business activities. 
This will lower the risk of downloading malicious software that could introduce vulnerabilities 
into the computer devices like kiosk computer systems, software and a kiosk itself. 
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Communications security is very important in the protection of the medium of 
communication, technology, and the content of communication. This may be in the form of data 
encryption and using secure means of communications or secure data transfer protocols. Such 
security measures are even more critical for devices such as a multi-user health kiosk that stores 
and transmits large amounts of PHI in electronic format. 
Careful attention must be paid to implement effective network security to offer protection 
for computer network components, connections, and data, through appropriate procedures to 
address access control, firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, system redundancy, 
change management, and single point of failure. Effective network security has become even more 
important since all computer systems and technologies, including kiosks, are networked. 
Servers and PCs must be protected through adoption of measures and procedures to manage 
software licenses, patches (operating system and other security updates), and laptop security. 
Keeping up with software and computer updates helps to lower privacy and security 
vulnerabilities.    
An important factor that is often overlooked is IT security policies, procedures and 
practices. Development and implementation of security, privacy, acceptable use, and backup 
(BC)/disaster recovery (DR) planning and policies can offer tremendous protection to computer 
devices and information/data.  
Up-to-date anti-virus (AV), anti-Spyware and SPAM filters should be deployed to protect 
against various vulnerabilities such as downloading malicious programs, hackers, and spammers, 
to minimize the possibility of a security or privacy breach. This is necessary to prevent 
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unauthorized access to users’ personal data, destruction of computer infrastructure and/or 
disruption of normal operation of the computer system or an entire organization.  
Attention must also be paid to software security to offer protection through identification 
of bugs and mission-critical apps, changes and updates, and testing. Bugs and incomplete updates 
can introduce security and privacy loopholes that can be exploited to gain access to user data or 
information.  
Having a good understanding of information security allows us to protect information that 
has value. Information security must therefore be shaped to protect the characteristics of 
information including confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy and non-repudiation: 
Confidentiality strives to assure that only authorized users can view the information 
(Buckovich, Rippen, & Rozen, 1999; S. Das & Mukhopadhyay, 2011; Russell & Gangemi, 1991). 
Integrity helps to make sure that  information is accurate and that no authorized or 
unauthorized person or malicious software has falsely or illegally altered the information (S. Das 
& Mukhopadhyay, 2011; Merkow & Breithaupt, 2014; Russell & Gangemi, 1991). 
Availability allows systems administrators to take steps to assure access  to computer 
systems and data/information by authorized users when needed and in a timely manner (Ciampa, 
2008; S. Das & Mukhopadhyay, 2011). This is very important, especially in computer systems that 
are used to provide health services to people. HIPAA and HITECH rules require systems to be 
reliable and highly available for patient care(HHS, 2013). 
Privacy accords users the ability to keep their personal information secret from others. 
Breach of confidentiality constitutes a breach of privacy (Buckovich et al., 1999; D. G. O'Brien & 
Yasnoff, 1999). Appropriate measures must be put in place to protect privacy of users as they 
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patronize the different health applications and technologies that are being developed. Violations 
could result in stiff monetary and other penalties (HHS, 2013; D. Solove, 2013).  
Non-repudiation allows us to verify the origin of a message. It ensures that the origin of 
the message is legitimate. This helps to prevent impersonation on computer networks (Djenouri, 
Khelladi, & Badache, 2005; Merkow & Breithaupt, 2014). It also prevents malicious people from 
employing different tricks such as phishing and man-in-the middle attacks to gain access to system 
resources including users’ data/information. 
It is prudent to envision information security beyond just protecting information. Because 
information is stored on computer hardware, manipulated by software, and transferred by various 
means of communication, all these areas must be protected. Information security in healthcare 
must be performed within the framework of HIPAA/HITECH. Sections of HIPAA address medical 
privacy and confidentiality. Healthcare providers, under this act, are required to abide by the 
electronic health information standards put in place by Congress (D. G. O'Brien & Yasnoff, 1999; 
Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015). 
 
4.1 DEFINITION OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
Healthcare providers and their associates as well as healthcare technology developers must 
understand that information security has moved from “just good business practice” to a legal 
requirement. They are obliged by various laws to protect privacy and confidentiality, provide 






Figure 1: Information Security Components 
 
Security measures can be very complex to implement. As illustrated in Figure 1, 
information, hardware, software, and communication should be protected in three layers: products, 
people, and procedures. These three layers work together to achieve the best results. Products 
refers to the physical security around the data. This could be door locks, intrusion detection 
systems, or computer firewalls. People refers to people who use the systems to perform various 
activities. Procedures are rules, plans, and policies that have been put in place by organizations to 
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guard against improper use of products, information, and data (Ciampa, 2008; Merkow & 
Breithaupt, 2014; Wu, 2007).  
A more complete definition of information security is, therefore, “that which protects the 
integrity, confidentiality, and availability of information on the devices that store, manipulate, and 
transmit the information through products, people and procedures (Ciampa, 2008)”.  
4.2 CHALLENGES OF SECURING INFORMATION 
Securing networks and applications, computer devices, especially mobile devices, web-based 
applications and kiosk systems is a daunting task in today’s information age (Conti et al., 2018).   
Speed of attacks makes it difficult for IT professionals to detect and stop or prevent attacks 
from being orchestrated. Attackers have access to very sophisticated tools that enable them to scan 
and exploit weaknesses and launch attacks on computer systems with extraordinary speed (Turban, 
King, Lee, Liang, & Turban, 2015). For example, the Slammer worm infected 75,000 computers 
in the first 11 minutes after its release in 2003, causing massive disruption of service. The worm 
scanned 55 million computers per second to find vulnerabilities that could be exploited to gain 
unauthorized access to computer systems and information (Ciampa, 2008; Householder, Houle, & 
Dougherty, 2002; Kizza, 2013b; L. Zhang & Zhao, 2008). 
Sophistication of attacks is a huge problem in information security. Attackers make it 
difficult for IT personnel to distinguish attacks from legitimate network traffic. This is because 
attackers employ common Internet tools and protocols in their attacks (e.g., Telnet, ping, Port 
Scanners, SQL injection, and malicious applications (Householder et al., 2002; Sanatinia & 
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Noubir, 2015; Turban et al., 2015). The simplicity of attack tools has also made it easy for people 
with little or no computer skills or technical skills to infiltrate computer systems and applications 
to gain access to sensitive information or disrupt entire computer systems or networks. Most of 
these tools are readily available on the internet. Some come with step by step instructions on how 
to use them (Ciampa, 2008; Householder et al., 2002; Kizza, 2013b; Merkow & Breithaupt, 2014).   
There has been a surge in “Zero Day” attacks. The simplicity and easy availability of attack 
tools have made it easy for hackers to discover new vulnerabilities and launch attacks with little 
or no warning. IT security experts are left fighting against time to find fixes (Householder et al., 
2002; Kizza, 2013b; Russell & Gangemi, 1991).   
Delays in patching hardware and software products can lead to serious consequences such 
as fines loss of information/data and disruption in services. With the increase in attacks, software 
and hardware vendors are constantly fighting against time to patch their systems against security 
vulnerabilities. System administrators also have to make sure their systems are updated with the 
latest patches. This can turn out to be a daunting task as new vulnerabilities are discovered every 
year or, in some cases, every day (Householder et al., 2002; Kizza, 2013b).   
The distributed nature of attacks makes it difficult to determine the source of an attack. 
Most attacks are launched from multiple (thousands) of computers, mostly against a single 
computer, making it almost impossible to prevent an attack by blocking a sole source. This very 
popular technique is employed by attackers to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks (Sumra, 
Hasbullah, & AbManan, 2015), which can result in violations of HIPAA and HITECH as well as 
penalties and fines (D. Solove, 2013).  
User confusion is a major problem in this highly mobile, web-oriented and self-service 
(kiosks) environment. Users are increasingly being asked to make security decisions on their 
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systems with little or no guidance. For example, a user with little or no knowledge of information 
security may be asked questions such as  “Is it okay to open this port?”; “Is it safe to quarantine 
this attachment?”; or “Do you want to include the installation of an add-in?” (Ciampa, 2008; 
Kizza, 2013b). This is a huge problem as users, by granting these privileges to these apps, can 
mistakenly provide access to their sensitive information. Attackers and hackers can then escalate 
those privileges to gain access to entire computer systems or networks, resulting in very serious 
HIPAA and HITECH security and privacy violations(Act, 2010; D. Solove, 2013).   
Disgruntled employees and insider attacks are a major source of attack against computer 
systems (Merkow & Breithaupt, 2014; G. S. Smith & Futter, 2015). For example, an attack was 
perpetrated by a former employee of a subcontracting company who was working on computer 
systems for the Maroochy Shire Council’s sewage system in Australia in the year 2000. After the 
employee was fired by the subcontracting firm, he used various means to undermine the computer 
system controlling the waste management plant, causing millions of liters of raw sewage to spill 
into local parks. The employee then tried to get the water and sewage company to hire him to 
resolve the problem (Cardenas et al., 2009). 
4.3 POSSIBLE INFORMATION/ NETWORK VULNERABILITIES OR ATTACKS 
Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in data networks, devices, and software that make them targets for 
attacks. The best way to make data networks, devices, and software secure is to identify, 
understand, and mitigate the mode of attack posed by possible vulnerabilities (D'ESTE & Taylor, 
2003; Kizza, 2013a; Merkow & Breithaupt, 2014; Ritchey & Ammann, 2000).  
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4.4 MEDIA-BASED VULNERABILITIES 
These are vulnerabilities based on the network transport media. Network administrators use 
various tools to help them to monitor network traffic to trouble-shoot problems as well as to 
perform different administrative functions on the network. These same tools can be used by an 
attacker for malicious reasons (Ciampa, 2008; Kizza, 2013a; Orebaugh, Ramirez, & Beale, 2006; 
Paliwal, Mudgal, & Taterh, 2015). One example of media-based vulnerabilities is the protocol 
analyzer, which captures packets of information or data in order to decode and analyze their 
contents (Ballmann, 2015). Port Mirroring is utilized for monitoring network traffic by copying 
each data packet from one network switch port to another. For example, a network administrator 
can attach a computer to a switch on a network that supports port mirroring to monitor network 
traffic. Network tap (test access point) allows a computer device to be installed by a network 
administrator between a switch, router, or firewall to monitor traffic (Ballmann, 2015; Orebaugh 
et al., 2006). This is usually for testing purposes. A hacker can exploit the network tap to gain 
access to the underlying computer network, resulting in a breach of HIPAA and HITECH privacy 
and security rules (HHS, 2013). 
The best way to limit media-based vulnerabilities is to have a good inventory of all network 
devices and their functions on the network. The network administrator should run periodic scans 
to detect any unauthorized devices (e.g., network dongles, malicious switches, and computers) that 
are attached to the network. Another way is to prevent access to false ceilings and to make sure 
that all access points are secured and that no network wires are exposed. All network ports that are 
not in use, especially in vacant buildings or unused work areas, should be disabled (Ballmann, 
2015; Merkow & Breithaupt, 2014).  
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Administrators should also protect their networks from network sniffers (Awad, 2015; 
Ballmann, 2015; Orebaugh et al., 2006) in a variety of ways: 
• Host-to-host VPN encryption should be employed to hide the data within the 
packets from sniffers. If the right techniques are employed, this protection approach 
could even be used to hide information about the ports and communication 
protocols used. 
• Data packets can also be protected by employing application-level encryption such 
as the Secure Socket Layer (SSL). 
• Deploying switches on a network instead of hubs makes the network more difficult 
to sniff.  
Good detection techniques also help to identify the presence of sniffers on a network 
(Ballmann, 2015): 
• Interfaces operating in promiscuous mode are a sign of sniffers’ presence. 
• Sniffers may also exhibit characteristics like superfluous DNS lookups, network 
latency, driver issues, and suspicious application behavior.  
• Strong organizational policies can provide an effective safeguard against different 
sniffing tools. For example, the University of Pittsburgh Computer Services 
department does not allow individuals to install their own switches, hubs, or routers 
on the university’s computer network.    
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4.5 NETWORK DEVICE VULNERABILITIES 
Attackers can also exploit vulnerabilities in the network devices themselves. This is accomplished 
by taking advantage of weak passwords, malware, default accounts, backdoors, and privilege 
escalation (Ballmann, 2015; Merkow & Breithaupt, 2014). Using weak passwords makes it easy 
for others to guess the passwords. However, the problem with stronger or complex passwords is 
that they are very difficult to memorize. Nonetheless, users must be encouraged to create stronger 
passwords devoid of personal information like favorite pets, cars, and nicknames (Merkow & 
Breithaupt, 2014). This will help to prevent occurrences of clandestine activities such as privilege 
escalation to gain unauthorized access information, data and other system resources. 
Malware is shorthand for “malicious software.” Malware includes viruses, spyware, and 
other types of harmful software designed to disrupt operations, gather information without user 
permission or knowledge, gain unauthorized access to systems resources, and instigate other 
potentially abusive or damaging behavior (Ballmann, 2015; Ciampa, 2008; Kizza, 2013a). Systems 
must be protected against malware through installation of good antivirus, anti-spyware, and anti-
adware programs. Administrators must take steps to download and install updates and patches for 
their systems. Users must be educated about potential activities (e.g., visiting suspicious internet 
sites, not updating their antivirus software, not opening suspicious email messages and 
attachments) that could expose their systems to viruses. Malwares can cause system failure, 
stealing and or loss of data/information. Systems like health kiosks are at greater risk because they 
are constantly connected to the internet. 
Default accounts are created automatically by a device or device manufacturer instead of a 
network administrator. These types of accounts are supposed to be used for initial device setup, 
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and they have full administrator privileges. Default accounts are supposed to be deleted or disabled 
after initial installation, but they are not deleted most of the time. Attackers will usually exploit 
these default accounts first, then create administrator accounts for themselves once they gain initial 
access to the system. This provides them with unlimited access to the network/system to perform 
malicious administrative functions. Disabling or deleting default accounts should be clearly stated 
in organizations’ information security policies (Ballmann, 2015; Schwingenschlögl & Pilz, 2001). 
Backdoors are usually used by programmers and system developers for testing during 
software/system development. They provide “emergency” access to system and software 
components in the event of a malfunction. Backdoors can be exploited by adversaries, however, 
to gain unauthorized access to computer systems. Telnet is the protocol of choice for such 
mechanisms. Backdoors are normally accounts, devices, and software set up without the 
knowledge of an administrator, and they are not easily detected (Neumann, 2015). Attackers can 
therefore use backdoors to gain access to various information and other devices on the network 
(Yin Zhang & Paxson, 2000). If backdoors are not uncovered and managed properly, cyber 
criminals can exploit them, leading to HIPAA and HITECH P&S breaches with dire consequences 
(Sametinger, Rozenblit, Lysecky, & Ott, 2015).   
Privilege escalation is a major concern in client/server environments where devices and 
applications have become ever more interconnected. Operating systems, applications/software, 
and network devices can be at risk of privilege escalation, which entails users giving themselves 
greater permission than they are supposed to have (Ciampa, 2008; Provos, Friedl, & Honeyman, 
2003). This can lead to serious HIPAA/HITECH violations in healthcare systems when 
unauthorized workers gain access to users’ PHI and other information.  Privilege escalation can be 
minimized by periodic IT audits to make sure that users/workers do not have access to resources 
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they are not allowed to have. Another method is privilege separation, which segments network 
resources into privileged and unprivileged sections, enabling assignment of different levels of 
privilege to resources and network devices (Provos et al., 2003). There should also be strict policy 
enforcement against privilege escalation (Bugiel et al., 2012).  
Denial of Service (DoS) can affect system availability. This is a very major concern in 
health applications for which non-availability of a system can jeopardize people’s health outcomes 
(Sametinger et al., 2015). This network attack vulnerability involves an attacker using various 
methods to consume all resources on a network so that legitimate devices or users are not able to 
connect (Awad, 2015). This can result in interruption of service. In this type of attack, the attacker 
uses a computer device or program to make repeated requests to a server but never responds. More 
requests are sent to the server and eventually the server gets overwhelmed as it waits for a response 
from the attacker’s computer, making it unable to respond to legitimate requests (Awad, 2015). 
This violates the aspect of HIPAA which mandates that information is to be available at all times 
(Djenouri et al., 2005; Householder et al., 2002). One of the best ways to reduce the impact of DoS 
attacks is for organizations to replicate their servers at backup centers (Awad, 2015; Singhal, 
Winograd, & Scarfone, 2007). DoS attacks can also be prevented by media access control (MAC) 
address filtering. This technique usually uses a network edge device to filter MAC addresses and 
internet protocol (IP) addresses from computers requesting information. If the MAC address and 
the IP address filtered do not correspond with the network lease information stored in a special 
database on the organizations network, then any request from that MAC address and the IP address 
is dropped (Caves, Altarac, & Ilgun, 2008; Kassi-Lahlou, Mansour, & Michel, 2014). 
An attacker can also exploit vulnerabilities in communication protocols as well as weak 
encryption procedures to launch Man in the Middle attacks. This allows the attacker to intercept 
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information in a data packet before it gets to the recipient. The attacker can either modify the 
information or fabricate additional information before it reaches the recipient. The adversary can 
also use this technique to gain unauthorized access to PHI and other sensitive information in transit 
(S. Das & Mukhopadhyay, 2011; Srivastava, Awasthi, Kaul, & Mittal, 2015).  This type of attack 
can be minimized by implementing cryptography in systems such as a health kiosk. If data packets 
are encrypted, they are almost impossible for the “man-in-the-middle” to read information 
contained in the packets (Awad, 2015; Ciampa, 2008; S. Das & Mukhopadhyay, 2011; 




5.0  SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN 
HEALTHCARE 
Emerging computer technologies being adopted in healthcare and other health services offer 
tremendous advantages. However, they are vulnerable to serious security threats if the right steps 
are not taken to secure them before adoption and use in healthcare and delivery of other health 
services. 
5.1 WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY CONCERNS 
Wireless security concerns are on the rise in the realm of PHI due to the increased use of mobile 
devices by healthcare providers (Martínez-Pérez, De La Torre-Díez, & López-Coronado, 2015). 
A recent Manhattan Research survey found that about 30% of physicians own iPads (Kate & 
Borten, 2010). The survey showed that some of the physicians have used such devices to access, 
view, and store PHI on their mobile devices (Kate & Borten, 2010). This poses an increase in P&S 
threats to information, including PHI. Seventy-three percent of physicians from a recent survey 
said they text other physicians about work. Thus, keeping the information exchanges secured is a 
major concern (Harman et al., 2012). 
 Securing mobile devices including mobile applications is a daunting task for IT 
professionals. This stems from the fact that mobile devices and the apps that run on them are 
largely designed for individual use and not for centralized management (Harman et al., 2012; 
Martínez-Pérez et al., 2015). 802.11 is a suite of protocols mainly used to protect wireless networks 
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and devices. Wireless devices and access points, like other network devices, are vulnerable when 
configured based on default administrative configurations (accounts and passwords). These 
configurations are commonly known to anyone who owns a similar device or has access to the 
documentation or manuals of such devices (Ballmann, 2015; networks, 2009). Another source of 
vulnerability is a wireless access point that uses a wireless adapter predisposed to remote exploit 
attacks (Ma & Wang, 2015; networks, 2009). A type of vulnerability that is usually overlooked is 
device loss or theft. Many users do not have passwords on their mobile devices. People usually do 
not encrypt the data on their devices either. Therefore, if these devices are lost or stolen, the 
information on the devices (including PHI if stored on such devices) may end up in the wrong 
hands (Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015). This problem is even more acute when these devices are used 
to deliver any form of health service to people that involves the handling of PHI in any form.  
Most wireless devices and networks are secured by means of access control. This is usually 
done by limiting device access to the access point (AP).  Restricting access to the AP means that 
only authorized devices are permitted to connect to the access point and become part of the 
network. Since the access point is responsible for connecting and transmitting data to all devices 
on the wireless network, protection of devices on the network should start with securing the access 
point (Awad, 2015; Ciampa, 2008; networks, 2009). Encryption is then used to secure the data and 
information transmitted between the devices on the network.  
Media access control (MAC) address filtering is utilized to limit access to access points. 
This is done because every wireless device has a MAC address that uniquely identifies it. This is 
sometimes confused with user access restriction, which involves restriction placed on what 
authenticated users may do once they gain access to the network. MAC address filtering is used to 
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prevent certain devices from accessing a wireless network (Celebi, Joseph, Bilange, Marx, & 
Conroy, 2015; Ciampa, 2008; Kizza, 2013b).  
Although MAC address filtering provides some level of protection, vulnerability is present 
because MAC addresses are initially exchanged in an unencrypted manner. Hence, an attacker can 
intercept and use the MAC address of an approved device to gain access to the network.  Managing 
a large number of MAC addresses can be quite difficult for an IT department due to the large 
number of computing devices present on an organizations’ network. It also does not make it easy 
to allow guest users on the organization’s network. 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) keys are considered a better alternative to MAC address 
filtering, as they provide encryption to data/information exchanged on a wireless network. WEP 
keys provide P&S equivalent to wired networks. WEP requires a 64-bit or 128-bit encryption key 
with an initialization vector of 24 bits. This short initialization vector makes it is easy for an 
attacker to decipher the key (Awad, 2015; Paliwal et al., 2015). 
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) was designed to be used for both authentication and 
encryption. It was made up of a PreShared Key (PSK) for authentication and a Temporal Key 
Integrity Protocol (TKIP) for encryption. PSK uses a passphrase as the encryption key. This phrase 
is created and entered into the access point and then pre-entered into all devices before they can 
join the network. Hence, PSK is used for both authentication and encryption (Reddy & Lakshmi, 
2014).  
TKIP has replaced WEP as an encryption technology and has some advantages over WEP, 
which uses a static 40-bit key for encryption, while TKIP uses a 128-bit key. This generates 280 
trillion possible keys for a given data packet. This level of randomness makes TKIP a better 
encryption algorithm than WEP (Ciampa, 2008; networks, 2009; Paliwal et al., 2015).  TKIP also 
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replaces WEP’s Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) with Message Integrity Check (MIC) to prevent 
an attacker from capturing, altering, and resending data packets. TKIP can be combined with other 
technologies (like biometric authentication) to achieve even greater protection.  
5.2  SECURITY RISKS POSED BY MOBILE DEVICES 
The proliferation of mobile devices has increased the P&S concerns of most IT P&S experts. The 
healthcare industry has also seen its share of this massive shift to mobile computing (Kelley, 
Cranor, & Sadeh, 2013; Potter, 2007). A recent survey demonstrates that there were more than 
165,000 mHealth applications in the world as of 2015. This number is supposed to double every 
year, with projections showing that there will be 1.7 billion mHealth users worldwide by the end 
of 2018 (Mabo, Swar, & Aghili, 2018). Mobile solutions have the main advantage of eliminating 
the need for wires and thus reducing clutter. They also offer convenience, workflow improvement, 
real-time voice access, and immediate and easy communication with people and machinery(Mabo 
et al., 2018). Despite all these advantages, mobile devices pose huge P&S risks (Abbott, 2010; 
Agarwal & Sebastian, 2014). Aside from having all the security risks of wireless communication 
networks, mobile devices pose other P&S risks because they are small and can easily be lost or 
stolen (Abbott, 2010). Today’s mobile devices have quite substantial storage and the capacity to 
connect to both cellular and local Ethernet networks including personal area networks like 
Bluetooth. This renders them susceptible to both global and local attacks (Potter, 2007).  
The use of mobile devices in healthcare amplifies these P&S concerns due to the sheer 
nature of the healthcare industry. Most organizations that provide health services have weak, or in 
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some cases missing, policies for the use of mobile devices. They typically lack procedures for 
workforce training and monitoring in place to protect people’s privacy (Kate & Borten, 2010). 
Mobile P&S risks can be categorized in three main areas:  
• Breach of data when at rest on a mobile device 
• Breach of data occurring during transmission of data to or from the mobile device 
• Breach of data occurring during transmission from the mobile device into the 
organization’s network 
There are multiple means by which a breach to mobile devices can occur. Some of these 
breach channels include: 
Mobile Malware: The increase in the number of people using mobile devices has led to an 
increase in criminals writing malware applications that target mobile devices. Some of these 
criminals are coming up with “malware for profit,” or they simply cause disruptions in mobile 
services. Most of these malwares come in the form of legitimate mobile apps injected with 
malicious code (Kate & Borten, 2010; Kelley et al., 2013; Markelj & Bernik, 2012; Martínez-
Pérez et al., 2015). These apps then compromise the mobile device to steal sensitive information, 
gain access to other network resources, and launch even bigger attacks on other devices on the 
network (Kelley et al., 2013). A report from McAfee found six million malwares in the first quarter 
of 2011 alone. What makes the phenomenon more worrisome is that many of these rogue apps 
have infiltrated the app stores on mobile devices and made themselves available for download 
(Martínez-Pérez et al., 2015; Rose, 2011). McAfee has reported a new version of Zitmo mobile 
malware that was created to steal user information such as passwords and bank account numbers 
on some operating systems like the Windows Mobile system.  
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Lack of Visual Privacy: It is very difficult to prevent other people from viewing one’s 
mobile screen, especially when it is used in an open area (T. Kwon & Hong, 2015). Due to their 
portability, mobile devices tend to be used by most people in the open. Hence, it is easy to expose 
confidential data/information (e.g., confidential PHI) to unauthorized persons in violation of 
HIPAA rules (Britton & Britton-Colonnese, 2017; Kate & Borten, 2010; Markelj & Bernik, 2012; 
Rose, 2011).  
Consumerization of Devices: Mobile devices have become more powerful, less expensive 
and more easily available. Hence, most individuals including healthcare workers use their personal 
mobile devices such as smartphones for business (Kate & Borten, 2010; Kelley et al., 2013; 
Markelj & Bernik, 2012). According to HIMSS, P&S remain a major concern for the adoption and 
use of mobile technology in healthcare. Data from a HIMSS survey showed that 41% of providers 
allow their personnel to use their own mobile devices for work-related activities. The survey 
further demonstrated that “Bring your own device” (BYOD) policies pose major P&S challenges 
to IT professionals with responsibility for managing and protecting PHI on these devices. Among 
users with no protection, 28% had devices that retained PHI and 77% used their devices on public, 
unsecured networks (Gallagher, 2012). For example, an email message sent from such a device as 
a means of collaboration between physicians could be intercepted by an attacker and lead to a 
breach in confidentiality.  Physicians surveyed have also acknowledged using devices provided by 
hospitals for personal reasons (Kate & Borten, 2010), which makes it even more difficult to secure 
such devices.   
Varying Operating Systems: Various mobile devices run on different operating systems or 
software platforms. This lack of standardization in the number of operating systems used on mobile 
platforms makes it even more difficult to implement P&S procedures to protect devices, including 
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the data on these devices (Britton & Britton-Colonnese, 2017; Kate & Borten, 2010). Hospitals 
and healthcare providers should therefore endeavor to buy standard mobile platforms for 
employees to use for business purposes. Healthcare providers can also invest in third-party or 
commercially available technologies to help manage divergent mobile platforms used by their 
staff.  
Vulnerable Connections: Users are still likely to use unsecured connections at times even 
if the healthcare unit provides them with a secured means of connection such as a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN). This usually occurs when using the devices for personal reasons (Kate & Borten, 
2010; Patton et al., 2014). 
Loss and Theft of a Device: This is a very serious issue. Of all the HIPAA P&S breaches 
posted on the U.S Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) website since 2009, theft 
and loss of portable devices and media have accounted for the highest number of breaches. This 
issue is even more acute because most mobile devices are not secured. Unencrypted data stored on 
the devices could be exposed in the event that the device is lost or stolen (Britton & Britton-
Colonnese, 2017; Kate & Borten, 2010; Rose, 2011). 
Insiders, Human Error: Security experts believe that company insiders and human error 
pose one of the greatest threats to data, information, and network security(Bhuyan et al., 2017). 
Two hundred and sixteen respondents from a recent survey by Unisphere Research in 2011 said 
that human error and privilege escalation were major concerns for information security. Seventy-
seven percent of the respondents were from financial institutions, and 56% were from non-
financial institutions (Kizza, 2013a).  
Lack of Awareness: A survey by McAfee and Carnegie Mellon University showed that one 
third of employees keep work-related and sensitive information on their mobile devices. Ninety-
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five percent of them said they were unaware of company P&S policies, even though these 
companies had well-defined policies in place. Most of the companies acknowledged widespread 
employee ignorance on how security, permissions, and other access settings work(Bhuyan et al., 
2017; Kizza, 2013b) . 
Bluesnarfing: When the Bluetooth on a user’s mobile device is enabled, rogue software or 
an individual can breach the connection to gain access to information on the device. This is a major 
issue when mobile users exchange information with other mobile users or transfer data between 
devices via Bluetooth. It turns out that many users are unaware of this loophole (Ciampa, 2008) 
(Bhuyan et al., 2017; Bindahman & Zakaria, 2011; Kizza, 2013a; Patton et al., 2014).  
Eavesdropping: Most mobile networks, as well as mobile devices, operate in what is called 
promiscuous mode, in which a node on the network captures data packets intended for other nodes 
(Awad, 2015). This is done to improve efficiency on the network. Yet it poses a security threat 
when a routing protocol uses this mode to learn different routes on a network in order to effectively 
and efficiently transmit data across the network (i.e., in the form of malicious code or payload). 
This same feature can also be employed by a malicious individual or software to eavesdrop on data 
in transit. The only effective solution available is cryptography, which ensures confidentiality but 
does not eliminate the security threat (i.e., does not prevent people from eavesdropping) (Awad, 
2015; Beretas, 2018; S. Das & Mukhopadhyay, 2011; Djenouri et al., 2005; Kelley et al., 2013). 
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5.3 PRIVACY AND SECURITY ISSUES OF WEB-BASED APPLICATIONS 
The need to service more than one person at a time, the popularity of the Internet, and low 
development cost have led to the development of web-based applications. The healthcare arena is 
no exception, as more and more e-Health applications are being developed to meet patient needs 
(Bhuyan et al., 2017; Maji et al., 2008; Weinstein et al., 2014). Web-based applications are 
expected to have a market exceeding $1 trillion in a few years. There is already a host of P&S 
concerns with the use of web-based technologies and software.  
To secure web-based/Internet-based applications and users, it is important to understand 
the architecture of web-based applications. Basically, web-based applications use three-tier 
architecture made up of Web clients, network servers, and databases to support different back-end 
information systems (Beretas, 2018; Ciampa, 2008; Joshi, Aref, Ghafoor, & Spafford, 2001; Kizza, 
2013a). For commercial web-based systems such as e-commerce and mobile health, there are other 
middleware applications that function between the network servers and back-end systems for 
proper interoperability (see Figure 2) (Joshi et al., 2001; Linthicum, 1999). Middleware is 
computer software that provides services not available in operating systems, making it possible for 
diverse applications to interconnect, communicate, and perform different input output functions 
(Beretas, 2018; Linthicum, 1999). One example is the Java application developed by Sun 
Microsystems that was later purchased by Oracle, which allows inter-connectivity and 
interoperability between computer software and hardware. Hence, middleware is sometimes 
referred to as “software glue” (see Figure 2). All network security vulnerabilities such as 
inadequate authentication, weak passwords, lack of encryption, and malware are still present for 
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web-based applications (Ballmann, 2015). These complications in web-based applications make it 
even more difficult for IT administrators to protect such systems (Kizza, 2013a).  
 
 
Figure 2:  Architecture of Web-based Applications 
 
 
Part of the process of protecting web-based applications requires protecting web browsers 
against attacks involving cookies, JavaScripts, Java, ActiveX, and cross-site scripting. Cookies are 
files containing information about various user online activities that are used to set user-specific 
preferences to better serve online content to users (Dadkhah, Beck, & Jazi, 2014; Sayed, Traore, 
& Abdelhalim, 2014). Cookies are usually stored on users’ computers. Cookies by themselves do 
not pose security risks, as they do not contain specific user information like user names and 
passwords. They do, however, pose privacy risks, as they can be used to track users’ online 
activities and prompt targeted presentation of online content such as advertisements and sometimes 
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unwanted content to users (Bouguettaya & Eltoweissy, 2003; Ciampa, 2008; Joshi et al., 2001; 
Kizza, 2013a; Lepofsky, 2014). 
 JavaScript was developed by Netscape to help websites run more smoothly and efficiently.  
For example, instead of loading large image files and other content each time a user visits a 
website, a button or link can be provided on the website for the user to click, which in turn would 
run the JavaScript to load an image or specific content to the user.  However, the fact that the script 
can load an executable program to run on the website poses serious P&S issues. An attacker can 
inject its own code to download and execute a malicious program/application to steal personal 
information (Bouguettaya & Eltoweissy, 2003; Ciampa, 2008; Joshi et al., 2001; Sayed et al., 
2014).   
Java, unlike JavaScript, is a complete, object-oriented, programming language developed 
by Sun Microsystems. The advantage of Java is that it can be used to create small, stand-alone, 
machine-independent applications called applets. These can be used to add different functionalities 
and features to web pages. The applets are stored on the web server and downloaded along with 
other HTML code to users’ computers to perform interactive animations, immediate calculations, 
and other simple tasks very quickly. Hackers or attackers can inject hostile Java applets onto 
websites to access data, passwords, and other information on both the user’s local computer and 
the network server. The most widely-used defense against malicious Java applets has been 
sandboxing, which creates a security fence to keep Java applets away from private data and other 
areas of the local computer (Ciampa, 2008; Joshi et al., 2001; Lepofsky, 2014). However, this is 
not a complete solution, as sandboxes can sometimes break down.  One way that users can protect 
themselves is to only run signed Java applets. Signed Java applets have information to prove that 
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the program is from a legitimate source, whereas unsigned ones are usually not from trusted 
sources and thus have no information about the source.  
ActiveX is not a scripting program, but rather a set of rules developed by Microsoft to 
control how applications share information. ActiveX controls, also called add-ons or ActiveX 
applications, are utilized to implement ActiveX (Dadkhah et al., 2014). These controls can perform 
most of the same functions as Java applets except that they do not run in sandboxes and hence 
have complete access to the computer, including the operating systems and hard drives. They can 
therefore be used by attackers or hackers to wreak more havoc, such as deleting or stealing files 
from computer hard drives, as well as formatting the hard drives. Signing ActiveX does not 
guarantee trustworthiness. The person who signed the control may not have taken time to assess 
all of the security vulnerabilities which could pose a threat to users and their computers. The main 
defense against ActiveX controls is to disable them in web browsers. The downside, however, is 
that some webpage functionality will be lost, such as the inability to run certain web applications 
or visit certain websites altogether (Bouguettaya & Eltoweissy, 2003; Ciampa, 2008; Joshi et al., 
2001). 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is a mechanism that involves using JavaScript on the victim’s 
computer to extract information and transmit it to an attacker. A malicious code is usually inserted 
into a dynamic webpage in this type of attack. The intent is not to attack the webpage or web server 
itself, but to obtain information from an unsuspecting web surfer. Hence, cross site scripting takes 
the form of social engineering to trick users into performing actions that otherwise should not be 
performed (Ciampa, 2008; Hydara, Sultan, Zulzalil, & Admodisastro, 2015).  
Insider Attacks are other forms of attacks that are on the increase. The FBI and the 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) reported that insider attacks account for the most losses in 
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organizations. Seventy-one percent of organizations interviewed said that they had detected 
various kinds of insider attacks. Insider attacks usually come in the form of privilege escalation 
and disgruntled employees, as mentioned earlier. People escalate their security privileges on the 
system to gain unauthorized access to information (Ballmann, 2015; Harris & Hunt, 1999; Joshi 
et al., 2001).   
 Push technology is employed by many sites to deliver content to clients. An attacker or 
even the content provider can take advantage of this to exploit vulnerabilities in a browser to 
deliver malicious executable code to users. This same vulnerability can be exploited to cause denial 
of service attacks by overwhelming systems by sending a high volume of information to servers 
(Basu & Kanchanasut, 2015; Joshi et al., 2001).  
Phishing Attacks/Malicious Software are new tricks employed by attackers to gain/steal 
information from unsuspecting people. One of the most popular phishing techniques is called 
spear-phishing. This takes the form of unsolicited emails sent to people who have access to 
sensitive network/computer system information. These emails are authored to appear to be 
legitimate. Once the victim clicks on them, malicious code or software attached to the emails is 
installed on the victim’s computer to steal sensitive information. This information can then be used 
to stage an even more sophisticated and damaging attack on the victim’s computer system (G. 
Smith, 2012).  
Fake Antivirus Software is another type of malicious software that is on the rise. Fake 
antivirus software mimics legitimate antivirus software and displays misleading information about 
non-existent viruses. This is done to trick users into purchasing the commercial version of such 
software programs in order to remove these non-existent viruses. Once the unsuspecting user 
provides a credit card number, not only is the person sold fake antivirus software, but the person’s 
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credit card information is also stolen. The software can then be used in most cases as a back-door 
to get into the victim’s computer at will to steal other personal information. The software can also 
be used for other malicious purposes like taking over the user’s computer and using it as a source 
of distributed DoS attack. This is a multibillion dollar industry operated mainly from European 
“partnerka network affiliates” networks with different pseudonyms, with each affiliate netting over 
$130 million annually (Huang, Siegel, & Stuart, 2018; Joshi et al., 2001; G. Smith, 2012; Stone-
Gross et al., 2011),   
5.4  THREATS FROM SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Social networking software has been defined as “online spaces that allow individuals to present 
themselves, articulate their social networks, and establish or maintain connections with others” 
(Cain, 2008). Social networking sites such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter are very popular 
with people, especially the younger generation. This increase in patronage and other advantages, 
such as being able to reach a mass audience all at once, has prompted businesses and various 
organizations to incorporate these social networking sites into various parts of their businesses 
(Garcia-Morales, Martín-Rojas, & Lardón-López, 2018). It is a well-known and publicized fact 
that even the US president and the Pope have Facebook and Twitter accounts. Eighty to ninety 
percent of US college students have accounts on Facebook, the preferred social networking site 
among that group. Facebook is said to be the most popular social media platform, with more than 
2 billion monthly active users as of the second quarter of 2018 (Coco et al., 2018).   
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Most social network users trust the friends that they make on social network sites. They 
share large volumes of private information like demographic information, contact information, 
comments, images and videos (Cain, 2008; Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Gunatilaka, 2011). Most 
people visit social networking sites to make friends, and then accept friendship requests very 
easily. In a recent study done at Carnegie Mellon University involving the download and analyses 
of Facebook profiles, it was found that less than 1% of Facebook users changed their default P&S 
settings. Most users provided large volumes of personal information like phone numbers (39.9%) 
and current residence (50.8%), with the majority mostly unaware of or unconcerned with limiting 
access to private information on their profiles (Cain, 2008). This website has therefore become a 
“pot of gold” for highly sensitive data.  
 It is this massive user base and large volume of data shared among these unsuspecting 
users that has aroused the attention of attackers. Even though most social networking sites have 
put security measures in place to combat ever increasing security threats, attackers are using 
trickery and more sophisticated mechanisms to attack users (Chambers, Fry, & McMasters, 2018; 
Gunatilaka, 2011; Irani, Balduzzi, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Pu, 2011). Cybercriminals have also 
capitalized on the ease of access to social networks to employ social engineering and reverse social 
engineering (RSE) to gain exclusive access to people’s sensitive information. Both social 
engineering and RSE are invoked as the first step in more sophisticated attacks. They are used to 
gain access to users’ context information (user specific information or identifying information) 
which can then be used to launch various attacks like phishing, spamming, and malware on 
unsuspecting users. The difference between the two approaches is the mode of attack. In RSE the 
user is normally not directly approached by the would-be attacker. Instead, users are influenced to 
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perform an action (e.g., click on a link) or tricked to initiate contact with the attacker (Djenouri et 
al., 2005; Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Gunatilaka, 2011; G. Smith, 2012). 
RSE involves three main attack methods: recommendation-based RSE, demographic-
based RSE, and visitor tracking-based RSE (Algarni, Xu, Chan, & Tian, 2014; Gunatilaka, 2011; 
Irani et al., 2011). Recommendation-based RSE attacks victims by exploiting the friend 
recommendation feature of social networking sites. Demographic-based RSE also uses the friend 
recommendation feature. Here, the attacker gains access to the user’s demographic information 
such as location, interests, and date of birth. This information can then be used to attack the user 
in various ways, such as impersonating the user or creating another account on a different social 
media environment and attacking the user’s friends to gain access to more information. Visitor 
tracking-based RSE, as its name suggests, is based on the visitor tracking feature on some social 
networks. This allows users to track who has viewed their profiles. This is a useful feature since 
most people would probably want to know who has viewed their profiles. Attackers, on the other 
hand, use this function to attract people to their profiles to initiate contact. This allows them to 
gain information from the visitors, which is later used to attack them.  
As mentioned earlier, overwhelming patronage coupled with the aggressive attack methods 
of attackers has brought P&S issues to the forefront, especially in the cyber environment. User 
anonymity or user identity is critical in any discussions of privacy in social media. Having access 
to information without knowing to whom the information belongs is of little use to an attacker. 
Being able to associate a name or put a face to the information is what adds value to the 
information. Since most users of social networking sites use their real names to set up their 
accounts, their identity is exposed to other users. Some search engines index individual social 
network accounts and make them searchable. Therefore, if an attacker knows a person’s name, he 
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or she can easily obtain the person’s profile information (Chambers et al., 2018; Gambs, Killijian, 
& del Prado Cortez, 2014; Gunatilaka, 2011; Irani et al., 2011). Other ways attackers can expose 
an individual’s identity on social networking sites are by de-anonymizing personal information 
and using neighborhood attacks (Bilge, Strufe, Balzarotti, & Kirda, 2009; Gambs et al., 2014; 
Gunatilaka, 2011; Sharad & Danezis, 2014).  
People who share the same interest can form distinct groups on social networks to facilitate 
exchange of information and ideas. An attacker can exploit this by using a combination of group 
membership information and other history-stealing techniques to reveal the identity of social 
network users (Chambers et al., 2018; Gunatilaka, 2011; Irani et al., 2011; Sharad & Danezis, 
2014). The only information needed to facilitate this type of attack is the user’s group information, 
which typically includes group name, username, date of birth, and other information about 
members in the group. Attackers are known to focus on social network groups because it gives 
them access to more information.  History-stealing techniques are used to obtain URLs to websites 
that a user has visited in the past in order to find out the victim’s group information (Gunatilaka, 
2011; Wondracek, Holz, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2010). The attacker first gains access to the victim’s 
browsing history, which is then scanned and analyzed to find out the victim’s group.  
Client-side scripting like JavaScript, mentioned earlier, and conditional logic in Cascading 
Style Sheet (CSS) are some of the methods that can be employed to steal URL link history 
information (Ciampa, 2008; Gunatilaka, 2011). Most social networks also provide mailing lists of 
users. Attackers can use these mailing lists to look for profile information of victims or to spam 
them.   
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5.4.1 Neighborhood Attack 
Social networks can be denoted by a social graph, with users representing a node on the graph as 
shown in Figure 3. An edge is used to link two people who are close friends. Neighborhood attacks 
involve the attacker using information about a victim’s (node or Vertex) neighbors to identify the 
victim’s (node) and leak the user’s privacy (Chambers et al., 2018; P. Wang, Zhang, & Huang, 
2015; Zhou & Pei, 2008). For example, user A in Figure 3 has five friends (users B, C, D, E, F); 
user’s B and C are also friends, but D, E, and F are not friends. If an attacker knows that A has two 
close friends who are also friends and three other friends who do not know each other, this 
information can be used to identify A and breach his or her privacy. This is because the 1-
neighborhood graph of A is unique to A; that is, no other vertex has the same 1-neighborhood 
graph (Gunatilaka, 2011; P. Wang et al., 2015; Zhou & Pei, 2008). 
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5.4.2 De-Anonymization Attack 
 
 
Figure 3: 1- Neighborhood Graph of A 
 
Because almost all Facebook users (>99%) do not bother to change the default privacy settings, 
their individual profiles are a source of much personal and sensitive information such as full names, 
contact information, relationship status, date of birth, previous and current addresses as well as 
educational background. When this personal information is leaked by compromising users’ 
profiles, an attacker can use this to launch more attacks. There are several ways that users’ profiles 
can be leaked: 
5.4.3  Inadequate Privacy Settings 
Most social network sites use default privacy or permissions of “friends of friends.” This means 
that a person whom a user does not know can gain access to sensitive or personal information by 
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virtue of the fact that that person is a friend of their friend (Cain, 2008; Watson & Rodrigues, 
2018). Attackers can still find ways to circumvent even the strictest privacy settings to steal 
personal information.  
5.4.4 Third Party Applications 
Third party developers use application programming interfaces (APIs) provided by social 
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter to develop applications that run on such platforms. 
Users allow access to their personal information by these third party applications (Abdulhamid, 
Ahmad, Waziri, & Jibril, 2014; Balebako, Marsh, Lin, Hong, & Cranor, 2014; Kelley et al., 2013). 
This usually happens during application setup. Users are typically asked if they want the 
applications to access their personal data. In other instances, users receive a generic warning that 
the software will access personal information. Most users are so intent on getting and installing 
the apps that they do not pay attention to these messages about privacy. These applications can 
then be used to obtain people’s personal data and perform various activities on the user’s behalf 
without the user’s knowledge. The information obtained is also sometimes shared with other third 
party vendors without the user’s knowledge (Gunatilaka, 2011; Kelley et al., 2013; Krishnamurthy 
& Wills, 2008).  
5.4.5 Information Leakage to Third Party Domains 
This is the use of a third party domain service which most social networking sites employ to track 
users’ activities, mostly for commercial benefit (Pan, Cao, & Chen, 2015). Some social networking 
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sites partner with different companies (usually advertising companies) to access, aggregate, and 
analyze users’ social networking data for commercial purposes, such as targeting specific 
advertisements to the users (Gunatilaka, 2011). 
Apart from the social engineering attacks discussed earlier, there is the issue of identity 
theft. This involves using someone’s (usually stolen) information to impersonate the person. One 
common or basic technique used by rogue people to commit identity theft on social networking 
sites is profile cloning. Another is social phishing.  
5.4.6 Profile Cloning 
Attackers take advantage of trust among friends on social networking sites and individuals’ general 
lack of care when accepting friendship requests to gain access to personal information. The most 
vulnerable to this type of attack are those who set their profiles to be public. This allows attackers 
to access their profile information in order to set up a false social network profile/identity 
(Gunatilaka, 2011; Meligy, Ibrahim, & Torky, 2015). The two main types of profile cloning are 
existing profile cloning and cross-site profile cloning (Bilge et al., 2009; Gunatilaka, 2011; Kelley 
et al., 2013; Kontaxis, Polakis, Ioannidis, & Markatos, 2011). 
5.4.7 Existing Profile Cloning 
This involves impersonations of social network users by using their biographic information such 
as name, picture, and other personal information to create another account. The attacker then sends 
friend requests to individuals known to the user. The strength of this type of attack is that most 
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users will accept friendship requests from people they know.  This then permits the attacker to 
access personal information of friends of friends (Kontaxis et al., 2011; Meligy et al., 2015; 
Wondracek et al., 2010).   
5.4.8 Cross-site Profile Cloning 
This is a more sophisticated attack strategy than existing profile cloning. In this case, the attacker 
uses personal information stolen from another social networking site to create an account on a 
social networking site that a user has never visited. This type of account looks even more legitimate 
in the sense that there is no duplicate account on this new social networking site. The attacker can 
then send invitations or friendship requests to people on the user’s contact list extracted from the 
previous social networking site. Once the “friends” accept these requests, the attacker can gain 
access to their profiles(Meligy et al., 2015).  
5.4.9 Phishing on Social Networks 
Phishing on social networking sites is another issue that users should understand. Phishing 
involves the use of illegitimate means to extract information from unsuspecting victims 
(Ciampaglia et al., 2015). Until recently phishing was implemented in the form of unsolicited 
emails (Smiths, 2012). Phishing has become more sophisticated, with attackers using fake websites 
that look authentic to fool victims into providing personal and confidential information like 
passwords, financial information, and various forms of identification information (Gunatilaka, 
2011; Halevi, Memon, & Nov, 2015). Phishing can also be in the form of malicious software such 
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as fake antivirus software that asks users to buy a full version of the antivirus software after the 
software is purported to have found “fake viruses.”   
5.4.10  Social Network Spam 
This type of spam usually comes in the form of unsolicited emails. People have become quite 
aware of spam and will usually delete these emails or use spam filters for protection. Spam on 
social networking sites, on the other hand, can be introduced in the form of wall posts, news feeds, 
and other messages that target victims. This spam often contains advertisements and hyperlinks 
that redirect users to phishing websites when clicked. The context-ware attacks can take three 
forms which have a high click rate because they look authentic (Brown, Howe, Ihbe, Prakash, & 
Borders, 2008; Gunatilaka, 2011; He, Lee, & Whinston, 2014):  
5.4.11  Relationship-based attacks 
These attacks use friend-to-friend relationship information and no other information from the 
user’s profile to attack. An attack is usually in the form of a social networking contact or email, 
which serves as a believable medium for launching an attack (Chadwick, 2014).  
5.4.12  Unshared-attribute attacks  
These malicious attacks use information gained from friend-to-friend relationships, in addition to 
some type of attribute from one of the persons in the relationship to launch an attack. About 87% 
of social network users include their birthday on social networks (Brown et al., 2008). An unshared 
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attribute attack, for example, could present in the form of a “birthday greeting attack” in which the 
attacker sends an electronic birthday card with embedded malicious code to one of the friends in 
the relationship. The greeting has to be sent close to the person’s birthday for it to look authentic 
(Brown et al., 2008).  
5.4.13 Shared-attribute attacks 
These attacks involve the use of an attribute that is visible to all parties in a “friend-to-friend 
relationship," such as a common school that both attended (Krombholz, Hobel, Huber, & Weippl, 
2014).  
 
5.4.14 HTTP Session Hijacking Attacks on Social Networking Sites (SNSs) 
HTTP Session Hijacking Attacks on SNS are usually manifested in the form of a man-in-the-
middle attack used to obtain context information from users and their friends. This information 
can then be used to spam victims and their friends (I. Das, 2014; Gunatilaka, 2011).  A variant of 
the man-in-the-middle attack used on SNSs is a friend-in-the-middle attack (FITM), which has 
been described as an active eavesdropping attack on SNSs (Huber, Mulazzani, Weippl, Kitzler, & 
Goluch, 2011). A user’s social networking session can be hijacked by an attacker, allowing the 
attacker to steal personal information from the victim’s profile (Grunin, Nachman, Nassar, & 
Nassar, 2015). This information can then be used to spam and send phishing emails to the victim’s 
friends (Huber et al., 2011). Friend-in-the-middle attacks can also start as eavesdropping. The 
attacker sniffs a communication/session between SNSs that are not using data encryption and thus 
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are more vulnerable to these types of attacks. The attack can take different forms: Address 
Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning or Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning (Grunin 
et al., 2015; Huber et al., 2011). In ARP cache poisoning, the attacker sends forged ARP requests 
and reply packets which allow the attacker to change the MAC address of the victim’s computer 
to one that the attacker can monitor. The attacker is then able to steal sensitive and private 
information such as profile information, passwords, and contacts that  in turn spam or initiate 
phishing attacks on the victim’s friends (Gunatilaka, 2011; Huber et al., 2011). Most websites 
employ cookie-based authentication (Ciampa, 2008). An attacker can therefore capture HTTP 
headers containing session cookies, which can, in turn, be used to access the victim’s profile and 
other personal/private information. The attacker uses information obtained from the sniffing attack 
to access the victim’s profile, which it uses to steal information such as email addresses from the 
victim’s friends to use against them (Gunatilaka, 2011).  
5.4.15  Malware/Viruses 
Malware such as viruses and other malicious applications also exist in the social networking 
environment. The spread of viruses in the social networking world is facilitated by the very nature 
and strength of the system itself. The system relies on the relationships among friends, making it 
easier for malicious software to be spread across the SNSs. Another weakness of SNSs is their 
inability to determine if embedded links or URLs are legitimate or not. This weakness can be 
exploited by attackers who provide fake links on SNSs. When users click on these links they are 
either redirected to malicious websites to execute a malicious program, or to install malicious 
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software on their computer in order to steal information from victims and, in many cases, their 
friends (Gunatilaka, 2011; Kumar & Rani, 2014; Mittal & Singh, 2014).  
5.4.16 Drive-by Download Attack 
This is defined as an attack in which the user’s browser is exploited and malicious software or 
code are downloaded onto the user’s computer without his or her knowledge (Sood & Enbody, 
2011). Also known as advertising, this type of attack involves the use of an advertisement to spread 
malware and other malicious applications across SNSs. Victims are usually redirected to malicious 
websites after they click on advertisements posted on their walls by attackers. In other instances, 
malicious code or software is directly installed on the victim’s computer when he or she clicks on 
the advertisements (Gunatilaka, 2011; Kim, Yan, & Zhang, 2015; Sood & Enbody, 2011). 
Facebook was reportedly hit by a drive-by-download attack that was traced to a group with ties to 
a certain Facebook application (Gunatilaka, 2011). 
5.4.17 Cross-Site Scripting Attack 
As described earlier, cross-site scripting (XSS) involves the insertion of JavaScript on the victim’s 
computer to steal information. The attacker injects malicious HTML code into a dynamic website 
to make the browser send the victim’s cookies, which contain personal information, to the 
attacker’s server (Ciampa, 2008; Gunatilaka, 2011; Householder et al., 2002; Lepofsky, 2014).  An 
example is the XSS worm that propagates amongst users who patronize malicious websites. This 
exploits the “connectivity characteristics” among social network users to spread malicious 
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software which is then used to steal information. For instance, the attacker identifies a social 
network user to start the spread of a virus. Once the user logs on, the malicious code takes over 
the user’s browser and performs various activities in the user’s name. These include but are not 
limited to stealing the user’s contacts and posting or sending messages to the user’s wall. 
(Gunatilaka, 2011). The contacts can then be used to send or spread malware to the victim’s 
friends.   
5.4.18 Clickjacking  
Clickjacking is a technique that tricks victims into interacting with an object on a webpage. It can 
take the form of a web framing attack where an attacker employs iframes to hijack a user’s web 
session (Rydstedt, Bursztein, Boneh, & Jackson, 2010; Shahriar & Devendran, 2014). There are 
different forms of clickjacking attacks. In some instances, a victim is presented with a video that 
looks like a real YouTube video. When the user clicks on the video, a malicious code is embedded 
in the video or a Facebook-like button is executed. This can then be used to access the user’s 
personal or private information. It is easy to spread this malicious code or malware to the victim’s 
friends once some type of profile or context information has been compromised. Sometimes the 
victim is asked to provide some information before viewing the video.  (Gunatilaka, 2011; 
Rydstedt et al., 2010).    
In a typical clickjacking attack, the victim’s site is framed in a transparent iframe. This 
iframe is put on top of another page that looks like a normal or legitimate page. The idea is to 
deceive the victim into clicking or interacting with the iframe which is, in fact, interacting with the 
attacker’s page (Rydstedt et al., 2010).   
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Some examples of social network malware are Twitter Worm and Koobface (Gunatilaka, 
2011). Koobface is very prominent on SNSs like Facebook. Its main form of propagation is 
through messages exchanged between friends, often in the form of a video, button, or iframe that 
entices the victim to click or interact with the object. Twitter Worm, on the other hand, is spread 
by tweeting a link to a friend, inviting him or her to download some type of application. This could 
be a third-party application like “Profile Spy,” which is supposed to help users to find out who has 
viewed their profile. Instead, the software steals the victim’s private or personal information 
provided before downloading and installing the software. This allows the attacker to gain access 
to a host of personal data or confidential information. 
5.4.19  Physical Threats 
Social media threats can easily lead to physical threats. Victims do not only have to worry about 
online threats, as some can actually result in physical threats such as stalking (Gunatilaka, 2011; 
Van Royen, Poels, Daelemans, & Vandebosch, 2015). The personal information that people post 
on their social network pages can be used to identify them, allowing criminals to find out where 
they live and either stalk or harm them in different ways. Location-based services on smartphones 
such as Google latitude or Foursquare can allow criminals to track victim’s behavior and location.  
As can be seen from these multiple examples, social network patronage must be done 
carefully for users to safeguard themselves against attacks. Particular attention should be 
concentrated on reducing the potential for such attacks before using the medium to provide 
healthcare services of any kind (e.g., healthcare support groups, information about diseases during 
epidemics, posting educational videos).   
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5.5 CLOUD BASED SYSTEMS 
Cloud computing is basically a way for computer users with varying backgrounds to share a range 
of computer resources (Abdelmaboud, Jawawi, Ghani, Elsafi, & Kitchenham, 2015; Bele, 2018; 
Mell & Grance, 2009). The backbone of cloud computing is virtualization. This allows 
organizations to create and manage their IT infrastructure in a shared environment provided by a 
third party company, mostly over the Internet (Christodorescu, Sailer, Schales, Sgandurra, & 
Zamboni, 2009). Cloud computing has been defined as “a style of computing where massively 
scalable IT-enabled capabilities are delivered ‘as a service’ to external customers”(Dhanalakshmi 
& Thomas, 2015). Factors driving the adoption of cloud computing by most companies include 
but are not limited to the cost of procuring and maintaining robust and powerful IT infrastructure 
or systems (Chou, 2015; Gangwar, Date, Ramaswamy, Irani, & Irani, 2015; Shankar & Duraisamy, 
2018). Some of the financial incentives for the adoption of cloud technology are: 1. reduced 
hardware costs, as companies do not have to invest in high-end computer devices like servers; 2. 
reduced license costs; and 3. reduced patch management costs. Companies can also save much 
more money by not having to engineer and manage their own data centers for optimum 
performance. Cloud computing can also help companies save money from poor utilization of IT 
resources, as companies only pay for the resources they currently need and can scale up or down 
as needed. This helps to reduce the tendency of over or under-budgeting for IT resources (Jensen, 
Schwenk, Gruschka, & Iacono, 2009).  
Most small and medium-sized businesses are taking advantage of sophisticated, robust, and 
powerful high-end business applications offered over the cloud to drastically boost their IT 
infrastructure at bargain prices (Subashini & Kavitha, 2011). In fact, the US government was 
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projected to account for  approximately 40% of the growth in cloud computing, at a cost that was  
expected to surpass $7 billion in 2015 (Kaufman, 2009). 
Cloud computing is touted to become the next big area in information technology due to 
its overwhelming advantages such as: on-demand self-service, ubiquitous network access, location 
independent resource pooling, rapid resource elasticity, usage-based pricing, and transfer of risk. 
Companies are also relieved of the burden of storage management, capital expenditure on 
hardware and software, and personnel maintenance (Chou, 2015; Shankar & Duraisamy, 2018; C. 
Wang et al., 2010).  
Even though there are many advantages to cloud computing, it also comes with new and 
very perplexing security issues (Danish & Sharma, 2018; Lian, 2015; C. Wang et al., 2010; Wei 
et al., 2014). Users and companies must relinquish definitive control over their data in the cloud 
to the service providers. No one is sure what third-party companies can or will do with all these 
sets of data that they control or manage. This poses P&S risks to individuals’ data and jeopardizes 
data integrity (Danish & Sharma, 2018; Kaufman, 2009; C. Wang et al., 2010).  With users’ data 
hosted on servers belonging to third party companies who provide cloud services, traditional 
cryptographic methods for data security become almost impossible to implement (Jensen et al., 
2009; C. Wang et al., 2010).  
Due to the complex nature of securing data in the cloud, most companies are employing 
the services of third-party auditors to help with data security(Lins, Schneider, & Sunyaev, 2018). 
The companies rely on security reports from these third-party auditors to evaluate and address 
security vulnerabilities in their cloud data. This auditing process has the potential to introduce an 
additional source through which users’ data could be compromised. The potential for information 
leakage by the third party auditors could create even more problems, especially for healthcare 
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providers trying to meet data privacy and security standards set by HIPAA/HITECH and other 
healthcare regulations (Rathi & Parmar, 2015; Rimal, Choi, & Lumb, 2009; C. Wang et al., 2010).      
Cloud technology by its nature, therefore, presents significant challenges for healthcare 
providers who want to adopt the cloud to meet HIPAA P&S requirements. The storage of patient 
information in the cloud may infringe on certain state and federal P&S requirements (Sotto, 
Treacy, & McLellan, 2010; C. Wang et al., 2010). Both HIPAA and HITECH regulations have 
restrictions for both CEs and their BAs to safeguard the P&S of their patients’ data (Pasquale & 
Ragone, 2014; Peterson & Watzlaf, 2015; D. J. Solove & Hartzog, 2014; Sotto et al., 2010). Cloud 
service providers and healthcare providers must enter into Business Associate Agreements to 
safeguard the security and privacy of patient data line PHI (F. A. Pasquale & T. A. Ragone, 2013).  
It is therefore a good idea for companies, especially healthcare providers and their BAs, to have a 
good understanding of cloud computing. This will make it possible for CEs and their BAs to 
formulate policies and procedures to protect patient data residing in the cloud, and to make sure 
that they are in compliance with all the necessary regulations (F. Pasquale & T. A. Ragone, 2013). 
Another very important policy that providers must contend with is the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GPRA). It is said to be the biggest shakeup in data protection laws in 20 years 
(Wilkinson, 2018). Hence health application developers and healthcare providers who intend to 
use cloud services have to also take GPRA requirements into account when formulating or 
designing their P&S policies (Wilkinson, 2018). 
For the most part, cloud computing comes in three main flavors:  private, public, and hybrid 




Private Cloud: The data resides in the company’s website. It is under full control of the 
company’s IT staff and therefore not exposed to the same security vulnerabilities and requirements 
of public clouds. This, however, could limit users’ access to the data stored there.  
Public Cloud: This is probably the most comprehensive definition of cloud computing. 
This form of cloud computing usually involves a third-party providing services over the Internet 
to subscribed users, enabling them to dynamically share resources.  
 Hybrid Cloud: This is a combination of the private and public cloud and is made up of 
internal and external providers.   
There are different forms of cloud services such as application/software and platform, 
hardware and infrastructure as a service.  
5.5.1 Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) 
This is otherwise known as the Application Service Provider (ASP) model and entails use of shared 
resources to make applications/software and associated databases available to users (Bele, 2018; 
James & Chung, 2015; Rimal et al., 2009; Ryan, 2014; Subashini & Kavitha, 2011). Companies 
including healthcare providers do not have to spend large sums of money to buy these 
software/applications, including the annual license and support fees (Jensen et al., 2009; Subashini 
& Kavitha, 2011; F. Zhao, Gaw, Bender, & Levy, 2018).   
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5.5.2 Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) 
This service is offered mainly for developers and programmers. It enables them to remotely access 
resources and tools needed for various aspects of the software development cycle. These include 
but are not restricted to developing, testing, deploying, and hosting sophisticated web applications 
(Bele, 2018; James & Chung, 2015; Rimal et al., 2009; Subashini & Kavitha, 2011).   
5.5.3 Hardware-as-a-Service (HaaS) 
The days of “personal computing” as it is known now are almost over (Carr, 2013; Shankar & 
Duraisamy, 2018). Most companies are not relishing buying or owning their own computer 
hardware or resources. Instead, they are shifting towards the use of HaaS (Bouzidi, Soltani, 
Bouhank, & Daoudi, 2018; Carr, 2013; James & Chung, 2015; Sotto et al., 2010; C. Wang et al., 
2010).  More and more companies are adopting pay-as-you-go subscription services that scale up 
or down according to their needs for IT hardware (Shankar & Duraisamy, 2018). HaaS has 
numerous advantages such as flexibility, scalability, cost and place independence. IT 
administrators do not have to worry about maintenance (system updates, software patches and 
disaster recovery) as these services are provided by the service providers (Bouzidi et al., 2018; 
Shankar & Duraisamy, 2018). Hence some corporations have even gone as far as using this type 
of service to set up complete data centers (Shankar & Duraisamy, 2018).  
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5.5.4 Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) 
Companies can build their whole IT infrastructure on a pay-as-you-go basis. This gives them the 
flexibility of paying for what they use as well as having the newest technology at their disposal. 
Most companies are starting to find this model very economical (Bele, 2018; James & Chung, 
2015; Rimal et al., 2009; C. Wang et al., 2010).    
On the average, the United States healthcare expenditure is projected to grow by 5.5% 
annually in 2017 to 2026. This will be 19.7% of the U.S. economy.(Cuckler et al., 2018)  
Healthcare providers including hospitals are looking for ways to cut costs. Adoption of cloud 
computing technology can lead to tremendous reduction in IT budget (Ali, Shrestha, Soar, & 
Wamba, 2018). This will require strict rules and procedures to be put in place to meet all 
HIPAA/HITECH and state regulations. Some of the data P&S issues pertaining to cloud 
computing are discussed here. 
5.5.5 Browser Security 
Because cloud computing is primarily done over the Internet, it is subject to most of the security 
issues of Internet browsers (Jensen et al., 2009; Mahajan & Giri, 2014; Shankar & Duraisamy, 
2018). These include Cross Site Scripting (XSS), ActiveX, JavaScript’s, and the malicious web 




Reliance on the cloud could cause significant availability problems due to downtime and outages 
that are out of an organization’s control. An attacker can use a flooding attack, which involves 
sending large volumes of nonsense data to the cloud. This could overwhelm the system and make 
it difficult for the system to respond to legitimate requests, thus leading to Denial-of-Service 
attacks (Danish & Sharma, 2018; Grover & Sharma, 2014; Jensen et al., 2009).  Summaries of 
downtime by some cloud service providers can be found in Table 6 (Addo, Ahamed, & Chu, 2014; 
Mesbahi, Rahmani, & Hosseinzadeh, 2018; Rimal et al., 2009; Srinivasan, 2014; Subashini & 
Kavitha, 2011). Such downtime poses significant problems with the parts of HIPAA and other 
healthcare legislation that deal with data availability. An example of non-availability of data could 
arise when, for instance, a patient has to be treated but physicians and other healthcare workers are 
not able to access their PHI residing in the cloud that is required to make decisions (Mxoli, Gerber, 
& Mostert-Phipps, 2014; Mxoli, Mostert-Phipps, & Gerber, 2017).  
 
Table 6:  Outages in Different Cloud Services 
 
Service and Outage Duration Date 
IBM’s cloud infrastructure 
failure  
Several hours January 26, 2017 
GitLab’s popular online 
code repository service 
outage 
Several hours January 31, 2017 
Facebook   February 24, 2017 
Amazon Web Services ~ 4 hours February 28, 2017 
Microsoft Azure  7 hours March 16, 2017 
Microsoft Office 365  Several hours March 21, 2017 
Microsoft Azure: 
Malfunction in Windows 
Azure  
22 hours March 13-14, 2008 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Gmail and Google Apps 
Engine 
2.5 hours Feb 24, 2009 
Google search outage: 
programming error 
40 min Jan 31, 2009 
Gmail: Site unavailable due 
to outage in contacts system 
1.5 hours Aug 11, 2008 
Google AppEngine partial 
outage: programming error 
5 hours June 17,  2008, October 26, 
2012 
S3 outage authentication  
service overload leading to 
unavailability  
2 hours Feb 15, 2008 
S3 Outage: single bit error 
leading to gossip protocol 
blowup 
6-8 hours  July 20,  2008 
FlexiScale: core network 
failure 
18 hours  Oct 31, 2008 
Amazon: Amazon Website 
Outage,  caused by a glitch 
in backup system  
3 days April 21, 2011 
Amazon: Amazon Website 
Outage 
- Sept 13, 2013  
Gmail outage: Few minutes April 17, 2013 
Microsoft Outlook Services: 
caused by firmware updates 
that affected temperatures at 
data centers 
16 hours March 14, 2013 
Facebook 2 hours January 28, 2013 
PayPal:  Internal network 
problems 
Several hours August 3, 2009 
Healthcare.gov Several hours October 2013 
 
5.5.7 Cloud Malware Injection Attack 
This type of threat to privacy and security is generally manifested in the form of SaaS or PaaS. 
The attacker creates his or her own malicious service implementation model. This could be a 
virtual machine instance (IaaS), SaaS, or PaaS and added to the cloud system. The rogue person 
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then must trick the cloud system into accepting the new (malicious) instance as one of its legitimate 
instances of the service he or she is looking to attack. Once this is accomplished, the cloud system 
automatically redirects the user request to the rogue service implementation. The malicious code 
incorporated into the service then executes once users connect to the service (Akshay, Kakkar, 
Jayasree, Prudhvi, & Metgal, 2015; Dhote & Bhavsar, 2018; Jensen et al., 2009). This could be 
used to access a patient’s sensitive data if a healthcare provider were using this service for patient 
care. 
5.5.8 Data Encapsulation and Data security  
If the right security measures are not put in place to segregate patient data, multiple users could 
see each other’s data (Ali et al., 2018; Subashini & Kavitha, 2011; J. Zhao et al., 2014), which 
would violate HIPAA/HITECH regulations. The right access control, data management, and 
encryption methodology must be employed to protect users data in the cloud (Usman, Jan, & He, 
2017).  
5.5.9 Data security 
Data security is a major issue in cloud computing. In “traditional computing,” a company’s data, 
software, and other applications are within the CE’s IT network. These data sets are therefore 
subject to the CE’s physical, logical, and personnel security and access control policies. When data 
are stored in the cloud, as in the SaaS model, companies must rely on the SaaS vendor for data 
security (D. J. Solove & Hartzog, 2014; Subashini & Kavitha, 2011; Yinghui Zhang et al., 2017). 
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They completely give up all security of their data in favor of the vendor’s approach. The possibility 
of a breach is thus very high because the data are on a vendor’s system (C. Wang et al., 2010; 
Yinghui Zhang et al., 2017). Even though these vendors may employ additional security, such as 
strong cryptography and other measures to protect data and a well-knitted authorization protocol 
for access control, they still must comply with HIPAA/HITECH and other state regulations. This 
is mandated by the BA rule of HIPAA/HITECH, as well as state regulations. 
There is a huge potential for attackers to use rogue means to gain access to users’ data   
because cloud computing has some of the same vulnerabilities as other Internet applications, such 
as Cross-site Scripting (XSS), Access Control weakness, OS and SQL injection flaws, cookies 
manipulation, and insecure storage (Appelt, Nguyen, & Briand, 2015; Subashini & Kavitha, 2011; 
Usman et al., 2017). 
5.5.10 Network Security 
In the cloud environment, data are moved between the user’s computer and the vendor’s system 
through the Internet, potentially leading to exposure of sensitive data to unintended recipients. 
SaaS providers must therefore employ strong network cryptography techniques like Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer security to protect data (Jensen et al., 2009; Mxoli et al., 2014; 
Subashini & Kavitha, 2011; Yan, Rong, & Zhao, 2009). If this is not performed correctly, users 
and corporations connecting to cloud vendors could be subject to attacks such as man-in-the 
middle attacks, IP spoofing, packet sniffing, and so forth.    
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5.5.11 Data Confidentiality Issue 
By virtue of its nature and implementation, cloud computing can have very serious consequences 
for data confidentiality (Goswami & Ravichandra, 2015; Jensen et al., 2009; J. Li, Zhang, Chen, 
& Xiang, 2018; Subhash, 2014). Even though cloud computing has been in use for some time now, 
data confidentiality is still a major concern(J. Li et al., 2018). Cloud computing involves sharing 
of users’ data stored on remote servers that belong to third party vendors. These data are then 
accessed through the Internet and other means. When any organization or entity stores sensitive 
data in the cloud, P&S concerns may occur(Mishra, Sharma, Sharma, & Vimal, 2018).   Therefore, 
this could be a major issue as healthcare providers explore cloud computing as a means of saving 
money as well as taking advantage of its immense potential benefits.  
5.5.12 Data Breaches 
Attackers will be enticed by the volume of information stored by cloud service providers. This is 
because breaching a cloud vendor’s system will give the attackers access to a great deal of sensitive 
data. Therefore, the cloud has the potential of becoming a gold mine of sensitive data for attackers 
(Golden, 2009; Lafuente, 2015; Mishra et al., 2018). A survey by the Cloud Security Alliance 
(CSA) found that data breach is a concern to most stakeholders (Mishra et al., 2018). Data stored 
in the provider’s cloud include very sensitive data hence a breach to the provider’s cloud could 
result in serious HIPAA/HITECH violations (Varghese & Buyya, 2018).    
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5.6 MULTI-USER HEALTH KIOSKS 
Self-service is the capacity for a customer to perform activities related to the provision of a 
particular service without the intervention of a service provider/personnel (Ding, Verma, & Iqbal, 
2007; H.-D. Yang, Lee, Park, & Lee, 2014). Self-service technologies (SSTs) have been used 
successfully in industries other than healthcare for years. They come in the form of automated 
teller machines (ATM), computer kiosks to check in for flights, self-service gas stations, self-pay 
parking meters, booths used in public parking garages, CD rental kiosks at various locations, self-
checkout kiosks at various super markets and grocery shops, Internet and cell phone apps and 
online classes or e-learning, among others.  
The main factors driving the adoption of SSTs across all major industries are efficiency 
and cost savings. Adopting self-service can also give companies a competitive advantage (C.-t. 
Hsieh, 2015). SSTs allow consumers to participate in service delivery, which enables employees 
to perform other functions (Burkhart, 2012; Castro, Atkinson, & Ezell, 2010).  It appears that users 
also want convenience and control. Thirty-seven percent of patients surveyed reported that they 
preferred using self-service kiosks for checking in for their hospital appointments. Another 43% 
indicated that the availability of SSTs influenced their decision in choosing a healthcare provider 
(Gaffney, 2009). 
The financial impact on the US economy due to the use of SSTs is huge: it is expected to 
contribute an additional $130 billion. This huge fiscal impact coupled with advanced computer 
hardware, software, and Internet technology means that we are going to see SSTs in more and 
more sectors in the service delivery system (Castro et al., 2010).  For example, a great many people 
use kiosks or self-service without even knowing it when they pay bills online or fill their gas tanks.  
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It is therefore not surprising that the healthcare industry has followed suit. In the health 
sector, SSTs come in the form of multi-user health kiosks. Persons who have checked their blood 
pressure at CVS or Giant Eagle have used a form of multi-user health kiosk for health service. 
Various kinds of multi-user health kiosks have been deployed in hospitals to automate a range of 
patient services including patient management services for admission, discharge, appointment 
scheduling, and patient check-in during hospital visits. They can also be used for processing co-
payments, patient consent forms, prescription refills, and verification of insurance eligibility. It is 
also important to note that health kiosks allow hospitals to provide these services in different 
languages.  
Multi-user health kiosks can be used to service many people so long as they have access to 
the Internet. This is in the form of Internet kiosks. The federal government’s healthcare.gov 
website is one such Internet kiosk which provides access to acquire health insurance to millions of 
Americans. Healthcare.gov was launched on October 1, 2013 as part of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). In its initial stages, the website had many flaws. Its fundamental flaws 
were in reliability and availability, as the website had difficulties coping with the large amount of 
network traffic from individuals trying to sign up for healthcare coverage (May, 2013; Srinivasan, 
2014). The explanation provided for the glitches and bandwidth issues was that the website had to 
interface with other old legacy government websites and databases. This is said to have created 
some bottlenecks in the whole system.  
Data integrity for healthcare.gov is another concern that has been raised by experts. Some 
insurance companies have reported receiving inaccurate data. This is a major issue because it could 
lead to major problems down the road, especially in the continuity of care for patients (May, 2013). 
Some security concerns have also been reported including claims that the website was vulnerable 
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to hacking and SQL injection attacks (Appelt et al., 2015). These vulnerabilities were part of 28 
unspecified, potential, vulnerabilities uncovered by a company said to have been hired to conduct 
penetration testing (PENTESTING) on the site (Fung, 2013). Other concerns have been potential 
threats to other government IT and computer systems with which the website interfaces. Experts 
are concerned that if healthcare.gov is breached, it will provide an easy gateway into the other 
government systems with which it interfaces (Fung, 2013).   
Despite all of the convenience and cost savings that multi-user health kiosks may provide, 
there are important P&S issues to consider (Ciampa, 2008; Kizza, 2013b; B. Smith, 2008; Uhley, 
2006). The very same characteristics of kiosks that make them attractive for use in the self-service 
environment could very well make them vulnerable (Günay, Erbuğ, Hekkert, & Herrera, 2014; B. 
Smith, 2008; Uhley, 2006): 
Unattended device: Users can access the devices on their own with little or no supervision. 
As a special purpose device, a multi-user health kiosk is built to be used to accomplish specific 
tasks. The systems are mostly tied down by disabling a user’s ability to view data entered by other 
users or to install programs, tamper with various software on the kiosk, or gain access to the 
operating system and the file system. 
Kiosks can be installed almost anywhere. Owing to their almost portable nature, they can 
be deployed in all kinds of places where users can easily see and access them. They are also 
connected to some type of network. 
Users have few or no restrictions: Most users who patronize kiosks do not need explicit IT 
or network privileges like user names and passwords. Users usually use some form of generic log-
on information, and all users operate by the same restrictions. It is a challenge for system 
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administrators to manage or track user activities on kiosks and to protect them from numerous 
security threats. 
Physical threats: These could be in the form of hardware threats or threats to the users. 
Because kiosks are typically available in public but sometimes obscure locations, vandals can 
vandalize the hardware itself as well as attack the data of individuals who patronize the kiosks.  
Media devices such as CD-ROM drives and USB ports could be exploited to breach the systems. 
Hence, there should be absolutely no user or external access to cabling or to any of the internal 
components of the system such as hard drives and USB and serial ports. Having access to CD-
ROM drives and USB ports would allow criminals to install malicious software or devices to 
compromise a kiosk. Internal components should be situated in secured enclosures to prevent the 
theft of hardware such as hard drives. Peripheral devices, like keyboards, could allow hackers to 
install devices like keyboard recorders to record users’ keystrokes and to gain access to personal 
and confidential information. If possible, kiosks should be designed to use touch screens instead 
of a regular keyboard and mouse. In situations where keyboards are used, special keyboards 
without function keys should be employed. Steps have to be taken to prevent users from having 
unrestricted access to the underlying hardware of kiosks.  They also have to be deployed in well-
lit areas in order to protect the equipment as well as the user.  
 Threat to users: These threats usually come in the form of identity theft and fraud. 
“Shoulder surfing” is one way that this can happen. Privacy screens have to be installed in kiosks 
to make it difficult for anyone to read information off the screen when someone else is logged on.  
Threat to the provider’s network and computer systems: Cybercriminals can profit from 
obtaining companies’ information as well as users’ personal or confidential information. Because 
most kiosks are deployed on shared networks (i.e., the same network as used for other information 
83 
 
technology services), attackers can gain access to other aspects of a company’s network by 
compromising kiosks on their network. As mentioned earlier, if ports and CD-ROM drives are not 
confined, malicious individuals could attach via network jacks. This would enable them to attach 
their own devices to the network to instigate man-in-the-middle attacks as well as other attacks. 
Kiosks should therefore be deployed on their own dedicated networks to segment them from other 
networks used by the company. Sub-netting, firewalls and other intrusion prevention systems 
should be deployed between the kiosk network and other aspects of the company’s network to 
prevent intrusion.    
Vulnerabilities due to operating systems and other software: Attackers can bypass kiosk 
access controls if they are able to gain access to the underlying operating system and file system. 
Special purpose operating systems, specifically designed for kiosk functions, are deployed on 
kiosks to prevent users from performing unauthorized functions. 
Most attackers find the means to circumvent the operating system access control 
mechanism. An operating system access control mechanism for a multi-user health kiosk therefore 
has to be configured to make it difficult to by-pass through what is usually referred to as “reference 
monitoring,” which uses a set of well-defined design requirements to enforce access control 
mechanisms (Jaege, 2013). However, it is very difficult to tie down systems without losing some 
of their functionality. A balanced approach to security is therefore the best way to go.   
As was mentioned earlier, a multi-user health kiosk system and all of its components should 
be protected in terms of all the attributes of PHI  (B. Smith, 2008). 
Kiosks may be exposed to a host of network attacks. The following are some examples of 
tricks attackers can employ to get around access control mechanisms: 
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• Most Microsoft applications have Visual Basic (VB) editors built into them. Attackers can 
activate and use these to write small scripts that could open up loopholes by which to gain 
unlimited access to the system. For example, using the ALT+F1 key combination in a blank 
Word document can open up the VB editor for the attacker to use. Similar tricks can be 
employed in the VI text editor in Linux.  
• Browsers offer another way an attacker can gain access to the file systems. Most kiosks 
have various functionalities of browsers disabled. For example, the address bar of browsers 
is typically disabled. However, holding down the shift key and clicking on a hyperlink will 
open up the link in a new browser window, usually with the address bar enabled.  
• The calculator is another method an attacker can use to infiltrate a kiosk system. Most 
Microsoft Windows operating systems contain calculators. Clicking F1 while the 
calculator application is opened will usually activate the Help function. There is a tap in 
the Help function labeled ‘Jump URL.” Clicking on this will open the web browser as well 
as provide access to other areas of the file system.  
 Table 7 gives a summary of several different ways to infiltrate, or hack, kiosk systems.  
These are just a few examples. There are numerous other ways an attacker can get into a kiosk 
system (Craig, 2008). 
 
Table 7: Some Simple ways to Hack Kiosks 
 
 Some Simple ways to Hack Kiosks 
Vulnerability Type Possible Solution 












Disable all windows shortcut keys.  An 
even better solution will be to install a 
special keyboard with no shortcut keys 
C:\windows\ may be blocked. But Test and block all file browsing 
capabilities 









%TMP%        
%HOMEDRIVE% 
Keyboard Combinations can produce Dialog 
CTRL-B, CTRL-I ( Favorite’s) 
CTRL-H (History) 
CTRL-L,CTL-O-(File/Open Dialog) 
CTRL-P - ?(Print Dialog) 
CTRL-S –(Save As) 
CTRL-SHIFT-ESC (Task Mgr.) 
ALT-TAB(Switch Task) 
CTRL-ESC(Start Menu) 
Alt-F4 (Close Application 
shell:::((21EC2020-3AEA-1069-A2DD-
08002B30309D)) 
Use a special driver for kiosk keyboard 
that disables all shortcut keys 
Type the following into URI Bar 
Shell: Profile 
Shell: Program Files 
Shell: System 
Disable access to the all web browsers 
on the kiosk 
Shell:ControlPanelFolder 
Shell:windows 
Hide or disable address bar of the 
Kiosk browser or block the shell 
handler on the Kiosk  
Online Tools Disable the access to the Web. 
iKAT –Interactive Kiosk Attack Tool Use for penetration testing to discover 






Apart from the general security concerns discussed earlier, kiosks present more security 
concerns when used in healthcare. Examples include:  
• Masquerading/unauthorized access: Imposters can use this technique to gain access to user 
data or escalate their privileges on a network. This is done by gaining unlawful access to 
another user’s credentials through illegal means such as hacking or shoulder surfing. 
• Unauthorized use of resources: Unscrupulous users can utilize various illegal means (e.g., 
privilege escalation, backdoors, rootkit, default accounts and unprotected access points) to 
gain access to resources on a network or network computers, allowing them access to 
another user’s PHI.  
• Unauthorized disclosure and flow of information: As mentioned earlier, once an attacker 
has access to the kiosk system, by installing network taps or malicious code/applications, 
he or she can gain access to a host of personal information. This includes information 
retained on the kiosk or saved on servers and other network devices. Attackers, after 
obtaining initial information, can engage in further clandestine activities such as man-in-
the-middle attacks and denial-of-service attacks (B. Smith, 2008; G. Smith, 2012; Uhley, 
2006).   
• User errors/forgetfulness: This is the least talked-about P&S vulnerability pertaining to 
kiosks. What is the consequence if a user fails to completely log out or exit the system after 
using it? Another person could easily latch onto the un-terminated session and gain access 
to the user’s information or even compromise the entire system (Fei Yu, 2011; Kizza, 
2013a).  
 For multi-user health kiosks to be HIPAA/HITECH compliant and also meet the 
requirements of other state and federal regulations, procedures must be in place to minimize some 
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of the P&S threats to kiosks.  The main issue with compliance is that there is no clear-cut measure. 
Kiosk architecture should be designed from the bottom up with HIPAA/HITECH and other 
regulations in mind. That means that the system must be able to protect or ensure security, privacy, 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation of information. Careful attention must 
also be paid to aspects of HIPAA/HITECH that deal with CEs and BAs. Kiosks’ hardware must 
also comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Section 508 regulations, which set 
standards for electronic and information technology (Gaffney, 2009). ADA requires that visually 
impaired as well as physically-challenged people who are restricted to a wheelchair and the 
visually impaired have equal access comparable to access enjoyed by people with no physical 
disability (Derek Fretheim, 2008; Gaffney, 2009). This means that an ADA-compatible kiosk must 
accommodate people with any physical capability and must not hinder their ability to use kiosk 
peripheral devices such as biometric devices, keyboard, bill acceptor, and blood pressure cuffs.   
Healthcare institutions which deploy kiosks that provide access to PHI should always have 
an attendant available to help the user and generally supervise kiosk usage. Having an attendant 
available also helps to prevent individuals with bad intentions from tampering with kiosks. There 
should also be user as well as employee education on P&S issues and procedures. There should be 
custom-built cabinets to conceal internal components such as CD ROM drives, USB ports, and 
other peripheral devices. There should also be physical intrusion detection systems in place 
(alarms). Privacy screens should also be part of the kiosk design to prevent shoulder surfing. The 
system should be configured to turn off after a period of inactivity to prevent people from latching 
onto un-terminated sessions. It is important to implement sub-netting with firewalls to separate the 
kiosk systems from other segments of the healthcare provider’s or application vendor’s network. 
Active directory group policies should also be employed to disable all unnecessary functionalities 
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to help close some of the major security loopholes. The kiosk should also be configured to transmit 
data in real time in an encrypted, secured manner to a secured server. User data should not be kept 
on a kiosk. Users’ PHI should be stored in segments. Identifying/personal information such as 
name, date of birth, and address should be stored in a separate database from users’ EHRs or PHI.  
Kiosk manufacturers also have to make sure they incorporate FDA-approved medical devices in 





6.0  EXTENSION OF THE TECHNOLOGY ACCEPTANCE MODEL 
As new technologies are developed or adapted to be used to provide healthcare services to people, 
it is important to pay attention to factors that contribute to technology acceptance.  Much research 
has been done on the design and implementation of IT in healthcare, but there has not been enough 
research on how people react to IT products that are already in place (Fox & Connolly, 2018; 
Holden & Karsh, 2010; Kowitlawakul et al., 2015). 
            The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was developed in 1980 by Fred Davis, 
specifically to predict and measure the factors that influenced users’ acceptance of information 
technology (IT) (Holden & Karsh, 2010; Kowitlawakul et al., 2015; Maillet, Mathieu, & Sicotte, 
2015; Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa, 2018). It was adapted from the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA) which states that a person’s performance of a specific behaviors is determined by his/her 
behavioral intention (BI) to perform the behavior, and BI is also equally determined by the person’s 
attitude (A) and subjective norms (SN) concerning the behavior in question (Holden & Karsh, 
2010; Porter & Donthu, 2006). The two main variables of TAM are: 
• Perceived usefulness (PU) – An individual’s perception that using an IT system or 
technology will enhance job performance or improve the method used to accomplish a 
specific task. 
• Perceived ease of use (PEOU) – The extent to which users find the use of a technology to 
be free from effort on their part. 
There are other variables that contribute to TAM. These are: 
• Attitude toward using – A user’s positive or negative feelings about using a technology. 
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• Intention to use – The state of mind that drives an individual to use or not use a technology. 
• Actual system use – The probability that a user will use a particular technology. 
A vital element in TAM is to trace the effect of external influences (i.e., individual differences) on 
internal beliefs, attitudes, and intentions (Curran & Meuter, 2005; Porter & Donthu, 2006; K. C. 
Yang, Chye, Fern, & Kang, 2015).  
TAM has been modified and extended to ascertain technology acceptance of IT products 
in different fields such as banking, healthcare, and marketing. Other variables such as “risk” have 
also been introduced in other models of TAM to investigate the influence that factors relating to 
those variables have on users’ acceptance of different technologies (Curran & Meuter, 2005; 
Holden & Karsh, 2010; Porter & Donthu, 2006; K. C. Yang et al., 2015).  Another example is the 
model used in a study conducted by Tung et al. in 2008 to study the adoption of the electronic 
logistics information system in the medical industry. Two research parameters, trust and perceived 
financial cost, were added to their proposed hybrid TAM model. They found that ‘trust,’ which 
has been referred to as “perceived risk” by other researchers, had a great positive influence on 
‘behavioral intention to use.’ ‘Perceived financial cost’ was found to have a “great negative 
influence” on ‘behavioral intention to use’ (Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa, 2018; Tung, Chang, & 
Chou, 2008). 
Researchers in Taiwan used an extension of the Technology Acceptance Model to assess 
the impact that risk perception plays in technology acceptance. They introduced “perceived risk,” 
defined by the variables security and privacy, into their TAM model (C.-F. Li, 2013; Lin, 
Featherman, Brooks, & Hajli, 2018). “Perceived risk” of using the system is associated with a 
perception of P&S and confidentiality (Fox & Connolly, 2018; P.-J. Hsieh, 2015; C.-F. Li, 2013). 
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Ease of use, usefulness, need for interaction, and risk are the predictors that influence user attitude 
towards SSTs and subsequently, intention to use. “Perceived risk” was defined as how confidential 
and safe an individual believed that banking transactions would be on Internet banking systems. 
Perceived usefulness contributed the most (54.6%) to the explained variance in acceptance of 
Internet banking technology among customers in Taiwan, followed by perceived risk (33.3%) and 
perceived ease of use (29.1%). The investigators also found that among those who had used the 
system for an extended period of time concerns about perceived ease of use declined as the systems 
became easier to use over time. Hence, perceived risk of breach to P&S is an important factor in 
determining whether a particular user will continue to use the system or not. For the rest of this 
paper, perceived risk will be associated with risk of breach to P&S. 
Ortega et al. (2011) extended the Technology Acceptance Model with two additional 
factors, trust and risk, to examine physicians’ acceptance of electronic health care records  (EHCR 
systems) (Ortega Egea & Román González, 2011). The investigators used three main variables 
(institutional trust, perceived risk, and information integrity) to assess how those variables affected 
physician acceptance of EHCR. They found trust and risk factors (perceived institutional trust, 
perceived risk, and information integrity) to be strong predictive factors of physician acceptance 
of EHCR systems.   
Users’ perceived risk has also been reported as a major barrier to adoption of new self-
service technologies (SSTs) (Charness & Boot, 2009; C.-F. Li, 2013; Subashini & Kavitha, 2011).  
To improve user acceptance of SSTs, it is important to reduce perceived risk of breach to P&S 
because this can improve users’ intentions to use SSTs, which may further result in their actual 
usage (Curran & Meuter, 2005; Lin et al., 2018).     
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Miyazaki et al. in 2001 cited P&S as one of the major concerns of online shoppers 
(Miyazaki & Fernandez, 2001).  Also, as far back as the year 2000, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) saw consumer risk perception as one of the primary obstacles to e-commerce. Therefore, 
P&S and confidentiality should be made a major part of the development of any technology to be 
used in the healthcare sector.  
Aside from ease of use and usefulness, in addition to P&S concerns, some of the main 
deterrents to acceptance of HIT among users are lack of perceived benefits, convenience, user 
friendliness, and trust. (P.-J. Hsieh, 2015; Or et al., 2010). Research has shown that ways to 
improve trust involve, but are not limited to, improved P&S, confidentiality, availability, and 




7.0  STEPS IN DEVELOPING PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
CEHCKLISTS AND POLICIES 
The Health Kiosk Project at the University of Pittsburgh provides an example of how an audit 
checklist aimed at mitigating users’ P&S and confidentiality concerns has been developed. Funded 
by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (5R01HS022889 PI: Matthews), the project 
involves several health kiosks that have been designed for use by older adults in community-based 
congregate settings. The settings include senior centers, subsidized senior housing, and continuing 
care retirement communities.  
Each kiosk consists of a wheeled desk and desk chair, touch screen monitor, RFID reader, 
printer, and selected medical devices that either require manual entry of measurements (blood 
pressure monitoring device) or are integrated (hand dynamometer and seated scale) with the on-
board computer. The hard drive is encrypted, as are data transferred from the kiosk via MiFi 
hotspot to secure university servers. A cell phone in the kiosk drawer facilitates users’ requests for 
assistance, and a messaging feature on the touch screen enables textual communication with the 
project team.  
At the kiosk, users self-administer health-related surveys, learn behavioral strategies for 
improving aspects of their health, and receive graphical feedback depicting their progress toward 
personal goals related to sleep, bladder control, mobility, and mood, among other topics. Wireless 
headphones convey voiceover for all content displayed on the touch screen. Relevant educational 
materials may be printed to take home. 
The following steps were implemented to develop an audit checklist for addressing 
potential P&S vulnerabilities of the kiosks in the Health Kiosk Project:  
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Investigate and Research Possible Security Vulnerabilities: This step entailed garnering 
expert opinions from published work, textbooks, and interviews with people involved in the design 
and development of the system, and from “walking through the systems” (Bishop, 2003; Craig, 
2008; Garg & Camp, 2015; Kalaiprasath, Elankavi, & Udayakumar, 2017). Specifically, we drew 
from the literature, interviews with the project team, and direct interaction with the kiosk. We also 
used the penetration testing techniques (PENTESTING) specified by Craig (2008) to aid in 
identifying possible vulnerabilities of our multi-user health kiosk design.  
Perform a Risk Assessment: Eight steps were involved in assessing the extent to which 
P&S could be breached (Oyelami & Ithnin, 2015; Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002; Takyi, 
Watzlaf, MATTHEWS, Zhou, & DeAlmeida, 2017): 
Characterize the System: This step helped to define the scope of the risk assessment by 
identifying items that needed to be protected. We recognized that a solid understanding of the 
system’s architecture as a whole was needed to successfully complete this step (Garg & Camp, 
2015; Oyelami & Ithnin, 2015). Hence, system information was collected and classified as: 
hardware, software, system interfaces (external and internal connectivity), data and information, 
individuals who support as well as use the system, main functions of the system (functions 
performed by the system), criticality of the various components of the system to the organization 
(e.g., how critical the particular component is to system functionality), and sensitivity of system 
components. After carefully looking through and analyzing various aspects of the health kiosk 
system, working with the project team, and using information about P&S for multi-user health 
kiosks discussed earlier in this paper, we identified areas of the system that needed to be protected. 
These areas formed the core part of the header for the major sections of our audit checklist.  
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Identify Threats: Possible threats to the system that could lead to vulnerabilities were 
characterized as high, medium, or low. Informed by expert opinion, the developer’s past 
experience, and industry trends and standards, we focused on identifying anticipated threats rather 
than every possible threat, as the latter could have been overwhelming and unrealistic to 
accomplish (Gribaudo, Iacono, & Marrone, 2015; Oyelami & Ithnin, 2015). We used this process 
to decide which aspects of P&S were worth protecting. Again, information pertaining to possible 
threats to kiosks in general, physical interaction with the kiosk during development, and 
discussions with the project team were instrumental in identifying the sources of threat to our 
multi-user health kiosk.   
Identify Vulnerabilities: Action must be taken to identify the vulnerabilities that can result 
from threats because vulnerabilities suggest possible weaknesses in the system that can be 
exploited by adversaries bent on breaching the system. Some of the ways to identify vulnerabilities 
are system security testing and evaluation, penetration testing, and vulnerability scanning using 
any type of automated vulnerability testing tool (Rebollo, Mellado, Fernández-Medina, & 
Mouratidis, 2015; Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). We undertook this step-in discussion with the main 
developer of the kiosk to identify whether vulnerabilities existed pertaining to password protection, 
privilege escalation, applications and user authentication, and encryption, to mention but a few.  
Control and analysis: This step entail reviewing and analyzing controls that have been 
implemented or are planned to be implemented, to reduce the probability of a threat or adversary 
exploiting the system. As part of this step, impact analysis should be performed to determine the 
impact (i.e., loss of integrity, loss of availability, and loss of confidentiality) to the system in case 
a vulnerability is exploited. The controls can be technical or non-technical. An example of a 
technical control would be implementing an encryption strategy to protect data. Non-technical 
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controls could include personnel training regarding proper methods for reducing the probability of 
a vulnerability occurring. Means of control should be preventive, deterrent, detective, reactive, and 
capable of recovery (Rebollo et al., 2015; Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). The Health Kiosk Project 
team considered the impact that the identified vulnerabilities could have on the functionalities of 
the kiosk. The team then acted to minimize or eliminate those vulnerabilities that posed the greatest 
risk.     
Determine Likelihood of Occurrence: This step involves estimating the likelihood (high, 
medium, or low) that a particular vulnerability will occur  (Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). The Health 
Kiosk Project team examined the design and types of activities performed on the kiosk to further 
decide which vulnerabilities were more likely to occur. This resulted in further streamlining of the 
kiosk features and functionalities that we wanted to protect to include in our audit protocol.  
Determine Risk: Assessing the level of risk to the IT system allows for expression of the 
level of  threat and vulnerability for the pairs that have been identified, the magnitude of the impact 
in the event that a vulnerability is successfully exploited by a given threat, and determination as to 
whether adequate P&S procedures have been put in place to reduce the risk (Nazareth & Choi, 
2015; Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). For the Health Kiosk Project, we had a series of meetings to 
discuss how the different vulnerabilities could impact the functionality of the kiosk, including what 
would happen if there were no backups and data were corrupted or lost in the backend database, 
or whether there was a redundant power supply in case of power outages. 
Recommend Controls:  To reduce or eliminate perceived risk, recommendations need to 
be enacted that are appropriate for an organization’s operations, requirements, legislated mandates, 
and standards. Factors that should be considered during this process include, but are not limited 
to, effectiveness of the recommended options such as system compatibility, legislation and 
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regulation, organizational policy, operational impact, and safety and reliability (Rinehart-
Thompson, 2013). The Health Kiosk Project team used information gathered in the earlier steps as 
well as requirements for HIPAA and HITECH compliance to decide the aspects of the OCR audit 
checklist to incorporate into our final audit checklist. 
Document the Result: Threat sources and potential vulnerabilities that are identified should 
be documented in a report or briefing (Rinehart-Thompson, 2013). For our work, we matched the 
potential vulnerabilities to the OCR Audit protocol. We then adopted aspects of the OCR audit 
protocol that match our vulnerabilities to develop an audit checklist for the multi-user health kiosk 
(Appendix A) which can be used by any developer, researcher, or other user of the health kiosk to 
make sure that the system meets the P&S provisions.   
Specify the Checklist: The audit checklist was then finalized for our kiosk by adapting parts 
of the OCR audit checklist, a checklist developed by Watzlaf et al., and a Security Self-Assessment 
Guide for Information Technology Systems that was developed by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (Christiansen, 2013; Swanson, 2001; V. J. Watzlaf et al., 2010; V. J. 




8.0  FACTORS THAT AFFECT TECHNOLOGY ACCEPTANCE BY OLDER-
ADULTS 
Researchers previously thought that physiological factors and cognitive variables were some of 
the main factors influencing technology adoption by older adults. However, recent comparisons of 
Internet usage between older adults and the younger generation suggest that there may be other 
variables influencing technology adoption rates (Knowles & Hanson, 2018; O’Brien et al., 2008). 
The Pew Research Center has found that more than half of older adults age 65 and older use the 
Internet for various purposes: 59% use online applications, 47% have high speed Internet or 
broadband at home, and 77% have cell phones. However, even though older adults use the Internet, 
they still lag behind younger adults when it comes to Internet usage (Care-Innovations, 2013; A. 
Smith, 2014). The number of older adults who use the Internet and broadband drops off sharply 
around age 75 and above(Mazur, Signorella, & Hough, 2018). 
Some of the factors or variables found by researchers to influence technology 
acceptance/adoption by older adults include but are not limited to:  
Physical challenges in using the technology:  Many older adults have health and physical 
conditions that make it uncomfortable to use new technologies. Approximately two out of five 
older adults have acknowledged physical or health conditions that make simple things such as 
reading a chore. Some also have a disability or chronic disease that hampers their ability to perform 
common daily activities (Fischer, David, Crotty, Dierks, & Safran, 2014; Hunsaker & Hargittai, 
2018; A. Smith, 2014). 
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Skepticism about the benefits of new technology:  Older adults are usually not sure if the 
use of a technology will be beneficial to them or not. They will not adopt a new technology unless 
they see clear benefits of adopting a particular technology (Fischer et al., 2014; Hunsaker & 
Hargittai, 2018; O’Brien et al., 2008; A. Smith, 2014). Research has shown store kiosks to have 
about a 60% usage rate among older adults. This finding suggests that older adults will voluntarily 
adopt new technologies if they find them to be beneficial or, as in this case, convenient (Anthony 
et al., 2015; O’Brien et al., 2008).  
Difficulties in learning to use new technologies: A good number of older adults have 
indicated requiring assistance in using new technologies or digital devices. Only about 18 % of the 
adults surveyed said they feel comfortable using new technologies on their own and 77% said they 
would need assistance in using a new technology (O’Brien et al., 2008; A. Smith, 2014). 
 Cohort and historical time periods: Perception and adoption of new technologies by older 
adults also depends on the cohort and historical period in which they grew up. This is explained 
by the time course theory, which takes into account the cohorts and historical time period 
influences in adoption of new technologies by older adults (White, 2008). The perceived ease of 
use and perceived benefit of new technologies by older adults is usually influenced by the cohort 
in which they grew up. Hence, technology usage by older adults in the United States, especially in 
healthcare, is expected to increase as over 78 million baby boomers age (Care-Innovations, 2013; 
Heinz, 2013). 
Digital Divide:  Older adults lag behind in the use of computer technology compared to 
adults in younger generations (Jesdanun, 2004; Mazur et al., 2018). Experience with technology 
declines in older adults age 65 year and older. This is due in part to the lack of access to different 
types of technologies at earlier stages of their lives (Heinz, 2013; Hunsaker & Hargittai, 2018).  
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This gap is expected to narrow as the baby boom generation ages (Jesdanun, 2004). Aging baby 
boomers are expected to rely more on technology for communication and activities of daily living 
compared to generations before them. However, experts are still not clear as to how the fluency in 
technology usage during their productive and earlier years will translate into rates of technology 
adoption (O’Brien et al., 2008).  
Socio-economic status (education and income): Although senior citizens in the US are 
often late in adopting new technologies compared to the younger generations, data from the Pew 
Research Center show an increase in the rate of adoption of new technologies by those age 65 or 
older, especially those who are highly educated or affluent (O’Brien et al., 2008; A. Smith, 2014). 
On the other hand, older adults who are less affluent or have little education and have health or 
physical disabilities are less likely to keep up with new technology (Hunsaker & Hargittai, 2018).  
According to O’Brien et al. (2008), among adults with annual incomes of less than $20,000 
only 15% reported ever using the Internet. For older adults with annual incomes between $20,000 
and $49,000, the rate increased to 40%. For those with incomes in the excess of $50,000 a year, 
the rate of internet usage increased to 65%. Older adults with annual incomes greater than $60,000 
reported significantly higher usage across technology platforms and activities compared to other 
income segments. Similarly, older adults’ education level greatly influenced their Internet usage. 
Among older adults with an education level of high school or less, only 18% reported Internet 
usage, compared to 45% of those with some college education and 60% of those with a college 
education.    
Gender is another variable that has been found to influence not necessarily the level of 
technology usage, but what older adults use technology like the Internet for (Care-Innovations, 
2013; O’Brien et al., 2008). For example, men use the Internet for recreation or entertainment, bill 
101 
 
paying, or stock trading more than women. Women on the other hand use the Internet to explore 
topics such as health and religion more than their male counterparts.  
Family and social structure have also been found to influence the type and extent of 
technology usage. Research by Intel Corporation found that the size and nature of the social 
network of friends was a predictor of the type of technology adopted by older adults (O’Brien et 
al., 2008). This means that older adults tend to adopt the type of technologies used by people they 
associate with.  
Security and privacy concerns: As people age, their concerns about privacy and security 
increase. Survey results from the Pew Research Center showed that 61% of adults 65 years and 
older are very uncomfortable about strangers and unsolicited businesses obtaining and sharing 
personal information about them and their families, compared to 46% of Americans between the 
ages of 18 and 29 (Care-Innovations, 2013; A. Smith, 2014). These findings suggest that a great 
deal of care must be taken to ensure that older adults feel at ease using health-related technologies, 





9.0  THE KIOSK PROJECT 
Our study was an ancillary investigation to a parent longitudinal study funded by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) being conducted by researchers from the University of 
Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Missouri-Columbia, and the University 
of Victoria (Canada). The primary purpose of the AHRQ study is to understand factors that 
influence older adults’ use of a multi-user health kiosk as a measurement and intervention delivery 
system, relative to their needs for a healthier life style. 
 Multi-user health kiosks were developed to be used for the study. To date, kiosks have 
been deployed in 10 congregate sites in southwestern Pennsylvania that serve older adults to help 
them self-manage their health and improve communication with their primary care providers 
(PCPs). The kiosks enable measurement and transmission of physical and psychological data such 
as high blood pressure, self-reported symptoms of depression, and other potentially sensitive 
health information as well as engagement with intervention modules and tracking of users’ 
computer-recognized emotions that prompt adaptive kiosk interaction. All kiosk activities are 
performed in modular form after the study participant has gone through the initial consent and 
registration processes for the study. Each participant will have a key fob specifically coded for 
them and a logon credential (username and password) to be able to access the system. 
The kiosk combines traditional telehealth and e-health applications. The telehealth 
component allows for delivery of healthcare services from a distance. While the e-health 
component allows for provision of healthcare services through the Internet.  
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10.0  METHODS 
The methodology for this dissertation research had two aims. The first aim explored potential 
vulnerabilities that existed in a multi-user health kiosk prior to deployment at 10 congregate sites 
in the Pittsburgh area in Pennsylvania. This allowed us to develop an audit checklist for P&S and 
confidentiality policies for the kiosk. The second aim explored the efficacy of intervention 
approaches designed to reduce users’ perceptions of risk associated with kiosk use and to increase 
their intention to use a multi-user health kiosk.  
10.1 SPECIFIC AIM 1 
Aim 1: Design, implement, and evaluate a new protocol to investigate potential vulnerabilities in 
a multi-user health kiosk.  
An exploratory study was performed to detect potential vulnerabilities in the multi-user 
heath kiosk. To conduct this part of the study, the OCR audit protocol was adapted to create an 
audit checklist for evaluation of the multi-user health kiosk. Privacy, security and confidentiality 
policies were then developed for the kiosk based on the evaluation conducted. Finally, a focus 
group of experts in privacy and security evaluated the P&S and confidentiality policies developed. 
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10.1.1 Research Question for Aim 1 
Do the audit checklist and privacy, security, and confidentiality policies developed for the multi-
user health kiosk address the kiosk’s P&S and confidentiality issues? 
10.1.2 Aim 1 Methods 
Preliminary evaluation of the P&S of the multi-user health kiosk was carried out by physically 
interacting with a prototype of the multi-user health kiosk and by interviewing the programmer 
who was developing the kiosk software. Based on possible vulnerabilities uncovered from expert 
opinions in various reviews of literature, interaction with the kiosk, and interviews with the 
programmer, the OCR audit protocol was adapted to create an audit checklist (Appendix A) for 
the multi-user health kiosk.    
We then used the audit checklist for the multi-user kiosk to develop P&S and 
confidentiality policies (Appendix B) for our kiosk system. The policies were then incorporated 
into the design and development process of the multi-user health kiosk. This included the physical 
kiosk design and logical kiosk design (software and applications) as well as computer systems of 
the kiosk (networking components).  
The P&S and confidentiality policies were incorporated into the physical design of the 
multi-user health kiosk. This process involved implementing controls to improve the physical parts 
of the kiosk based on the policies we developed. It also involved making sure unauthorized persons 
cannot gain physical access to the internal components of the kiosk systems. The design ensured 
that all hubs, ports (e.g., graphics card, USB, network, serial ports), hard drives, and other internal 
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components of the kiosk are well enclosed to prevent access by unauthorized users. The new kiosk 
design included steps to prevent access to network cables, power cables, and other cables 
employed to attach peripheral devices to the kiosk. This was necessary to prevent individuals from 
compromising the kiosk system to install computer and network devices as well as rootkit software 
that could be used to engage in malicious activities on the kiosk and breach kiosk security. 
Physically securing the kiosk system also helped to guard against the theft of kiosk components 
such as the hard drive, which is a serious violation of HIPAA/HITECH rules. 
The P&S and confidentiality policies were also applied to the design of the kiosk software, 
computer configuration, and configuration of other hardware components. The policies were also 
taken into consideration when the kiosk was integrated into the underlying computer network 
and/or systems.  
Finally, the P&S and confidentiality policies were summarized into a privacy statement 
that explains in language directed to kiosk users the P&S and confidentiality policies implemented 
in the kiosk system. This privacy statement was used with the minimal intervention and intensive 
intervention groups involved in the intervention trial that was performed to address part of Aim 2 
of this dissertation.   
10.1.3 Aim 1 Data Analysis 
A gap analysis was performed to determine which of the P&S and confidentiality provisions 
followed the OCR protocol. A gap analysis is a study which provides information that deals with 
the current state and the desired future state of an information system. A careful review of the P&S 
policies was performed by our research team and the programmer developing the kiosk to 
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determine criteria for implementing items in the security policies developed for the kiosk. The 
criteria for policy implementation were based on the criticality of items as well as the availability 
of resources needed to implement those items. Descriptive statistics such as frequencies and 
percentages were computed based on the results of this gap analysis (Christiansen, 2013). We 
computed the percentage of ‘Yes,’ ‘No,’ and ‘N/A’ answers on the audit checklist (Appendix A). 
The results were tallied as shown in Appendix E. This allowed us to quantify the proportions of 
the P&S and confidentiality policies that have been implemented versus those that still need to be 
implemented. 
10.2 SPECIFIC AIM 2 
Aim 2: Test the feasibility and preliminary efficacy of an intervention to reduce users’ perceived 
risk of breaches to P&S and to explore their intention to use a multi-user health kiosk. 
10.2.1 Research Questions for Aim 2 
Q1: Is it feasible to implement a randomized controlled trial to investigate the preliminary efficacy 
of an intervention to reduce users’ “perceived risk”? 
Q2: Does receiving a printed summary of P&S and confidentiality policies implemented in the 




HQ20: Users’ “perceived risk” of a health kiosk will not be affected by receiving a print 
summary or a print summary plus a detailed oral explanation of P&S and confidentiality policies. 
HQ21: Users will have the lowest level of “perceived risk” if they receive a print summary 
of the P&S and confidentiality policies as well as get a detailed oral explanation of the policies 
(Intensive intervention group) compared to those who just receive a print copy of the P&S policies 
(minimal intervention group) and those who receive no intervention beyond the explanation about 
privacy protections that is part of orientation to the kiosk (control group).   
Q3: Is users’ “intention to use” the health kiosk associated with their level of “perceived risk”? 
        HQ30:   Users “perceived risk” will have no correlation to their intention to use the kiosk. 
        HQ31:  A lower user “perceived risk” will have a positive correlation to “intention to use.” 
10.2.2 Aim 2 Methods 
Adults 21 years of age and older who were participating in the parent study at nine of the 
congregate sites where the kiosks had been deployed were surveyed during performance 
assessments conducted at baseline and six months. Participants were required to be community-
residing or living in an assisted living environment, able to read and understand English, and able 
to see and hear well enough (with corrective lenses and/or hearing aids, if necessary) to watch 
television and view images on a computer screen, listen to the radio, and carry on a phone 
conversation. Their eligibility had previously been established through prior screening for the 
Health Kiosk Project, the parent study for which this dissertation constitutes an ancillary study and 
from which demographic data were provided to describe our sample.  
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The block or random permuted blocks method was used in the randomization process, in 
an effort to ensure treatments were balanced for a given block size (Nagin & Weisburd, 2013). 
Because we had three groups (control [A], minimal intervention [B], and intensive intervention 
[C]), we had a block size of six (3*2=6). The following example is a depiction of the order in 
which study participants were intended to be randomized to their respective groups: AABBCC, 
ABCABC, CABBAC or BACCBA. This meant that after the first block we would ideally have an 
equal number of participants in each group. To accomplish this, we used an Excel spreadsheet to 
randomize the letters ABC. We then assigned numbers 1,2,3… to the letters. We wrote these 
numbers at the back of the envelopes as we stuffed them with the study materials for each group 
ABC.  The envelopes were then sealed to make sure only the study participant could see the content 
of the envelope that was handed to them. This process ensured that the study was completely 
blinded so that the person handing the envelopes to the study participants did not know their group 
assignments. The survey that was administered had a slot for recording the number at the back of 
every envelope. When we got the surveys back, we matched the envelope numbers recorded on 
the surveys to our Excel spread sheet to determine which group the participant belonged to in order 
to administer the right intervention.  
             At baseline, participants were asked to respond to a paper-based, investigator-developed 
survey questionnaire on P&S and confidentiality as well as to indicate their intention to use the 
health kiosk over the next six months. The survey questionnaire was administered prior to 
completing a battery of performance-based tests of cognition, mobility, and balance for the Health 
Kiosk Project (Appendix D). The response options to the questions on each questionnaire were 
ranked and scored as follows: Strongly Disagree -1, Disagree -2, Neither Agree/Disagree -3, Agree 
-4, and Strongly Agree -5 for the “Perceived Risk” part of the questionnaire and “Yes” or “No” 
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for the “Intent to Use” part of the questionnaire. The intent to use part also had space for 
participants to provide a short explanation if they answered “No” on the “Intent to Use” question. 
After completing the questionnaire, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups 
(control, minimal intervention, or intensive intervention) and received the numbered envelope with 
the study materials for their group assignment. The minimal intervention group received a copy of 
a summary of the security policies (Appendix C), while the intensive intervention group received 
a summary of the policies and a phone call to have the policies explained to them. The control 
group received neither a printed summary nor a phone call to explain the P&S policies to them.  
 The control group envelope included a printed script that read, “Thanks for completing the 
survey. You will be asked to complete another survey when you came back for your six-month 
review.” The minimal intervention group received a printed script that read, “Thanks for 
completing the survey. Please take time to read a summary of the necessary steps that have been 
taken to protect your information in the kiosk. You will be asked to complete another survey when 
you came back for your six-month review,” along with a print copy of the P&S policies for the 
kiosk. The intensive intervention group was given a printed script that read, “Thanks for 
completing the survey. Please take time to read the necessary steps that have been taken to protect 
your information in the kiosk. A member of the kiosk’s project team will be contacting you to 
schedule a session for detailed explanation of the steps and procedures put in place to make sure 
your information that you enter at the kiosk is secured. You will be asked to complete another 
survey when you come back for your six-month review.” The script for the intensive intervention 
(see Appendix F) was used to explain the items in the P&S statement and to ensure consistency in 
the information provided during each phone session with each participant in this group. During a 
one-on-one session for repeated mobility and balance testing at 6 months, participants in all three 
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groups were asked to respond once again to the same questionnaire that they had completed at 
baseline. 
10.2.3 Aim 2 Sample Size Justification 
We expected to recruit 100 participants for our study, with an attrition rate of 40% from baseline 
to the six-month follow-up period. Hence, we expected to have a total sample size of 60 
participants. Because this was a feasibility study and we did not have prior effect size estimates 
for our outcomes, we calculated a possible range of sample sizes. Calculations represent a given 
sample size and the detectable effect size (f) for a within-between interaction using a two-tailed 
repeated measures ANOVA with three groups over two time points, with alpha at .05 and power 
of 80%: 
 
Table 8: Effect Size Estimates Based on Sample Size 
 
TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE EFFECT SIZE (f)  
30 .29  
40 .26  
50 .23  
60 .21  
 
 
Cohen describes an effect size of f =.10 as small, f =.25 as moderate and f =.40 as large 
(Coe, 2002). With a sample size of 60 participants, we will have 80% power to detect a small to 
moderate within-between interaction effect of f =.21.  
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10.2.4 Aim 2 Data Analysis 
Q1: Is it feasible to implement a randomized controlled trial to investigate the efficacy of  
an intervention to explore the magnitude of differences in users’ “perceived risk” of P&S breaches 
as well as correlation between “perceived risk” and their “intention to use” a multi-user health 
kiosk? 
To answer our first research question, we collected information to assess the feasibility of 
our intervention. Next, we assessed the appropriateness of our randomization process by 
determining if equal (or near equal) numbers of participants were distributed among the three 
groups. We also evaluated the feasibility of retaining participants in the study. Our goal was to 
retain 60% of participants at follow-up. 
Q2: Does receiving a printed summary of P&S and confidentiality policies implemented in the 
kiosk, either alone or in combination with a detailed oral explanation of the policies, affect users’ 
“perceived risk”? 
HQ20: Users’ “perceived risk” of a health kiosk will not be affected by receiving a print 
summary or print summary plus detailed oral explanation of P&S and confidentiality policies. 
HQ21: Users will have the lowest level of “perceived risk” if they receive a print summary 
of the P&S and confidentiality policies as well as get a detailed oral explanation of the policies 
(intensive intervention) compared to those who just receive a print copy of the P&S policies 
(minimal intervention) and those who receive no intervention beyond the explanation about 
privacy protections that is part of orientation to the kiosk (control).   
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Our independent variables (IVs) for Question 2 were group (control, minimal intervention 
group, and intensive intervention) and time (baseline and six-month follow-up). Our dependent 
variables (DVs) were “Perceived Risk” and “Intention to use.” 
Perceived risk was measured by taking the average of the scores of user answers to P&S 
and confidentiality questions. High average/mean scores would correspond to low “perceived 
risk.”   
10.2.5  Preliminary Analyses 
All statistical analyses were performed using Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences (IBM 
SPSS, v 25) with a significance level set to.05.  
Prior to our primary analysis (repeated measures ANOVA), we tested for the assumptions 
of normality and compound symmetry. A Shapiro-Wilk test was performed to test for normality 
of our dependent variables (“perceived risk” and “intention to use”) in our three groups (control, 
minimal intervention, and intensive intervention). The Shapiro-Wilk test p-value should be 
above.05 for normality. We also visualized the graphs generated by SPSS (histograms, Normal Q-
Q plot and box plots) to further cross-check for normality results from the Shapiro-Wilk test 
(Razali & Wah, 2011). To test for compound symmetry, we used Box’s M and Mauchly’s test for 
Sphericity to see if variances of the differences between all combinations of related groups are 
equal  (Keselman, Rogan, Mendoza, & Breen, 1980; R. G. O'Brien & Kaiser, 1985). Both tests 
should be non-significant for the data to meet the assumption.  
An advantage to using a repeated measures ANOVA is that it is considered by most 
researchers to be robust enough to accommodate issues with non-normal and non-homogenous 
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data (Fife-Schaw, 2014; Huck, Cormier, & Bounds, 2000).  However, if there are severe departures 
from normality, we planned to switch to an alternative method such as the generalized linear 
model. 
10.2.6  Primary Analysis 
We performed 3 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA with a between-subjects factor (group) and a 
within subject factor (time) for our “perceived risk” DV.  The group factor had three levels 
(control, minimal intervention, and intensive intervention), while the time factor had two levels 
(baseline and 6 months). For the ANOVA, we examined test statistics with standard errors, 95% 
confidence intervals, and effect sizes to evaluate for preliminary efficacy of our intervention. 
Because this was a preliminary study, we were more interested in the magnitude of the effect 
(effect size) estimates, to be used to power a larger, more confirmatory study.  
The table below shows how our 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was designed. The cells 
were used to represent the DV (“perceived risk”) for the ANOVA that was be performed.  
 
Table 9: 3*2 Repeated Measure ANOVA Table 
 
 
      GROUP TIME 
 BASELINE SIX MONTH FOLLOW-UP 
CONTROL   
MINIMAL INTERVENTION   
INTENSIVE INTERVENTION   




The primary purpose of the ANOVA was to determine if there was interaction between our 
two factors (group and time) on our dependent variable (“perceived risk”). In other words, we 
wanted to find out if the change in kiosk users’ “perceived risk” was the result of the interaction 
between the type of intervention (control, minimal intervention or intense intervention) and time 
(baseline and six-month follow-up).  
The repeated measures ANOVA analysis we performed allowed us to (Huck et al., 2000): 
• Evaluate the group-by-time interaction to see if there is a significant difference in 
“perceived risk “among kiosk users due to interaction between their group (control, 
minimal intervention, and intensive intervention) and time (base line and six-month 
follow-up) (group by time interaction effect).    
• Evaluate the between-group effect to see if there are significant differences in “perceived 
risk” between the three groups (main effect of group). 
• Evaluate the within-group effect to see if there are significant group differences in 
“perceived risk over time, from pre (baseline) to post (six months) (main effect of time).   
We did not observe any significant difference in “perceived risk” as a result of interaction 
between the intervention type (control, minimal and intensive intervention) and time (baseline and 
six-month follow-up), hence we did not perform a simple main effect analysis of group against 
time.  Main effect of group was also not significant. However, we observed a small but significant 
decrease in “perceived risk “with time. Hence, we did not perform any post-hoc analysis. 
Q3: Is users’ “intention to use” the health kiosk associated with their level of “perceived risk”? 
         HQ30:   Users’ “perceived risk” will have no correlation to their intention to use the kiosk. 
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         HQ31:   Users’ “perceived risk” will have a positive correlation to “intention to use. “ 
These analyses could not be performed since all the participants answered “Yes” on their intent to 
use questionnaire at baseline and six-month follow-up (see Appendix H).   
Prior to conducting a correlational analysis, we would have tested to see if there was a 
linear relationship between our two DVs (“perceived risk “and “intention to use”). To accomplish 
this, we would have plotted our “perceived risk” against our “intention to use” to create a scatter 
plot.  We could then visually examine the scatter plot for linearity as shown in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 4: Test for Linearity for Pearson’s Correlation 
                
 
 
For Pearson’s r there should be no significant outliers as it is sensitive to outliers. We would 
have used “case-wise diagnostics” to detect outliers. Finally, we would have made sure our data 
are normally distributed.  If the data failed the linearity test and normality test, we would have had 
to switch to Spearman’s rank-order correlation. If the assumptions were met, we would have 






















Intention to use  
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calculated Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient to measure the strength and direction 
of association that exists between “perceived risk” and “intention to use.” Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient ranges from r =+1 to r = -1.  A correlation coefficient of r = +1 would have meant a 
perfect positive correlation, while a correlation coefficient of r= -1 would have meant a perfect 
negative correlation (Huck et al., 2000).   
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Figure 5: Timeline for data collection 
 
 
Table 10: Summary of Methods 
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10.2.7 Missing Values /Drop out 
Because our study was a pre-post-test study, there was a good chance that some of the participants 
would drop out before the six-month follow-up appointment. There was also a likelihood of some 
participants not completing the intervention. Thus, we used complete case data for the analysis. 
             Only 36 participants had both baseline and six-month follow-up data when we suspended 
data collection to perform data analysis for this dissertation. Seventy-four of the participants did 
not have six-month follow-up data.   Thirty-seven participants out of the 74 were not due for their 
six-month follow-up and 37 were due for their six-month follow-up. Of the 37 who were due for 
their six-month follow-up, 11 dropped out due to personal reasons (sickness, busy, moved, family 
emergency, etc.), 16 had no six-month follow-up data for unexplained reasons, 9 were erroneously 
not handed a six-month P&S survey, and one participant could not be reached (see Table 11).    
  
 
Table 11: Sample break down (N=110) 
Category Number of participants 
Both baseline and six-month data 36 
Unreachable 1 
Not due for six-month follow-up 37 
Dropped out 11 
No six-month follow-up data 16 




11.0  DEMOGRAPHICS/SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
We were able to randomize 110 participants into our sample at baseline.  Only 36 (32.7%) of them 
made it to the six-month follow-up and 74 (67.3%) had only baseline data at the time of our data 
analysis.  Table 12 shows comparison of the 36 participants with both baseline and six-month data 
and the 74 participants with only baseline data. We performed an independent t-Test for the 
continuous variables and χ2 for categorical variables.  
 
 
Table 12: Comparison of participants with both baseline data and six-month follow-up 
data and those with only baseline data (N = 110) 
 





P     Statistic 
Age   M(SD) 72.69(7.18) 74.39(8.74) _ .32 t108 = 1.71 
Gender n (%) 
      Female 
      Male 
 
29(26.36%) 





.81           
 
 = .06 
Income   n (%) 
   Low income <$40,000 
   High income ≥ $40,000 












  =2.3 
Eyesight   n (%) 
   Poor- Fair 
   Good 
 










   Missing 
 
Hearing n (%) 
   Poor-Fair 
   Good 
   Missing 





  4(3.64%) 
0(0%)                     

















Table 12 (continued) 
In general, to what 









.21        
 




We performed the analysis for findings shown in Table 12 to be sure that nothing in the 
methodology of the study design caused 74 of the participants to not complete the six-month 
follow-up.   All the P values were greater than .05 hence there were no significant differences 
between the 36 participants with both baseline and six-month follow-up data and the 74 with only 
baseline data that made them not make it to the six-month follow-up.  
Table 13 shows the sample characteristics of the 36 participants that were included in the 
analysis. We performed a One-way ANOVA for the continuous variables and χ2 test for the 
categorical variables.   
 
 
 Table 13: Comparison of selected characteristics, by group (N = 36) 
 
Variable  Control Minimal Intensive  P           Statistic 
Gender  n (%) 
     Female 












                   
















  3(8.33%) 
 
















           = .94 
Eyesight N (%) 
   Poor- Fair 
   Good 
   Missing                      
 
  4(11.11%) 
10(27.78%) 











   
      = .92 
Hearing N (%) 
   Poor-Fair 
   Good 
 











       = 2.53 









In general, to 






F(2,34)=.34,  n2 = 3.15 






This analysis in Table 12 was performed to test if our randomization procedure worked 
and whether the randomization still held true for the 36 participants that we used in our 3*2 
repeated measures ANOVA. All our P values were greater than .05 (not significant), hence our 
randomization procedure still held true in the three groups that made up the 36 participants that 
were included in our final analysis.  
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Table 14 summarizes the demographic information of the 36 study participants with both 
the baseline and six-month follow-up questionnaire data. Twenty-nine (80.56 %) were female and 
7 (19.44 %) were male. Twelve (33.34 %) of the participants were 60-69 years old, 17 (47.22%) 
were 70-79 years old and 7 (19.44%) were 80+ years old. For education level, 11 (30.55%) 
completed high school, 10 (27.78%) had some college education and 14 (38.89%) completed a 
college education. Two (5.55%) never used a computer before, 13 (36.11%) considered their 
computer skill as beginners, and 20 (55.56%) said they were competent computer users. Twenty-
one (58.33%) had low income<$40,000, 10(27.78%) reported high incomes>$40,000 and 5 
(13.89%) were not certain how much they made. All 36 participants said English was their primary 
language.  Nine (25.00%) said they had poor-fair eyesight, 25 (69.44%) had good eyesight. For 




















Table 14: Sample Demographics (N=36) 
 
Characteristic  Subject(n) Proportion % 
Gender  
       Male  







Age   
       60-69 
       70-79 










      High School 
      Some College 
      College 










  2.78 
Computer skills 
     Never 
     Beginner 
     Competent 







  5.55 
36.11 
55.56 
  2.78 
Income 
     Low income<$40,000 
     High income ≥ $40,000 



















      Poor- Fair 
      Good  










     Poor-Fair 
     Good 











12.0  RESULTS 
12.1 AIM 1 GAP ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Figure 6 shows the results of the gap analysis performed for Aim 1. Our initial goal was to 
implement those items deemed most critical. Those items were addressed first and foremost and 
then as time and resources permitted, all other items were addressed. Our aim was to implement 
50% of the items referenced on our P&S policies in this version of the kiosk. 
   
  
 





As shown in figure 6 we were able to implement 73% of our P&S policies as part of our 
System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) for the current multiuser health kiosk. Seven percent of 
the policies were not implemented in this version of the kiosk. We also found 20% of our P&S 
policies from our audit checklist were not applicable to the current release of our kiosk platform. 
When we filtered out the non-applicable policies, the implementation rate for our P&S policies 
went up to 91% and the percentage of policies not implemented went up to 9%. This means we 
surpassed our goal of implementing 50% of applicable P&S policies. 
The four (9%) policies that were not implemented are: 
• Is there a clear written procedure to grant access to e-PHI? 
• Is there any HIPAA and HITECH security awareness and training program in place? 
• Are there any policies for testing emergency contingency plans or backup procedures? 
• Are there procedures for terminating access when it is no longer needed? 
The Health Kiosk Project is ongoing and so those policies that were not implemented will be 
addressed. 
12.2 AIM2 DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
12.2.1    Result for Aim 2 Question 1 
Our study has shown that it is possible to perform a single-blinded randomized controlled study to 
investigate the efficacy of an intervention to explore the magnitude of differences in users’ 
“perceived risk” of P&S breaches as well as the correlation between “perceived risk” and their 
“intention to use” a multi-user health kiosk. However, we did not meet our goal of retaining 60 
participants at six-month follow-up.  
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12.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Analysis was performed on 36 participants and results are shown in Table 15.  The control group 
(1) had 14 participants with a  pre-perceived-risk mean and standard deviation of 3.90 and .82, 
respectively, and a post-perceived-risk mean and standard deviation of 4.20 and .74, respectively.  
The minimal intervention group (2) had 12 participants with pre-perceived-risk mean and standard 
deviation of 3.99 and .52 respectively, and a post-perceived-risk mean and standard deviation of 
4.38 and .55 respectively.  The intensive intervention group had 10 participants with a pre-
perceived-risk mean and standard deviation of 4.32 and .52 respectively, and a post-perceived-risk 
mean and standard deviation of 4.47 and .59, respectively.  
 
 




Group ID Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
Pre-Perceived-Risk 1 3.90178571 .815286501 14 
2 3.98958333 .523478133 12 
3 4.32336957 .521176373 10 
Total 4.04815821 .658970562 36 
Post-Perceived-Risk 1 4.20238095 .741197839 14 
2 4.37552838 .554587337 12 
3 4.47277778 .594948730 10 




1= strongly disagree – 5 = strongly agree; higher the number the less perceived risk 
Group 1=Control Group(A), Group 2= Minimal Intervention Group (B) Group 3= Intensive 
Intervention Group (C)   
 
12.2.3 Assumptions for Aim 2 Question 2 (3 X 2 repeated measures ANOVA) 
Box’s M test for compound symmetry was not significant. Hence, the compound symmetry 
assumption was met. Mauchly’s test for sphericity was non-conclusive since we only had 2 levels 
of our DV (Perceived Risk). Apart from the control group at baseline, all other group/time 
combinations were normal.  Even though the control did not meet the assumption for normality at 
base line, ANOVA is robust to the normality assumption.  
 
 
12.2.4 Results of 3*2 Repeated Measures ANOVA 
The results from the 3*2 repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant group-by-time 
interaction (no Time*Group interaction) F (2, 33) = .27 P=.77, ηp2=.02.  This means there was no 
significant change in perceived risk among kiosk users due to interaction between their group 
(control group [A or 1], minimal intervention group [B or 2] and intensive intervention group [C 
or 3]) and time (baseline and six-month follow-up).  There was a significant main effect of time F 
(1, 33) = 4.73, P=.04, ηp2=.13. Hence, there were significant differences in perceived risk over 
time regardless of group. Also, there were no significant differences in perceived risk between the 
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three groups (control, minimal intervention and intensive intervention) F (2, 33) =1.27, P=.30 




Table 16: Main Effect of Group, Time and Interaction results of Time* Group (N = 36) 
 
 
Source SS df MS F      p           ηp2 
Between-Subjects Effects  18.24     33 .55    
              GroupID  1.40       2 .70 1.27 .30 .07 
       
Within-Subjects Effects 9.57 33 .29    
 
              Time 
 
 
      
1.37 1 1.37 4.73 .04 .13 




              As shown in Figure 7, perceived risk decreased across all the three groups with time 
(higher values correspond to lower perceived risk). The intensive intervention group had the lowest 
perceived risk in the six-month follow-up, followed by the minimal intervention group and the 






Figure 7: Plot of Estimated Marginal Means 
 
Group 1=Control Group(A), Group 2= Minimal Intervention Group (B) Group 3= Intensive 




13.0  DISCUSSIONS 
13.1 AIM 1 GAP ANALYSIS DISCUSSIONS 
A 2015 study on the implementation of IT P&S policies in the retail sector in South Africa 
concluded that there was a significant lack of IT P&S policies, processes, procedures and 
corresponding documentation (van Vuuren, Kritzinger, & Mueller, 2015). A summary of the 
results is shown in Table 17. 
 
 
Table 17: GAP in IS P&S policies 
 




Findings  Percentage 
implanted 
55% Not informed of Applicable work-related information 
systems (IS) P&S Policies when they joined the 
company. 
45%  
62% Employees did not sign any document to show that 
they were provided P&S policies highlighting their 
responsibilities towards protecting organization IS 
assets. 
38%  
96% Employees said that there was no documentation of IS 
P&S polices or did not know of existence of 
documentation of steps (instructions/procedures) to 









Table 17 (continued) 
91% Employees state that they did not receive training or 
updated company IS P&S policies in the past year 
9% 
39% Employees were not aware of enforcement of new 
company IS P&S policies or are not informed about 
those policies. Of the 61whos said they were made 
aware of the polices, only 5% went through periodic 
training programs, 30% were informed through the 
grape vine and 65% via email or other ad-hoc means. 
61% 
 
   
 
Their reporting showed an average 31.4% implementation/enforcement of IT P&S policies, 
processes, procedures and corresponding documentation. Other studies have strongly linked the 
GAP in IT P&S policies and actual implementation/enforcement of the P&S policies to the recent 
increase in breaches (Kafali et al., 2017). A recent HIPAA case study which looked at 1577 
breaches reported by Health and Human Services (HHS) found gaps between HIPAA and reported 
breaches,  that led to a coverage/enforcement rate of 65% (Kafali et al., 2017). This means actual 
polices implementation is 65% of what is supposed to be implemented. Hence, our implementation 
rate was much higher compared to what has previously been reported. This also means that overall 
our multi-user kiosk design is quite secure compare to other systems. The policies that we did not 
implement (9% of policies not implemented) were the ones that needed an addendum to make 
them complete. For example, we have a policy which states that all access to the kiosk and its 
resources must be terminated once a kiosk project member is no longer with the kiosk project. 
However, there was no detailed written procedure yet for terminating access to the kiosk. The GAP 
68.6% Average 31.4% 
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analysis results are supposed to help us improve our P&S policies.  Hence, like other studies, we 
should have categorized our GAP analysis into the various sections of our P&S policies (Privacy, 
Confidentiality, Security, etc.) because this would have allowed us to view which categories of the 
P&S policies needed more work or improvement (Mineraud, Mazhelis, Su, & Tarkoma, 2016). 
13.2  AIM2 QUESTION 1 DISCUSSION 
We were able to show that it is possible to perform a single-blinded, randomized, controlled study 
to investigate the efficacy of an intervention to explore the magnitude of differences in users’ 
“perceived risk” of P&S breaches as well as the correlation between “perceived risk” and their 
“intention to use” a multi-user health kiosk.  One thing we uncovered right at the beginning of the 
study was that we needed to tweak our randomization procedure to make the data collector blinded 
to the participant’s group assignment.  Initially, we were putting the group IDs (A, B, C) directly 
on the envelope labels. That meant that the person handing the envelopes containing the survey 
questionnaire would have known to which group the participant was being randomized. We 
therefore created a “master Excel sheet” (Appendix G) of numbers that matched the group IDs (A, 
B, C). We put those numbers on the back of the envelopes and the participant ID at the top of each 
survey questionnaire. Once completed, each survey questionnaire administered at six months was 
paired with its baseline counterpart.   
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13.3 AIM 2 QUESTION 2 DISCUSSION 
Our study was consistent with characteristics of most feasibility studies. Feasibility studies are 
usually used to test ideas (study design, practicality, sample-size, randomization procedure, data 
analysis type, etc.) for a more extensive, full-scale or future study (Bowen et al., 2009).  In general,  
there are eight areas of focus in feasibility studies (Bowen et al., 2009): 
Acceptability looks at how both the targeted individuals and those administering the 
programs react to the intervention. For example, did the kiosk study coordinators follow the study 
script correctly and did the kiosk study participants understand or follow the intervention 
instructions correctly? 
Demand involves gathering data by documenting the actual use of the intervention 
activities in a defined population or setting to evaluate the intervention. For our kiosk project we 
used a questionnaire to collect data from the participants and an Excel spreadsheet to input our 
data. In the future, we will add a date field to the questionnaire to ensure capture of the date the 
questionnaire was administered, and we will add a date field to our Excel spreadsheet to record 
the date. This will allow us to easily keep track of when a participant first completed a baseline 
survey and received his or her group assignment, furthering allow us to know when a participant 
missed their six-month follow-up, so we can contact them.      
Implementation is usually done in an uncontrolled process or design, and is the extent, 
likelihood, and manner in which an intervention can be fully implemented as planned and 
proposed. Our study was controlled, and it was a Single Blinded Randomized Control Trial. 
Practicality focuses on the extent to which the intervention can be delivered within 
constraints of time, resources, commitment, sample population, etc. We were constrained by time 
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because this was a dissertation and therefore had to completed within a set period.  Another 
constraint was that we ended up deploying in 10 locations instead of the initial one location.  
Hence, we decided to perform the intensive intervention follow-up to explain P&S policies by 
phone. 
Adaptation is making the appropriate changes to procedures and program content to 
accommodate requirements of a different media or population. Explanation of P&S polices were 
done on the phone instead of face-to-face. We also had to tweak our randomization procedure to 
make sure the study was single blinded so that the data collector remained unaware of the 
participant’s group assignment. 
Integration focuses on changes that need to be put in place to integrate a new program, 
process or design into an existing one. We had to integrate the procedures for our study into those 
established by the parent study. 
Expansion deals with the possibility of expanding an already successful intervention with 
a different population or different setting. This did not pertain to our study.  
Limited-efficacy testing, most feasibility studies involve limited testing of an 
intervention.  This could be done with a sample of convenience, preliminary data, intermediate 
rather than final outcomes, shorter follow-up periods, or limited statistical power.  Our study was 
ancillary to another study and, hence, we had to use a sample of convenience. We also used 
intermediate data since we are still collecting data. 
             We did not meet our goal of retaining 60 participants in our study at the sixth-month 
follow-up.  This was due in part to the fact that we did not deploy all the 10 kiosks at the same 
time. Hence, some the participants were not due for their six-month follow-up at the time of our 
data analysis. This is consistent with “practicality” explanation of feasibility studies (Bowen et al., 
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2009). We had to suspend our data collection to run a preliminary analysis for the dissertation. We 
therefore, had a small sample of 36 for our data analysis.  The small sample size can affect the 
power of our study as well as reduce the potential of arriving at statistically significant outcomes 
(Faber & Fonseca, 2014). This may explain why we did not observe significance in the main effect 
for group or in a time*group interaction.  In the future we will recruit more people into the study 
to improve the chances of having more than 36 people after six-months. Other studies have shown 
that intensive follow-up contact with subjects seems to improve continuous participation in 
research studies and retention of participants (Yancey, Ortega, & Kumanyika, 2006). Hence, we 
will have to find a way to have a more intensive follow-up without coming across as harassing our 
study participants. All this fits into the “limited efficacy testing” of feasibility studies (Bowen et 
al., 2009). 
            Trust has been found to be one of the major determinants of “perceived risk”. High trust 
correlates to low “perceived risk” (Fox & Connolly, 2018; van Schaik et al., 2017).  Participants 
in All three or our groups had a very low (saturated) “perceived risk” at baseline. This may have 
been due to participants at the outset having had a very high-level trust in the system and the study 
they were signing up for.  They had only recently consented to take part in the study, so they likely 
knew/felt or perceived/trusted their information to be safe. They also received a Brief explanation 
of P&S of the kiosk as part of their orientation to the parent study.  
“Perceived risk” decreased with time. This is consistent with previous research which has shown 
that  trust tends to increase with time, and “perceived risk” decreaseS with time as trust increases 
(Fox & Connolly, 2018).  
Studies have shown that people are willing to trade the P&S of their information for very little 
reward (Kokolakis, 2017).  So perhaps for our study participants, sacrificing their P&S to further 
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research was a good thing to do (this was more rewarding to them). This could be another reason 
for the low level of “perceived risk” among our three study groups at baseline, as they were willing 
to sacrifice their P&S to advance research. The low (saturated low level) “perceived risk” meant 
there was very little room for improvement in response to our intervention.  This could be why the 
magnitude of change in our “perceived risk” with time (main effect of time) was small and no 
significant changes were detected for a group by time interaction (main effect of group by time) 
as well as group (main effect of group). 
Another explanation for the low-level of  “perceived risk “ at baseline could be due to what has 
been described by researchers as the information security and “privacy paradox,”  characterized 
by inconsistencies between privacy attitude and privacy behavior (Kokolakis, 2017; Schmidt, 
2018).  In one study, subjects were asked to buy a DVD from one of two competing stores.  One 
of the stores asked buyers to provide very private and sensitive personal information but offered a 
small discount on the purchase. The second shop did not ask for private or sensitive personal 
information from buyers and offered no discounts.  Almost all participants were reported to have 
bought from the cheaper store. The irony was that 75% of the participants said they had a very 
strong interest in data protection and 95% indicated they had a strong desire to protect their 
personal information (Kokolakis, 2017).  In another study of users’ attitude towards P&S, 95% of 
the participants said they were concerned about their privacy online.  However, only 31% said they 
understood how their personal information was collected and shared.  Thirty three percent said 
they could access the online privacy policies, although only 16% had actually read them.  Just 43% 
said they knew how to  change their security setting on social media, but only 29% had actually 
changed it (see Table 18) (Schmidt, 2018).   
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             Researchers are baffled as to what is causing the dichotomy in user attitude and actual 
behavior towards privacy and security (P&S). Hence, to improve this study in the future, we will 
also research cognitive behavior as it relates to P&S to help us in our questionnaire design.    
 
 
Table 18: User P&S Attitude 
 
User Attitude Towards P&S  
Percentage Findings 
95% Of the participants said they were concerned about their privacy online 
31% Only 31% said they understood how their personal information was collected 
and shared (Why will they not find out if they were that concerned) 
33%  Can access the online privacy policies but only 16% read them 
43%  knew how, and could change their security setting on social media, but only 
29% changed them 
 
 
The fact that there was a slight reduction in “perceived risk” over six months may be 
attributable in part to the good work done by the Health Kiosk Project team in designing the kiosk; 
building its physical structure and the underlying software and computer hardware; incorporating 
the P&S policies into the kiosk. As was shown in the gap analysis we successfully implemented 
91% of our P&S policies. This is very high compared to the industry standards and as reported in 
other studies(Kafali et al., 2017). This could mean that the participants were very 
comfortable/trusted using the kiosk from the P&S standpoint. The study coordinators also did a 
good job to make the study participants comfortable and trusting throughout the duration of the 
study. The reduction in perceived risk with time (main effect of time) also meant that the users’ 
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trust in our multi-user health kiosk increased with time as they used the kiosk, consistent with 
findings in the study conducted by Fox and Connolly (Fox & Connolly, 2018). 
Questionnaire design is another thing we will have to look at in our future studies.  Studies 
have shown that it is very difficult to design questionnaires that are easy to understand (Krosnick, 
2018). Our future questionnaires will be designed in collaboration with the School of Psychology 
and Education. This collaboration will also involve designing P&S polices and checklists for 
various information systems.  
We were not able to run the correlation analysis for the study.  This was because all the 
study participants answered “Yes” to the intention to use question.  In future studies the intention 
to use question will be designed using a Likert-type scale instead.  Compared to “Yes/No” type of 
question, Likert-type scale questions have the advantage of being very flexible. They provide the 
ability to measure broad areas or look at specific facets of what the investigator is trying to measure 
(DV) (Canada, 2018). They are also more precise than “Yes/No” or “True/False” questions, easy 
to compile and understand (Canada, 2018).  
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14.0  LIMITATIONS OF OUR STUDY 
Our study included adults 60 years of age and older, so it is not generalizable to an entire 
population. Lack of generalizability affects external validity of our research. Hence, future 
research will try to recruit participants 21 years and older in order to improve external validity 
(Schofield, 2002). Because this was an ancillary study to another study, the study participants came 
in at a “saturated” low-level of “perceived risk,” perhaps due to self-selection and due to receiving 
brief information about P&S measures incorporated into the kiosk design prior to being recruited 
into our study and receiving the P&S questionnaire. Hence, there was very little room for 
improvement (Levin, 2005) in this convenience sample, which makes control of extraneous 
variables difficult (Bowen et al., 2009). In the future participants will be recruited solely for our 
P&S study to lower the crossover effect from the parent study to which they consented (Levin, 
2005). Because this was a feasibility/pilot study, we did not include covariates such as age, 
socioeconomic variables, gender, etc. in the analysis, so there is no way of telling how much these 
confounding variables may have affected “perceived risk” to breach of P&S of the multi-user 
health kiosk. Not accounting for the confounding variables could affect the internal validity of our 
study (Pourhoseingholi, Baghestani, & Vahedi, 2012). Our plan is to add potentially confounding 
variables to our future data analysis to allow us to see how those variables affected our intervention 
(Levin, 2005). We had a small sample of 36 participants at the six-month follow-up. The small 
sample size could explain for the reason why we did not have significant results (Faber & Fonseca, 
2014). Our aim is to recruit more people to our study to improve the sample size. All 36 used in 
the data analysis answered “Yes” (see Appendix H) regarding their intention to use the kiosk both 
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at baseline and six-month follow-up so we could not run our correlation analysis. In the future, we 
will use a Likert-type scale in our “intention to use” questionnaire to capture more responses that 
could have enabled us to run the correlation analysis (Canada, 2018).    
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15.0  FUTURE STUDIES 
The immediate follow-up with this dissertation is to continue with the data collection for the study 
to get a larger sample to analyze. A larger sample size might permit detection of significance for 
a group*time interaction as well as a main effect for group (Faber & Fonseca, 2014).  With a larger 
sample size our analysis will be expanded to include confounding variables like age, gender, 
income, education and computer skills to see how those affect “perceived risk”. Adding potentially 
confounding variables to our analysis will reduce the possibility of Type I error and improve 
internal validity of the study (Pourhoseingholi et al., 2012).  
Armed with the experience and findings from this study, we will design a future study to 
see if having a well-designed training for internal users could improve their attitude and positively 
influence their behavior items of P&S to engage in safe P&S behavior. This will be performed in 
collaboration with the School of Education and Psychology Department. This is very important 
since most research has identified the internal user as the source of most of the recent breaches.  
Another adventurous and interesting study will be a multi-disciplinary, longitudinal study 
to create a chronology of all the recent high profile privacy and security breaches and team up with 
researchers at the School of Education and Psychology Department to see if it is possible to create 
a profile of those attacks so we can build that profile into machine learning software to help 
forecast activities leading to a breach. This way we can always be one step ahead of will be 
attackers.      
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16.0  CONCLUSION 
We were able to research possible vulnerabilities that could pose security risks to multi-user health 
kiosks. The possible risks were then used to successfully select aspects of the OCR audit protocol 
to develop an audit checklist for our kiosk. P&S policies were developed successfully from the 
audit checklist to make sure our P&S policies matched our audit checklist.  The P&S policies were 
then successfully incorporated into our kiosk design (as part of our kiosk SDLC) to make our kiosk 
secure and compliant with HIPAA/HITECH standards. We were also able to successfully 
implement 91% of our P&S policies, surpassing the goal of 50% that we had set for this version 
of our kiosk, as was shown in our gap analysis results. Our P&S implementation rate was also 
much higher than what has been reported in other studies in the industry 31.4% in one study (van 
Vuuren et al., 2015) and 65% in another study (Kafali et al., 2017). 
We were able to design a single blinded randomized control trial (RCT) and run a pilot 
study to test the efficacy of an intervention to lower “perceived risk.” To our knowledge no one 
has done RCT studies on P&S. Even though we did not see significant changes due to group*time 
interaction as well as group, we observed a reduction in “perceived risk” because of main effect 
of time. A larger sample size could have led to significant results for time*group interaction as 
well as group. This finding suggests that educating users about the content of the P&S policies of 
the systems they are using could help to improve attitudes towards P&S and positively influence 
P&S behavior (van Schaik et al., 2017).   
Research has also shown there is general lack of funding in P&S because it is difficult to 
quantify the momentary gain in information/data security. However, with the recent increase in 
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high profile breaches, P&S has become one of the main determinants of technology acceptance 
and adoption (Mitzner et al., 2017) and fines for breaches are on the rise. Hence, organizations 
will lose out of patronage from users and potentially lose money in the process. Technology 
development and deployments might fail outright if P&S is not incorporated as part of the systems 
development cycle. This is evident with the recent complete shutdown or discontinuation of 
Google+ (Carman, 2018). Fines for information breaches have also increased tremendously. Hence 
P&S will have to take “a front row seat” in technology development.      
 More research is needed to find out if a larger sample size could yield more robust results 
in our pilot study. This study design could also be adapted for research in P&S during systems 
design and implementation.  For instance, it could be adapted to test whether a specific training 
program or communication of P&S policies could lead to better adherence to P&S polices by both 
internal and external users. Our findings could serve as a framework to drive policy in P&S of 










APPENDIX A: MULTI-USER HEALTH KIOSK AUDIT CHECKLIST 
The protocol below provides a guideline that can be used to assess whether a multi-user health 
kiosk is meeting P&S regulations such as HIPAA and HITECH.  It has been adapted from the 
OCR audit protocol.(V. J. Watzlaf et al., 2010) 
 HIPAA/HITECH Compliance Checklist for Multi-User 
Health Kiosk  
 PRIVACY  Yes  NO  N/A 
1. Personal Information       
• Is there a privacy policy?       
• Does the kiosk have a privacy screen?       
• Will user information be shared with third-party 
companies?       
o If yes, is there a Business Associate (BA) 
agreement with this company?       
2. Retention of Personal Information        
• Is user information and e-PHI stored?       
• Is there a policy outlining the retention period of e-
PHI? 
  
      
• Can users request copies of their Information?       
o If yes, is there a well-defined procedure for 
requesting copies of PHI and other information?       
 CONFIDENTIALITY        
3. Request of Information       
• Is there a policy for disclosure of e-PHI or identifiable 
information?       
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 SECURITY  
       
4. Security Management Process       
• Is there a well-written procedure or protocol for 
performing a thorough risk assessment?       
• How many times in a year is a risk assessment 
performed? 
o 0 times in a year? 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
o More than three times a year? 
      
• Is there a formal or informal policy or procedure to 
review information system activities like audit logs, 
access reports incident tracking etc.? 
      
• Are current security measures sufficient to reduce risk 
and vulnerabilities to a reasonable level?       
5. Assigned Security Responsibility       
• Do you have a security officer in charge of developing, 
implementing, monitoring and communicating 
HIPAA/HITECH security policies and procedures? 
      
6. Workforce Security       
• Do you have documentation for authorization and 
supervision of all entities working with or helping to 
manage and maintain the kiosk? 
      
• Do you have clear job descriptions for all entities 
working with the kiosk?        
• Is there documentation listing the level of access to the 
system, including e-PHI for each employee?        
• Is there a clear procedure to terminate access to 
resources once a person is removed from the project or 
terminated? 
      
7. Information Access Management       
• Is there a clear written procedure to grant access to e-
PHI?       
• Do policies and standards exist to authorize and 
document access, review and modify a user’s right to 
computer systems, software, databases and other 
network resources? 
      
• Are users going to pay to use the kiosk system?       
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o If so, will a clearinghouse or third party be used to 
process payment? 
 If so, are there policies and procedures for 
access to information, by clearinghouse 
workers, consistent with HIPAA and 
HITECH security rules? 
• Are formal or informal policies and procedures in place 
for security measures relating to access control?       
• Is there any HIPAA and HITECH security awareness 
and training program in place?       
• Are there procedures and measures in place for 
protection from malicious software and exploitation of 
vulnerabilities? 
      
• Have employees been trained as to the importance of 
protecting against malicious software and how to guard 
against it? 
      
• Are there policies and procedures for log–on 
monitoring and password management?       
• Do security training materials target current IT security 
topics relevant to kiosk security?       
• How often are security procedures, policies and 
protocols updated? 
o 0 times in a year? 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
o More than three times a year? 
      
• Are there any policies and procedures in place to 
identify, respond to, report and mitigate security 
incidents? 
      
8. Contingency Plan       
• Is there a contingency plan in place to identify critical 
applications, data and other operations of the kiosk 
system? 
      
• Is there a disaster recovery and backup plan in place to 
restore lost data?       
• Is any redundancy built into the kiosk deployment?       
• Is there any well-defined policy for operating in 
emergency mode that allows continuation of critical 
business processes? 
      
• Are there any policies for testing emergency 
contingency plans or backup procedures?       
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9. Evaluation       
• Are there policies in place for evaluating the security 
procedures as they apply to HIPAA/HITECH security 
rules? 
      
10. Business Associate (BA) Contracts       
• Is there a policy for contracts with Business Associates 
and other third-party vendors?        
11. Physical Security       
• Are there policies in place to analyze physical security 
vulnerabilities of the kiosk system?       
• Are there policies in place to guard against physical 
security vulnerabilities and to protect kiosk hardware 
and components that hold e-PHI? 
      
• Are there procedures and policies in place to control 
access to kiosk hardware, systems and other 
components by staff, visitors etc. that could 
compromise the kiosk system as a whole? 
      
• Are there maintenance records for repairs and 
modification of physical components especially relating 
to security? 
      
12. Computer Component Use       
• Is there other computer hardware, like 
workstations and servers that manage the kiosk 
system? 
      
o If yes, are there policies and documentation 
outlining specific workstations and servers and 
their functions and location? 
      
o Is there documentation and procedures to identify 
specific functions of each workstation and server?       
13. Workstation and Server Security        
• Is there any policy or procedure to prevent 
unauthorized access to an unattended workstation or to 
limit the ability of un-authorized persons to access 
other users’ information (analyze physical surroundings 
for physical attributes)?  
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• How are workstations and servers physically restricted 
to limit or restrict access to only authorized people?       
14.  Device and Media Controls       
• Is there any policy for monitoring and tracking the 
location and movement of kiosk hardware (especially 
containing e-PHI)? 
      
15.  Access Control       
• Is there an access control policy? 
       
• Is there an encryption procedure in place to protect e-
PHI?       
o If yes, are there any well documented policies 




 Access Control (Continued)       
• Are there any policies to make sure all users are 
assigned unique access credentials, like IDs and 
passwords, to log on to the kiosk system? 
      
• Are all users assigned usernames and passwords?       
• Is there documentation of each user’s exact privileges 
in the kiosk system (useful to prevent privilege 
escalation)? 
      
• Are there clearly defined policies to track changes and 
modifications made within the kiosk system, including 
which users made the changes? 
      
• Are there any policies in place to make sure user 
access is reviewed on a periodic basis and how often 
that is done? 
      
• Is the system configured to auto-logoff after a 
predetermined time?        
o  Is there any documentation and defined policy 
for this?       
• Are there procedures for terminating access when it is 
no longer needed?       
16.   Audit Control        
• Has any audit control been implemented?       
• Are there any audit control policies in place?       
• How often are the audit control tools and mechanisms 
reviewed to determine if upgrades are needed? 
o 0 times in a year? 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
o More than three times a year? 
 




17.  Integrity   Yes  NO  N/A 
• Who has access to information or e-PHI stored in 
the kiosk systems?       
• Is there a well-defined policy or procedure to 
identify these individuals?       
18.  Person or Entity Authentication       
• What kind of authentication procedure or 
mechanism is in place within the kiosk system?       
• Are there any policies to govern this and evaluate 
the authentication mechanisms in place to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of the mechanism? 
      
o If so does the policy also look at the cost benefit 
ratio of the various types of authentication 
mechanisms?  
      
• Is there a policy to test and upgrade the 
authentication mechanism tested on a periodic 
basis? 
      
19.  Transmission Security       
• Is there any formal data transmission policy for the 
kiosk system?       
• Is there any risk assessment policy to determine the 
security level of the data transmission procedure in 
the kiosk system? 
      
• Is there a formal policy for breach notification?       
• Is there a template or letter or other defined means 
of breach notification?       
• Does the notification policy include procedure for 
notification of media outlets?       
• Does the policy also spell out notification 






APPENDIX B: KIOSK PRIVACY AND SECURITY POLICIES 
 
Kiosk Security Policies                                                                  Last Updated_________________ 
 
Purpose 
This document defines the privacy and security policies for the “XYZ” Multi-user health 
kiosk system. We take all aspects of security of our system as well as the privacy and 
confidentiality of our users’ data very seriously. To protect the overall multi-user health kiosk 
system and keeping user data and information private and confidential in compliance with HIPAA 
and HITECH rules, this policy must be fully implemented and adhered to.  
Intent 
The goal of this policy is to provide the kiosk project team and future administrators of the 
multi-user health kiosk system to meet privacy, security and confidentiality requirements of 
HIPAA, HITECH and other healthcare regulations.  The content of this policy will reflect 
requirements listed in the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) audit protocol. 
Scope 
This policy applies to the entire multi-user health kiosk infrastructure. This includes but 
not limited to servers, network, databases, software, kiosk hardware, data at rest, and data in transit. 
The policy also applies to workers and users who interact with the kiosk and any third-




This policy covers all employees, management, contractors, vendors’ business 
partners/associates and any party that may have access to any aspect of the multi-user health kiosk 
system. 
Attributes of Information to be protected  
A complete inventory of the multi-user health kiosk system should be conducted to 
determine what will need to be protected. This process should be completed any time a change is 
made to the kiosk system/infrastructure.  
Definitions 
         Privacy 
This is the ability for people to keep their personal information a secret from others. 
It is good to note that a breach of confidentiality will constitute a breach of privacy. 
Confidentiality 
This is a process to ensure that only authorized people can view the people’s personal 
data.  
Availability 
This is making sure that information and other system resources are available, when 
needed, to all authorized users. 
Access 





This is a procedure of approving or denying specific requests for obtaining and using 
information. This is to make sure only authorized people have access to IT/computer systems. 
Principle of Least privilege 
User Privilege to access and use any resources should be absolutely limited only to 
resources necessary to perform assigned duties and nothing else. This is important to prevent 
privilege escalation. 
Principle of Separation of Duties 
As much as possible to limit the potential for fraud, or fraudulent activities, one person 
should not be put in charge of completing any tasks from beginning to end.  Multiple people must 
be assigned sections of the task to be completed.  
Security Outline 
Appropriate steps should be taken to protect all aspects of the multi-user health kiosk 
system; hardware, software and data/information with the kiosk system. 
Security should therefore cover a wide range of security entities including: 
• Physical Security 
o Access controls, DC controls, data disposal Methods, preventing access to internal 
kiosk components. 
• Logical Security 
o  Deals with user accounts & passwords 
• Servers & PCs 
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o Software licenses, patch management (operating system and other security 
updates), laptop security. 
• Network Infrastructure 
o Making sure there is a standby version for network components in case of outage, 
to reduce downtime (Core redundancy), Change Management, single point of 
failure 
• IT Security Policies, Procedures, Practices 
o Security, acceptable use, Backup (BC)/Disaster Recovery (DR) planning, etc. 
• Internal Network Vulnerabilities 
o Patch and firmware levels, password management, etc. 
• External Network Vulnerabilities 
o Penetration testing, attack vulnerabilities, open ports. 
• File Backup & Recovery  
o  File backup and recovery procedures, offsite storage, and retention periods. 
• AV, Spyware, SPAM  
o Protection, content filtering, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/ Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS). 
• Software Security  
o  Mission-critical apps, changes and updates, testing. 
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It is the responsibility of everyone who interacts with the multi-user health kiosk to protect 
the system including the data and all computer infrastructure of the kiosk.  
Responsibility 
All individuals including users’ who interact with the kiosk system must comply with the 
contents of the policy and reporting of any actions that violates this policy in any way. 
Administrators of the kiosk system are responsible for making sure any group of people 
that work with on the kiosk system understands the scope and implications of this policy.  
Kiosk administrators should, on a continuous basis, monitor the entire kiosk system 
including data and update access requirements and other P&S requirements.  
Management  
Kiosk management shall be the owner of this security and should work with all others in 
charge of all the IT components of the kiosk to keep the system secured. All the various activities 
to secure the system will be in the detailed part of this policy. 
Review 
Kiosk management is responsible for keeping this policy current. The policy will be 
reviewed annually/quarterly, or any time there has been major changes in the kiosk system.  
It is highly recommended to undertake a full security audit to make sure policies are well 
aligned with HIPAA, HITECH and other regulations. 
Enforcement 
Anyone found to be engaging in activities, unintentionally or intentionally that compromise 




Kiosk Management name:   __________________________________ 
Signature:                                __________________________________        
 
Witness Name:                      __________________________________ 
Witness Signature:                __________________________________   
Date:                                        __________________________________     
 
Detailed Policies 





1.1 Privacy Policy  
How your Information will be used:  
User’s private information including 
Protected Health Information (PHI), if it exists in 
the kiosk system will not be disclosed without 
authorization from the user. 
Disclosure to Business Associates 
When necessary, a user’s personal 
information should only be made available to 
Business Associates (BAs) who have agreed in 
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writing to maintain the privacy of the information 
as required by law  
Use or Disclosure Requiring 
Authorization 
The multi-user health kiosk personnel 
should only disclose user’s private information 
for only the purposes mentioned in this document.  
Written authorization or consent from the user 
will be obtained before disclosing any personal 
information for other reasons.  
Revoking Authorization 
Users can revoke written previous 
authorization at any time in writing.  
 
Use or Disclosure Permitted by Law 
Kiosk management/personnel may use or 
disclose users personal or protected information 
to the extent that that is permitted by law: 
• Public Health: For public health activities 




• Health Oversight: To a health oversight 
agency for activities such as audits, 
investigations and inspections. Oversight 
agencies include, but are not limited to, 
government agencies that oversee the 
health care system, government benefit 
programs, other government regulatory 
programs and civil rights laws. 
• Legal Proceedings: In response to an 
order of a court or administrative tribunal, 
in response to a subpoena, discovery 
request or other lawful process. 
• Law Enforcement: For law enforcement 
purposes, including:  
– legal process or as otherwise required by 
law;  
– limited information requests for 
identification and location;  
– use or disclosure related to a victim of a 
crime; 
–Criminal Activity: As requested by law 
enforcement authorities, if the use or 
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disclosure is necessary to prevent or 
lessen a serious and imminent threat to the 
health or safety of a person or the public. 
 
Use and Disclosure Examples 
• Payment: Kiosk Management/personnel 
may use PHI for payment processing to 
verify that services provided were covered 
under the patient’s vision care plan. 
• Health Care Operations: Kiosk 
Management/personnel may use and 
disclose PHI for audit purposes. 
• Treatment: To coordinate treatment by a 
health care provider. 
Personal Representative: Kiosk 
Management/personnel may disclose your PHI to 
a person who has legal authority to make health 
care decisions on your behalf. 
Disclosure Requiring Opportunity 
to Object 
Kiosk Management/personnel may 
disclose your PHI to a family member, friend, or 
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other person involved in your care or payment if 
the information is relevant to their involvement 
and you have agreed or had an opportunity to 
object. 
              User rights 
A copy of this notice should be made available to 
all first-time kiosk users or upon user request. 
 
1.2.1 Retention of Personal 
Information/PHI 
HIPAA and HITECH requires all 
covered entities (CEs) and business 
associates (BAs) to retain most personal 
information including PHIs for at least 6 
years. Some state regulations require and at 
least 7 years.  
For Multi-user health kiosk system 
the retention period will be not less than 8 
years.  The following actions will be taken in 
order to meet this requirement: 
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• There must be a designated person tasked 
to ensuring that records and information is 
retained for the required amount of time. 
• An inventory of all records to be retained, 
as well as the locations of such records, 
should be created. These records should 
then be backed up using appropriate back 
up procedures. 
• This backup should be kept separate from 
all other backups. 
• Where possible software tools such as 
IBM’s software should be employed to 
categorize data that must be retained for 
HIPAA, HITECH and other regulations as 
well as the time period that these data sets 










1.2.2 Disposal of  PHI/ Personal 
information 
All PHI and other 
information should be disposed of 
in accordance to HIPAA/ HITECH 
or state law.  
Where possible a third 
party should be hired to dispose of 
PHI and other confidential 
information after they have 
exceeded their retention period of 
7 years. 
Paper based records should 
be shredded or place in special 
beans to be picked up by a third 
party company to be shredded. 
Electronic PHI should be 
disposed of by deleting and 
reformatting the magnetic or 
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electronic media like flash drives, 
CD-ROM drives, hard drives and 
other media on which such 
information is stored. Hard drives 
should be placed in a highly 
magnetized medium to make sure 
information could not be retrieved 
from such hard drives in a way or 
form.  
Hard drives from all 
computers should be replaced and 
the old ones destroyed before the 
computers are either reused or 
sold.  
2 CONFIDENTIALITY    
2.1 Request of Information 
Kiosk user permission must be 
sought before disclosing or   sharing patient 
information with any third party; except in 
situations when the information is to be used 
to directly treat the user of billing.  This 










3 SECURITY    
3.1 Security Management Process 
         Asset Inventory (Items to 
protect): 
1. Network (servers, switches, 
computer devices) 
This policy will depend on 
CMU network security policies 
since the backbone of the kiosk 
system is part of the Carnegie 
   
authorization must always be signed by the 
user.          
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Mellon University (CMU) 
network. 
2. Kiosk Hardware (Hard-drives, 
USB ports, CD-ROM drives) 
3. Kiosk Software and underlying 
operating systems 
4. Kiosk database 
5. Users and other human assets 
(Employees etc.) 
          Threat Sources: 
1. Environmental – external fires, 
HVAC failure/temperature 
inadequacy, water pipe burst, 
power failure/fluctuation, etc. 




software, code or application, 




3. Natural – Fires, flooding, other 
natural disasters, etc. 
4. Technological – Power outage, 
database problems, failure of 
computer components, etc. 
5. Other – Quitting of employees, 
medical emergencies, misuse of 
privilege and resources, etc.  
6. Threat to users – Identity theft, 
fraudsters, etc.  
          Vulnerabilities: 
1. Access to USB, CD-ROMs, and 
other internal components. 
2. Keyboard function keys could be 
used to get to the underlying 
operating system. 
3. Ability to gain access to the 
underlying operating system. 
4. Theft of kiosk components.  
5. Data at rest on the kiosk or in 




6. Hacking and gaining access to 
kiosk database 
7. Privilege escalation 
8. Shoulder surfing 
9. Network breach or intrusion 
10. Data loss or corruption of data 
11. Failure of computer components 
Detail policies to minimize the impact 
of these vulnerabilities are highlighted in 
subsequent areas of the security section of this 
document. 
Risk Assessment Policy: 
Risk assessment should be 
performed twice a year or when there is 
a major update of the kiosk system and 
other auxiliary computer components or 
system. 
    Audit Trail: 
 Audit trails can play a 
tremendous role in detecting security 
violations, performance problems, flaws 
in applications or software and trouble 
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shooting. Hence all user activities and 
other system and application processes 
must be preserved. 
All users on the kiosk system 
must be authenticated to allow for 
accountability of user actions. In 
addition, all administrative activities 
must be monitored to help in trouble 
shooting and resolving problems.   
3.2 Assigned Security 
Responsibility 
There should be a security officer 
whose job it will be to develop implement 
monitor and communicate HIPAA 
/HITECH policies and procedures to 
employees. 
   
3.3 Workforce Security 
To prevent privilege escalation and 
unauthorized access to all kiosk resources;  
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 There should be documentation of 
the type of authorization and supervision for 
all entities working with the kiosk. 
 
This documentation shall include 
clear job description for all the people 
working with the kiosk and shall also state 
clearly the level of access each employee 
has to the kiosk systems and the data within 
the kiosk. 
 
All privileges to every Aspect of 
the kiosk including computers, servers 
and other kiosk network resources should 
be terminated and all user accounts 
disabled the moment a person stops 
working with the kiosk or is relieved of 
all duties associated with the kiosk.   
3.4 Information Access Management 
There must be clear 
documentation for granting access to 
sensitive information in the Multi-user 
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health kiosk systems. This must include 
clear procedure to authorize and document 
access, review and modify user’s access to 
Multi-user health kiosk computer systems, 
software, databases and other network 
resources.  
 
 All third parties that access and 
use any information in the Multi-user 
health kiosk systems must adhere to these 
procedures in accordance to HIPAA and 
HITECH security rules. 
 
Identification: 
To facilitate decision making on 
the level of access to be granted to 
individuals, unique identifiers must be 
assigned to every person who uses the 
Multi-user health kiosk.   




• Uniqueness, meaning each 
identifier (User ID, username 
etc.) must be uniquely associated 
to only one person.   
• No one person should have more 
than one account or identifier 
within the Multi-user health 
kiosk system. This makes it 
easier to implement audit trails.  
• There should be no reassignment 
of identifiers even if a person 
leaves, resigns or is terminated. 
Once an identifier is associated 
with a person it should never be 




This is the process of determining 
if a person, entity or thing is what it is 
said to be. So, authentication validates 
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the identity of a person or thing within the 
computer system.  
 
This process uses both a public and 
private identifier. The public identifier is 
usually the person’s username or 
identification number assigned within the 
system and the private identifier is usually 
a Personal Identification Number (PIN), 
password or secrete code. The private 
identifier must never be shared or 
disclosed to anyone.  
 
Encryption authentication must be 
used, and should have the adhere to the 
following rules: 
• Credentials for authentication 
should never be incorporated into 
program codes or queries. The 
only exception is when no 
reasonable alternative exists. In 
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such situations, the authentication 
information must be encrypted.   
• Temporary or initial passwords 
must be communicated to intended 
users in a secure manner and user 
accounts must be configured to 
prompt for password to be 
changed on first or initial logon. 
• Refrain from storing passwords in 
reversible forms or in clear text. 
• Identify and reset all Vendor-
supplied, default or blank 
passwords immediately following 
installation of 
applications/software, devices or 
operating systems. 
 
• All passwords must meet 




Password Expiration     Every 180 
Days 
Minimum Length          12 Characters 
Password Complexity  Enabled 
Password History         Last 10 
passwords 
Account Lockout           After 5 consecutive         
unsuccessful 
logon Attempts 
Lock-out Duration        30 minutes 
Renewed Log In           After 30 minutes of 
inactivity or by a 
systems 
administrator 
Screensaver                  Password protect 




                 This is a way of granting 
authenticated users’ permission to 
use information and resources. This 
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can be accomplished through the 
use of technology or process and 
determines what type of access 
(Read, Write, Create, modify, 
delete) that a user has to a resource.  
                     
                    The system must be effective 
enough to verify if a particular user 
has the right to perform a given 
operation.  
                    
                   All users must be prevented from 
having access to information or 
resource without proper 
authorization.   
                   
                   Data access procedures must be 
clearly defined and should include: 
• The use of access request 
forms must be used to modify 
of delete existing privileges to 
176 
 
the Multi-user health kiosk 
systems 
• Users to the kiosk should be 
accorded the least privilege 
necessary to perform their 
assigned functions within the 
Multi-user health kiosk 
system. Privileges should be 
reviewed regularly and 
modified, suspended or 
deleted if a user’s job function 
changes, gets transferred, 
resigns or is dismissed. 
• In the case of new account 
requests, must be completed 
and authorized by: 
I. The person requesting 
the access to the kiosk 
systems or resource. 
II. Supervisor or 
department head of the 
person requesting the 
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access must complete a 
portion of the form. 
III. The person who owns 
the data or the person 
who generated the data 
must also complete a 
portion of the form.  
• User accounts must be modified 
in a timely manner according to 
their new job description of 
privilege level matching their 
role when a worker is promoted 
or assumes new responsibilities.  
In situations where a worker is 
terminated with cause the 
accounts should be deactivated 
immediately.  
 
• Privileges must be reviewed to 
make sure user privileges match 
their current responsibilities. 
This allow accounts to be 
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modified, or deactivated when 
access is no longer needed. 
 
Management of the kiosk system will 
have to ensure that anyone who has access 
kiosk system is properly trained on how to 
interact with such data in compliance with 
HIPAA and HITEC rules. They should also be 
given copies of the kiosk privacy and security 
policies. 
 
Segregation of Duties 
       Segregation of duties principle 
must be used to grant access privileges to 
individuals. For example, systems 
administrators should be given a 
separate/personal account that they will use to 
log on to the system for non-admin/ person 
business.  
  All third-party vendors who view or 
interact with the Multi-user health kiosk 
system and have access to any data in the kiosk 
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system should enter into a business associate 
agreement with the Multi-user health kiosk 
management. 
            
 There should be security officer who 
will constantly review HIPAA/HITECH and 
other federal and state regulations and train 
employees who administer components of the 
Multi-user health kiosk accordingly.  
   
 All computer systems and software 
forming part of the Multi-user health kiosk 
system should be updated frequently to protect 
against viruses, malware and other security 
threats. Anti-virus programs should be 
installed on all the kiosk computer system. For 
example, Sub-netting and firewalls can also be 
implemented to reduce the spread of viruses 
and other malware.  Databases and Webpages 
should be protected against SQL injections and 
other attacks.   
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 In other not to confuse people, security 
training materials should target security issues 
relevant to the Multi-user health kiosk system. 
   
 Security policies will be reviewed and 
updated quarterly in situations where there are 
no issues.  If any issues occur or vulnerabilities 
are identified, then the issues should be 
investigated and resolved, and the security 
policy updated accordingly to protect against 
future occurrence. 
   
 All security breaches should be 
investigated and reported immediately. All 
malware infested computers should be taken 
off the network immediately to minimize the 
spread of the malware.  
If the security breach involves the loss 
or compromise of user’s data in any way, the 
affected individuals must be noted, and steps 
should be taken to report the incident to the 
appropriate entity according to HIPAA and 
HITECH rules. 
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3.5 Contingency Plan 
 Steps must be taken to identify critical 
applications, data and other kiosk operations 
and components. This makes it easier to 
implement or put procedures and processes in 
place to restore and recovers services in case 
any of those components fail, gets damaged or 
stolen.  
   
 There should be a disaster recovery 
plan to restore data, hardware, and other 
components of the Multi-user health kiosk 
systems in case of a disaster. (disaster recovery 
plan details later) 
 
Disaster recovery plans must be tested 
quarterly to test their effectiveness and find a 
fix potential problem in the plan. 
   
3.6 Evaluation 
The security and privacy officer are 
responsible to review and evaluate kiosk 
security and privacy procedures to make sure 
they reflect standards set by HIPAA/HITECH 
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and other state agencies.  The security and 
privacy officer will be responsible for creating 
and documenting procedures for evaluating 
security and privacy of the kiosk to make sure 
they comply with HIPAA/HITECH and other 
regulations. 
3.7 Business Associate (BA) Contracts 
 All third-party vendors and 
contractors who interact with the kiosk must be 
required to sign a business associate agreement 
with the Multi-user health kiosk management. 
   
3.8  Physical security 
   The physical location within which 
the kiosk is deployed must evaluated for 
probable security vulnerabilities.  
The kiosk must be deployed in a well-
lit area, free of water and fire hazards and offer 
protection from vandals and other criminals. 
 
All internal, sensitive and vulnerable 
kiosk components must enclose in a secured 
and locked compartment attached to the kiosk 
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assembly to minimize threat posse by thieves, 
vandals and other criminals. Only 
administrators or kiosk management will have 
keys to the storage attached to the kiosk.  
 
When it is possible, there must be an 
attendant to supervise the use of the kiosk 
system.  
 
A log should also be kept of all 
maintenance activities and any physical 
modifications of the Multi-user health kiosk 
system.   
3.9 Computer Component Use 
      Documentation of all kiosk 
computer component (workstation, servers, 
etc.), as well as their functions and location 
should be maintained.  These computer 
components must be identified by their names 
and IP addresses This will help identify 
potential intrusion or breaches of the Multi-
user health kiosk system. 




All workstations, servers and other 
computer components must be configured to 
prompt users for usernames and passwords 
before they can access any resources. User 
should be logged of the screen saver activated 
if there is no activity for 15 minutes.  
3.10 Workstation and Server Security 
Access to workstations and servers 
must be physically restricted. Server should be 
locked in a dedicated room with the 
administrator and manger being the only 
people with keys.  There should be 
administrator accounts to allow administrators 
to log on and perform access various resources 
on the multi-user health kiosk. 
 
There should be intrusion prevention 
mechanism installed on all computers. This 
provides the ability to lock the chassis/system 
box to prevent people from stealing computer 
components like hard drives etc. 




In a situation where administrators 
want to access resources remotely this should 
be done through a secured VPN connection.  
VPN access must be managed through a 
special organization unit. This makes it easier 
for users to added or removed from the 
organization unit to give them access or disable 
access respectively.  
 
More detail on this should be based on 
CMU security policies on server and 
workstation security,   
3.11 Device and Media Controls 
This policy helps to meet 
HIPAA/HITECH requirement to limit PHI to 
those with a need to know. This should apply 
to receipt, movement, hardware removal or 
destruction. This should also cover installation 
or removal of hardware devices from the multi-
user health kiosk and its computer systems. 
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There should be an inventory system 
for all kiosk hardware that is used to store 
users’ personal information like e-PHI. There 
should also be a description of the person 
responsible for ensuring this policy. This 
documentation or inventory should contain: 
 
• A well-defined procedure for the 
destruction and disposal of hardware 
and other electronic media used to store 
PHI. It should also state clearly who is 
responsible to oversee this process. 
• A well-defined procedure for removal 
of PHI from reusable media like tapes, 
discs, CD-ROMs or Diskettes before 
they are reused.    
• A well-defined method for recording 
the movement and storage of hardware 
and electronic media into and out of the 
multi-user health kiosk system. There 
should be people responsible for 
documenting the receipt or removal of 
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hardware and electronic media to 
ensure that their location is known at all 
times.   
• Where necessary a copy of the data on 
the Multi-user health kiosk equipment 
should be made before the equipment is 
moved, and the procedure should be 
well documented. There should be a 
unique tracking number to help track 
the whereabouts of such devices at all 
times. 
• Where necessary a copy of the data on 
the multi-user health kiosk equipment 
should be made before the equipment is 
moved, and the procedure should be 
well documented. There should be a 
unique tracking number to help track 
the whereabouts of such devices at all 
times. 
• There should be a well-defined backup 
and restore procedure in place. 
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• They should be weekly full backups 
and daily deferential backups (to allow 
for faster restore during data loss or 
corruption) 
• Data that is more than five years should 
be archived and kept on backup tapes 
for 25 years. So, the same data is not 
backed up over and over again. This 
also helps to ensure that only the 
newest data is kept on line. 
• Full monthly backups should be taken, 
and backup tapes stored at an offsite 
location 
• In the situations where electronic 
media is reused, all previous data on 
such devices must be completely 
erased.  
• There must be a well-documented 
process for processing electronic media 
for reuse. There must be a designated 





3.12 Access Control 
This policy is to guard against 
unauthorized access to information and data 
generated within the kiosk systems. This 
includes data at rest and data in motion or in 
transit.  This means the storage media on which 
the data is stored must be encrypted and the 
data itself must be encrypted before it is 
transmitted or moved across a computer 
network. Since HHS deferred to NIST for 
Cryptographic standards it is recommended to 
use the NIST standard (AES, Triple DES, and 
Skipjack) as a guide. 
• There must be an elaborate access 
control policy. 
• An acceptable encryption method 
comparable to the three encryption 
standards recommended by NIST 
should be employed in the Multi-user 
health kiosk system (Data Encryption 
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Standard (DES), Triple Data 
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA), and 
Advance Encryption Standard (AES)). 
• The encryption should protect the data 
at rest:  Hard drives, removable drives 
(CD-ROM, USBs and portable hard 
drives) used to store data should be 
encrypted. 
• Encryption should also be employed to 
protect data in motion or transit: This 
means data that is being transmitted 
across a network should be encrypted. 
The data will then be protected in the 
event that it falls in the wrong hands or 
it is intercepted by a rouge person. 
• All user duties, responsibilities and 
access needs for all people who interact 
with the multi-user health kiosk must 
be identified and well documented. 
This procedure as well as the access 
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needs of all the various people must be 
well documented. 
• All kiosk users must have a unique 
identifier (Username and Password) to 
allow user activities within the system 
to be logged and tracked. There must 
be documentation of how this is done. 
• There must be an administrator of the 
kiosk who has the right to add, modify 
and delete user access. This must be 
reviewed on a periodic basis and 
updated when users job responsibilities 
change or when users are no longer 
working on the multi-user health kiosk.  
• As part of this procedure, the 
computers must be configured auto log 
off when the system is not in use for a 
period of time. 
• There should be thorough 
documentation to serve as a directive 
for this policy. 
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3.13 Audit Control 
       There should be a well-documented 
procedure for performing security audits of 
the kiosk system. 
       This is to serve as a guide for performing 
security audits of the   kiosk system. Audits 
are necessary to ensure integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability of 
information and resources. This is to 
protect the system against: 
• Access to confidential data 
• Unauthorized access to the multi-
user health kiosk computers 
• Sharing or compromising people’s 
passwords 
• Out of date anti-virus definition 
files 
• Denial of service (DOS) attacks 
• Unsecured network access from 
the outside world including open 
ports and badly configured 
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network devices (routers, 
modems, switches etc.) 
• The audits should be performed 
semiannually. 
            
3.14 Integrity 
         This part of the security policy is to 
protect the accuracy and constituency of 
data in the multi-user health kiosk system. 
• Data must be stored, accessed and 
transmitted in a secured manner in 
order to maintain data accuracy and 
consistency. 
• Only kiosk administrators must have 
the privilege to delete or modify data.  
• Steps must also be taken to minimize 
the possibility of man- in-the-middle 
attack by transmitting data in a secured 
manner.  This procedure must me well 
documented. 
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APPENDIX C: PRIVACY AND SECURITY POLICY 
STATEMENT FOR STUDY 2 (SAMPLE) 
To protect the information, you provide at the health kiosk and to ensure that the kiosk is 
secure, the following measures are in place: 
1. Rules are being followed from two laws: 
a. the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
b. the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act  
2. The Office for Civil Rights enforces the HIPAA and HITECH laws. Its standards and 
audit protocols guide the policies we have in place to protect your security, privacy, and 
confidentiality related to the health kiosk.   
3. All parts of the health kiosk are locked down to prevent access by people without 
permission. 
4. We make every effort to make sure the health kiosk is placed where it would be difficult 
for others to read your information on the screen. 
5. Every person who uses the health kiosk must access his or her account using a unique key 
fob and password. No kiosk user may access anyone else’s account. 
6. No user data is stored at the health kiosk. Instead it is sent directly to a secure computer 
storage system at the University of Pittsburgh. 
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7. All your responses and measurements obtained at the health kiosk are labeled with a 
unique code number. That way, your private information cannot be linked to your name 
by anyone else using the kiosk.  
8. Information sent in reports to your primary care provider is done only with your 
permission.   
9. Based on the consent you provided to take part in this Health Kiosk Study, members of 
the Health Kiosk Project team may see your kiosk data only for the purposes of the study.  
10. Members our team always keep your information private and secure. 
11. Up-to-date antivirus and anti-malware software are on the kiosk computer system at all 
times. 
12. When a member of our team stops working on the Health Kiosk Project, his or her kiosk 
account is disabled right away.  
13.  The health kiosk system is regularly checked to ensure that all security, privacy and 
confidentiality policies for the kiosk are being met. 
14. Data gathered through our health kiosk is backed up daily to prevent data loss in case of 




APPENDIX D: SECURITY AND PRIVACY SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Name:                                                                             Participant # 
 
What is your educational level?   
____Less than High School 
____High School /GED 
____Some College 
____College 
How would you rate your computer skill level? 
______Never used a computer  
______Beginner  
______Competent  
Security and Privacy Questions 
Please circle the number to show your level of agreement with each statement below: 
Security:  
Security refers to protecting the equipment, software, and information gathered or provided 
 by persons using the health kiosk. 
 







1. The information I provide at 
the kiosk is secure due to the 
key fob and password I use 
to get to my account. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The kiosk safely transfers 
my information to the 
University of Pittsburgh. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. The kiosk is placed in a safe 
location. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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4. I trust the kiosk and the 
personnel who work with it.  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I am satisfied with the 
overall security of the kiosk. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The kiosk does a good job of 
protecting my information 
from people who should not 
have it.   
1 2 3 4 5 
7. All my personal information 
at the kiosk is kept safe so 
that people who should not 
see it cannot see it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Privacy:  
Privacy protection is about keeping personal information secret from others.  Confidentiality refers 
to ensuring that only authorized people can view a person’s personal data. Breach of confidentiality 
occurs when a person’s information is viewed or shared with others without that person’s consent. 
A breach of confidentiality is a breach of privacy. 
 







8. The kiosk respects my 
privacy rights when 
obtaining personal 
information. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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9. The kiosk design shows 
concern for the privacy of its 
users. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The kiosk only collects 
personal data from me that 
are necessary. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Using the kiosk does not put 
my privacy at risk. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I feel that it is safe to enter 
my personal information at 
the kiosk. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The kiosk appears to abide 
by personal data protection 
laws. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I am confident that the 
personal information I 
provide at the health kiosk is 
not shared with others 
without my consent. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. The kiosk prevents people 
who should not have my 
1 2 3 4 5 
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personal information from 
accessing it.  
 
16. From the modules listed 
below, rank the ones that you 
believe are extremely private 
(5) to not so private (1) 
     
A. Bladder Health 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Lifestyle 1 2 3 4 5 
C. Sleep 1 2 3 4 5 
D. Patient-Provider 
Communication: 
1 2 3 4 5 
E. Mood 1 2 3 4 5 
F. Mobility and Balance: 1 2 3 4 5 
G. Lifestyle 1 2 3 4 5 
H. Physical activity and  1 2 3 4 5 
I. nutrition 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
17.  Intention to use:   
Refers to a state of mind that drives an individual to use or not to use the kiosk 
 
Do you intend to use the kiosk? 
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Yes☐                           No ☐ 
If you answered no, can you please provide a brief explanation for your answer?  
Questionnaire References: 
(Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006; C.-F. Li, 2013; Lwin, Wirtz, & Williams, 2007; Okazaki, 





APPENDIX E: SCORING OF CHECKLIST FOR MULTI-USER HEALTH KIOSK 
 HIPAA/HITECH Compliance Checklist for Multi-User 
Health Kiosk  
 PRIVACY  Yes  NO  N/A 
Personal Information       
• Is there a privacy policy?  X     
• Does the kiosk have a privacy screen?  X     
• Will user information be shared with third-party 
companies?      X 
• If yes, is there a Business Associate (BA) agreement 
with this company?     
Retention of Personal Information        
• Is user information and e-PHI stored?  X     
• Is there a policy outlining the retention period of e-
PHI? 
  
 X     
• Can users request copies of their Information?      
 X • If yes, is there a well-defined procedure for requesting copies of PHI and other information?     
 CONFIDENTIALITY        
Request of Information       
• Is there a policy for disclosure of e-PHI or identifiable 
information?  X     
 SECURITY  
       
Security Management Process       
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• Is there a well-written procedure or protocol for 
performing a thorough risk assessment?  X     
How many times in a year is a risk assessment 
performed? 
o 0 times in a year? 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
o More than three times a year? 
      
• Is there a formal or informal policy or procedure to 
review information system activities like audit logs, 
access reports incident tracking etc.? 
 X     
• Are current security measures sufficient to reduce risk 
and vulnerabilities to a reasonable level?  X     
Assigned Security Responsibility       
• Do you have a security officer in charge of developing, 
implementing, monitoring and communicating 
HIPAA/HITECH security policies and procedures? 
 X     
Workforce Security       
• Do you have documentation for authorization and 
supervision of all entities working with or helping to 
manage and maintain the kiosk? 
 X     
• Do you have clear job descriptions for all entities 
working with the kiosk?   X     
• Is there documentation listing the level of access to the 
system, including e-PHI for each employee?   X     
• Is there a clear procedure to terminate access to 
resources once a person is removed from the project or 
terminated? 
 X     
Information Access Management       
• Is there a clear written procedure to grant access to e-
PHI?    X   
• Do policies and standards exist to authorize and 
document access, review and modify a user’s right to 
computer systems, software, databases and other 
network resources? 
 X     
• Are users going to pay to use the kiosk system? 
o If so, will a clearinghouse or third party be used to 
process payment? 
 If so, are there policies and procedures for 
access to information, by clearinghouse 
workers, consistent with HIPAA and 
HITECH security rules? 
     X 
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• Are formal or informal policies and procedures in place 
for security measures relating to access control?  X     
• Is there any HIPAA and HITECH security awareness 
and training program in place?    X   
• Are there procedures and measures in place for 
protection from malicious software and exploitation of 
vulnerabilities? 
 X     
• Have employees been trained as to the importance of 
protecting against malicious software and how to guard 
against it? 
     X 
• Are there policies and procedures for log–on 
monitoring and password management?  X     
• Do security training materials target current IT security 
topics relevant to kiosk security?      X 
How often are security procedures, policies and 
protocols updated? 
o 0 times in a year? 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
o More than three times a year? 
      
• Are there any policies and procedures in place to 
identify, respond to, report and mitigate security 
incidents? 
 X     
Contingency Plan       
• Is there a contingency plan in place to identify critical 
applications, data and other operations of the kiosk 
system? 
 X     
• Is there a disaster recovery and backup plan in place to 
restore lost data?  X     
• Is any redundancy built into the kiosk deployment?  X     
• Is there any well-defined policy for operating in 
emergency mode that allows continuation of critical 
business processes? 
 X     
• Are there any policies for testing emergency 
contingency plans or backup procedures?    X   
Evaluation       
• Are there policies in place for evaluating the security 
procedures as they apply to HIPAA/HITECH security 
rules? 
 X     
Business Associate (BA) Contracts       
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• Is there a policy for contracts with Business Associates 
and other third-party vendors?       X 
Physical Security       
• Are there policies in place to analyze physical security 
vulnerabilities of the kiosk system?  X     
• Are there policies in place to guard against physical 
security vulnerabilities and to protect kiosk hardware 
and components that hold e-PHI? 
 X     
• Are there procedures and policies in place to control 
access to kiosk hardware, systems and other 
components by staff, visitors etc. that could 
compromise the kiosk system as a whole? 
 X     
• Are there maintenance records for repairs and 
modification of physical components especially relating 
to security? 
     X 
Computer Component Use       
• Is there other computer hardware, like 
workstations and servers that manage the kiosk 
system? 
 X     
• If yes, are there policies and documentation outlining 
specific workstations and servers and their functions 
and location? 
     X 
• Is there documentation and procedures to identify 
specific functions of each workstation and server?      X 
 Workstation and Server Security        
• Is there any policy or procedure to prevent 
unauthorized access to an unattended workstation or to 
limit the ability of un-authorized persons to access 
other users’ information (analyze physical surroundings 
for physical attributes)?  
 X     
• Are workstations and servers physically restricted to 
limit or restrict access to only authorized people?  X     
  Device and Media Controls       
• Is there any policy for monitoring and tracking the 
location and movement of kiosk hardware (especially 
containing e-PHI)? 
     X 
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  Access Control       
  Integrity   Yes  NO  N/A 
• Is there an access control policy? 
  X     
• Is there an encryption procedure in place to protect e-
PHI?  X     
• If yes, are there any well documented policies 
governing and outlining the encryption strategy?  X     
 Access Control (Continued)       
• Are there any policies to make sure all users are 
assigned unique access credentials, like IDs and 
passwords, to log on to the kiosk system? 
 X     
• Are all users assigned usernames and passwords?  X     
• Is there documentation of each user’s exact privileges 
in the kiosk system (useful to prevent privilege 
escalation)? 
 X     
• Are there clearly defined policies to track changes and 
modifications made within the kiosk system, including 
which users made the changes? 
     X 
• Are there any policies in place to make sure user access 
is reviewed on a periodic basis and how often that is 
done? 
 X     
• Is the system configured to auto-logoff after a 
predetermined time?   X     
•  Is there any documentation and defined policy for this?  X     
• Are there procedures for terminating access when it is 
no longer needed?    X   
   Audit Control        
• Has any audit control been implemented?  X     
• Are there any audit control policies in place?  x     
How often are the audit control tools and mechanisms 
reviewed to determine if upgrades are needed? 
o 0 times in a year? 
o Once a year? 
o Twice a year? 
o Three times a year? 
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APPENDIX F: SCRIPT OF EXPLANATION OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
POLICY STATEMENT FOR STUDY 2 (SAMPLE) 
To protect the information, you provide at the health kiosk and to ensure that the kiosk is 
secure, the following measures are in place: 
1. Rules are being followed from two laws: 
a. the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
b. the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH) 
Explanation to statement 
HIPAA was enacted to protect people data and privacy and was later extended to HITECH 
to give it more bite.  Violation could result in severe penalties (jail time and severe fines). The 
kiosk project is bound by HIPAA and HITECH to take steps to protect your personal data, privacy 
and confidentiality.   
  
2. The Office for Civil Rights enforces the HIPAA and HITECH laws. Its standards and 
audit protocols guide the policies we have in place to protect your security, privacy, and 
confidentiality related to the health kiosk.   
Explanation to statement 
 




Explanation to statement 
This prevents unauthorized people from stealing components like data storage systems that 
might have user information. It also prevents unauthorized people from installing secrete 
devices that can be used to steal personal/sensitive information from the kiosk.  
4. We make every effort to make sure the health kiosk is placed where it would be difficult 
for others to read your information on the screen. 
Explanation to statement 
This is to prevent people from reading other people’s information on the screen of the kiosk 
during kiosk usage. 
5. Every person who uses the health kiosk must access his or her account using a unique key 
fob and password. No kiosk user may access anyone else’s account. 
Explanation to statement 
Each user’s key fob and password are linked to only their personal data, so they cannot 
access another person’s personal information.  Think of it as your bank card. Only you can 
use your bank card and your pin to access your account on an ATM. 
6. No user data is stored at the health kiosk. Instead it is sent directly to a secure computer 
storage system at the University of Pittsburgh. 
Explanation to statement 
This limits access to your personal data in the event of a breach on the kiosk. It also allows 
a copy of your data to be created (backed up) to prevent data loss in the event of any failure 
of a computer component.  
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7. All your responses and measurements obtained at the health kiosk are labeled with a 
unique code number. That way, your private information cannot be linked to your name 
by anyone else using the kiosk.  
Explanation to statement 
All information that is obtained on the kiosk is de-identified (meaning no unauthorized 
people can link that information to you). This ensures that your personal information is 
kept private and confidential.  
8. Information sent in reports to your primary care provider is done only with your 
permission.   
Explanation to statement 
Your approval/ consent will always be sought before any of your information is shared or 
made available to anyone including your primary care physician. 
 
9. Based on the consent you provided to take part in this Health Kiosk Study, members of 
the Health Kiosk Project team may see your kiosk data only for the purposes of the study.  
Explanation to statement 
People working on the project are only allowed to use your personal information only for 
the study and nothing else. 
10. Members our team always keep your information private and secure. 
      Explanation to statement 
The project team are not allowed under any circumstance to share or make your personal 
information available to anyone  
11. Up-to-date antivirus and anti-malware software are always on the kiosk computer system. 
210 
 
Explanation to statement 
Anti-virus and anti-malware software must be kept up-to-date or current. This will prevent 
viruses and hackers from gaining access to the kiosk computer systems. 
12. When a member of our team stops working on the Health Kiosk Project, his or her kiosk 
account is disabled right away.  
Explanation to statement 
This ensures that people who are no longer working on the project do not have access to 
the kiosk computer systems, your personal information and data. 
 
13.  The health kiosk system is regularly checked to ensure that all security, privacy and 
confidentiality policies for the kiosk are being met. 
Explanation to statement 
Periodic audits will be performed to make sure all the security and privacy configurations 
of the kiosk are up-to-date. This will also make sure all employees, and everyone involved in the 
kiosk project are keeping up with the security and privacy requirements of the kiosk. 
14. Data gathered through our health kiosk is backed up daily to prevent data loss in case of 
system failure or natural disaster such as a flood, fire, or power outage. 
Explanation to statement 
A good backup and recovery strategy must be put in place to protect the kiosk data and 
your personal information.  This allows us to have a copy of your personal data just in case 


















GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Terminology Definition 
Availability Information should be available to authorized 
users all the time and in a timely manner 
Bluesnarfing Is the unauthorized access of information from 
a wireless device through a Bluetooth 
connection, often between phones, desktops, 
laptops, and PDAs (personal digital assistant) 
Click Jacking  Is a malicious technique of tricking a Web user 
into clicking on something different from what 
the user perceives they are clicking on, thus 
potentially revealing confidential information 
or taking control of their computer while 
clicking on seemingly innocuous web pages 
Communications Security  ways to protect organizations operations or 
activities 
Communications Security  Protection of medium of communication. 
Examples are encryption, secure transferee 
protocols like HTTPS 
Confidentiality To ensure that only authorized users can view 
the information 
Default accounts  Administrator accounts created to allow initial 
setup and configuration of computer software 
and devices. These accounts are supposed to be 
disabled after initial setup  
External and Internal users External users are like clients who use the 
system and Internal users are like employees  
External Network Vulnerabilities Network vulnerabilities from external sources 
like Hackers, Spammers, viruses, cross site 
scripting and information leakage. 
Integrity Information is legitimate and that no 
authorized or unauthorized person, malicious 
software, has falsely or illegally altered the 
information 
Internal Network Vulnerabilities Network vulnerabilities that come from 
internal sources obsolete network devices and 
software applications, inefficient password 
management, privilege escalation 
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IT Security Policies, Procedures, Practices- 
developing and implementing  
Privacy, acceptable use, Backup (BC)/Disaster 
Recovery (DR) planning and policies 
Logical security  Measures to secure software, computer 
applications, operating systems, databases, 
passwords and other user information. 
Malware Short term for malicious software, it can be 
used to disrupt computer operations, steal 
sensitive information. EG Viruses, Trojan 
horses, rootkits  
Non-repudiation This is to ensure that the origin of the message 
is legitimate.   
Personnel security  Measures taken to protect workers; like having 
security guards and ID cards 
Physical security  Physical mean of protecting computer systems. 
Examples are locks, security guards, 
concealing network and other computer cables. 
Privacy Ability for people to keep their personal 
information secret from others 
Risk ISO 13335 – Information Technology Security 
Techniques defines “risk” as: The potential 
that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities 
of an asset or group of assets and thereby cause 
harm to the organization  
Rootkit  Is a stealthy type of software, typically 
malicious, designed to hide the existence of 
certain processes or programs from normal 
methods of detection and enable continued 
privileged access to a computer system? 
RSE Short form for Reverse Social Engineering. It 
is techniques used to trick a people to provides 
person/ sensitive information  
Servers & PCs Software license management, patch 
management, device security (portable 
security)  
Software Security This include measure to protect software like 
installing anti- malware software like 
antivirus software 
Threat The Oxford Dictionary defines threat (noun) as 
1 a stated intention to inflict injury, damage, or 
other hostile action on someone. 2 a person or 
thing likely to cause damage or danger. 3 the 









NIST SP 800-30 – Risk Management Guide 
for Information Technology Systems – defines 
a vulnerability similarly: A flaw or weakness 
in system security procedures, design, 
implementation, or internal controls that could 
be exercised (accidentally triggered or 
intentionally exploited) and result in a security 
breach or a violation of the system’s security 
policy.  
Weak password  Passwords that do not meet password 
complexity requirements (at least 8 character 
long, include special characters, uppercase and 
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